GAME PRACTICE II EIGHTH SUMMER MEETING ON GAME THEORY July 19-21, 2000 Valencia Spain |
PROGRAMME
(Also available in PDF here)
WEDNESDAY, 19 July
9.00 to 10 Registration
10,15 to 11,30 Parallel Sessions
A: Complexity and Games (Chair: Gossner, O.)
Hernandez,
P. and Urbano, A.
Pseudorandom Processes: Entropy and Automata
Hernandez,
P., Urbano, A and Vila, J.
The
Complexity of a Strategy
Gossner,
O.
Sharing
a Long Secret in a Few Public Words
B: Applied Game Theory I (Chair: Sempere, J.J.)
Van Tassel, E.
Product
Quality under Confidential Pricing
Moner. R. , Sempere,
J.J. and Urbano,A.
Equilibrium
Distribution System under Retailer's Strategic Behavior.
Sempere, J.J, Moner, R. and
Urbano,A.
Product Quality and Distribution Channels
C: CORE (Chair: Stefanescu, A.)
Borm, P., Calleja, P. Hamers,
H y Klijn, F.
On
the Balancedness of a Multi Machine Sequencing Game
Levinsky, R.
Balanced
Solutions for TU-Games
Stefanescu, A
On
the Structure of the Core of Balanced Games.
D: GP-I: Cost-Sharing Models (Chair: García-Jurado, I.)
Llorca, N., Meca, A., Molina,
E., Pulido, M. and Sánchez-Soriano, J.
Sharing the Cost of an Educational Network in Alicante Province
Llorca, N., Pulido, M. and
Sánchez-Soriano, J.
Why
not to use Game Theory?
Garcia, M.D., and Garcia-Jurado,
I.
Cooperation
in Queuing Models
11,30 to 12 Coffee Break
12 to 13,30 OPENING PLENARY SESSION Chair: A. Urbano
Ehud Kalai
Strategic Polarization (joint with Adam Kalai)
13,30 to 15,30 Lunch
15,30 to 16,45 Invited Sessions
A: Bargaining I (Organizer: Clara Ponsatí)
Ponsatí, C.
Search and Bargaining in Simple Markets
Cardona, D.
Multilateral Bargaining under Proportional Rules
Cunyat, A, Olcina., G. and
Calabuig, V.
Commitment
and Choice of Partners in a Negotiations with a Deadline
B: Social Choice (Organizer: Salvador Barberá)
Barbera, S.
Some
Dynamical Aspects in Social Choice
Berga, D., Bergantiños,
G., Massó, J. and Neme, A.
Voting
by Committees with Exit.
16.45 to 17,15 Coffee Break
17,15 to 19 Parallel Sessions
A: Topics in Non-Cooperative Games I (Chair: Radzik, T.)
Keiding, H. and Abdou, J.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Strong Solvability of Games Forms
Hansen, M. and Vermeulen,
D.
Computation
of Strictly Perfect Equilibria
Fernandez Saez, M.J,
Zoroa, N. And Zoroa, P.
On a Ruckle Problem in Discrete Games of Ambush
Radzik, T.
Equilibria
in Constrained Matrix Games
B: Auctions (Chair: Orzach, R.)
Corbella, T.
Declining
Price Anomaly and Discrimination in Multiunit Auctions
Gavious. A. and Sela, A.
Auctions
with Bounds
Orzach, R., Einy , E. and
Sela, A.
Dominance
Solvability of Second Price Auctions with Differential Observations
C: NTU Games (Chair: Calvo, E..)
Rafels, C. And Vilella, M.
Average Monotonic Games with Non-Transferable Utility
Orshan, G., Valenciano, F.
And Zarzuelo, J.M.
The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, The Core and NTU Bankruptcy
Bergantiños, G., and
Masso, J.
The
Chi-compromise Value for Non Transferable Utility Games
Calvo, E. and Peters, H.
Cardinal-Ordinal
Invariance Solutions
D: GP-II European Union (Chair: Bilbao, J.M.)
Laruelle, A. and Valenciano,
F.
Inequality
in the Distribution of Power among the EU Citizens, 1958-1995
Lewinsky, R. and Soukenik,
A.
Bicameral
System for the Enlarged EU: A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Redistribution
of Power in the European Decision-Making
Bilbao, J.M., Fernandez,
J.R, Jimenez, N. And Lopez, J.J.
Voting
Power in the European Union Star Game.
THURSDAY, 20 July
9,00 to 10,15 Parallel Sessions
A: Evolutionary Games (Chair: Arce, D.)
Haller,
H., Baron, R., Durieu, J. and Solal, P.
Control
Costs and Potential Functions for Spatial Games
Possajennikov,
A.
Evolution of Preferences in 2X2 Symmetric Games.
Arce,
D.
The
Evolution of Heterogeneity in Biodiversity and Environmental Regimes
B: Voting Games. (Chair: Valenciano, F.)
Bugarin,
M.
Vote
Splitting, Reelection and Electoral Control: A Unified Model.
Montero,
M. and Morelli, M.
Stable Demands in Majority Games
Valenciano,
F. and Laruelle, A.
Power
Indices and the Veil of Ignorance
C: TU Games I. (Chair: Driessen, T.)
Izquierdo,
J.M. and Llerena, F.
Priority
Methods for TU Cooperative Games.
Norde, H.W.
Information
Sharing Games..
Driessen,
T. and Meinhardt, H.
Convexity and Average-Convexity of Common Pool TU Games
D: GP-III Environmental Models. (Chair: Patrone, F.)
Okada.
A.
A Cooperative Game Analysis of CO2 Emission Permits Trading:
Evaluating Initial Allocation Rules.
Imai,
H.
Some
Incentives Issues in the Clean Development Mechanism for the Global Warming
Problem
Patrone,
F.
Cost Allocation Problems Related with Waste Collection and Disposal.
10,15 to 10,45 Coffee Break
10,45 to 12 Invited Sessions
A: Cooperative Games (Organizer: Carles Rafels)
Rafels, C.
Cooperative
Games: The State of the Art.
Bilbao, J.M.
Dual
Games on Combinatorial Structures
Nuñez, M. and Rafels,
C.
Reduced Marginal Worth Vector and the Core of Assignment Games
B: Experimental Game Theory (Organizer: Jordi Brandts)
Brandts, J. and Charness,
G.
Do
Market Conditions Affect Preferences? Evidence from Experimental Markets
with Excess Supply and Excess Demand.
Cooper, D.J. and Kagel,
J.H.
Transfer
in Signalling Games
12.P.M. PLENARY SESSION Chair: F. Patrone
Eyal Winter
Scapegoats and Optimal Allocations of Responsibility
13,30 to 15,30 Lunch
15,30 to 16,45 Parallel Sessions
A: Correlation and Communication (Chair: Koessler, F.)
Fiestras-Janeiro,
G. and Garcia-Jurado, I.
Proper
Solution and Correlated Equilibrium
Koessler,
F.
Strategic Communication in Games with Incomplete and Certifiable Information.
B: Information and Games. (Chair: Weinschelbaum, F.)
Dimitri,
N.
Efficiency and Equilibrium in the Electronic Mail Game: The General Case.
Escriche,
L., Olcina, G. and Sánchez, R.
Education
and Job Assignment: A Signalling Model.
Weinschelbaum,
F. and Tommasi, M.
The
Threat of Insurance
C: Large Games. (Chair: Rosenmuller, J.)
Ekes,
M.
General
Elections Modelled with Infinitely Many Voters
Malawski,
M.
"Oceanic"
Probabilistic Values.
Rosenmuller,
J.
The Endogenous Formation of Cartels in Large Markets
D: GP-IV Topics in Game Practice (Chair: Borm, P.)
Mas-Mañez, X.
Leader-Follower Equilibria in a Two-Stage Model
Catilina, E.
Information
Acquisition Games in Cournot Oligopolistic Markets: A Three Stage Approach.
Borm, P.
On
Evaluating the Graph Competition
16.45 to 17,15 Coffee Break
!7,15 to 18,30 PLENARY SESSION Chair: Y. Tauman
Pradeep Dubey
Competitive Prizes: When Less Scrutiny Induces
More Effort
FRIDAY, 21 July
9,00 to 10,15 Parallel Sessions
A: Bargaining II (Chair: Rusinowska, A..)
Potters, J. and Sudholter, P.
The semi-reactive bargaining set
Flamini,
F.
Two-Player Bargaining Games with Continuation Game Dependent from the Initial
Agreement
Rusinowska,
A.
Bargaining
Model with Preferences Described by Sequences of Discount Rates and Sequences
of Bargaining Costs
B: Applied Game Theory II. (Chair: Filipovich, D.)
Harrison,
C.
Collusion
and Dynamic Perfect Competition
Meca,
A., Timmer, J., Garcia-Jurado , I. and Borm, P.
Inventory Games
Filipovich,
D.
Choosing one's Identity
C: TU-Games II (Chair: Veldman, L.)
Sales,
J. , Izquierdo J.M. and Rafels, C.
Cost
Allocation in Library Consortia
Tijs, S.,
Llorca, N., Timmer, J. , M. and Sánchez-Soriano, J.
Balancedness of Semi-Infinite Discrete Transportation Games
Veldman,
L.
Representation
of Multi-Level Games
D: GP-V Political Science Models I (Chair: Ball, M.)
Carreras, F. and Freixas, J.
Semivalue
Versatility and Application
Bodo,
P.
An
Evolutionary Game for the Analysis of the Russian Economic Transition
Kim,
H.
Sequential
Crisis Bargaining
Ball,
M. A..
How
Coalitional Theory Overcomes the Problem of the Bicameral Postulate for
Voting Games
10,15 to 10,45 Coffee Break
10,45 to 12 Parallel Sessions
A: Topics in Non-Cooperative
Games II (Chair: Arribas, I.)
Arribas, I. and Urbano,
A.
Repeated
Games with Probabilistic Horizon
B: Experimental Game Theory II (Chair: Ponti, G.)
Broseta, B., Fatas,
E. and Neugebauer, T.
Forward
Induction and equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision
Points: An Experimental Study.
Peñarrubia, C., Olcina,
G. and Fatas, E.
Specific Investment and Coordination Failures.
Gantner, A., Montgomery,
R. and Ponti, G.
Solomon´s
Dilemma: an Experimental Study on Dynamic Implementation.
C: Simple Games and Topics in Game Theory (in Spanish) (Chair: Llongueras, M.)
Sales-i-Ingles, V.
Función
característica múltiple
Amer. R. and Gimenez, J.M.
Indistinguishable Games by Semivalues
Amer. R. and Gimenez, J.M.
An
Axiomatic Characterization of the Banzhaf Solution for Games with Coalition
Structures
Llongueras i Arola,
M. and Magaña Nieto, A.
Optimum
Cuota in R-Majority Simple Games.
D: Coalition Formation (Chair: Olaizola, N.)
Revilla,
P. and Alcalde, J.
Strategy-Proofness
and the Coalition Formation Problem
Iñarra,
E., Kuipers, J. and Olaizola, N.
The
Absorbing Sets Solutions in Coalition Formation Systems
12 to 13.30 PLENARY SESSION Chair: G. Olcina
Thomas R. Palfrey
The quantal response approach to equilibrium in games: theory and experiments.
13,30 to 15,30 Lunch
15,30 to 16,45 Parallel Sessions
A.: Topics in Cooperative Games (Chair: Erauskin, A.)
Klijn, F. and Massó,
J.
Weak
Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model.
Sotomayor, M.
The
Strategy Structure of the College Admissions Stable Mechanisms.
Arín, J. , Kuipers,
J. and Vermeulen , D.
Some
characterizations of Egalitarian Solutions on Classes of TU-Games.
Erauskin, A. and Arín
,J.
Egalitarian
Allocations and Cost Games.
B: TU-Games III (Chair: Algaba, E.)
Rossi, G.
Axiomatizations of Value-Functions for Communication Situations
Branzei, R., Tijs, S. and
Timmer, J.
Transmission
of Knowledge in a Cooperative Environment
Algaba. E., Bilbao, J.M.
and Fernandez, JR.
On
the Complexity of Computing the Myerson Value by Dividends
C: GP-VI Political Science Models II. (Chair: Gambarelli, G.)
Sacconi, L.
A Game Theoretical Model for Developing Company Codes of Ethics
Alonso, J.M.
A
New Power Index for Games for a Coalition Structure
Bertini, C., Gambarelli,
G. and Stach-Janas, I.
Values
and Algorithms for N-person Games
16,45 to 17,15 Coffe Break
17,15 PLENARY SESSION Chair: I. García-Jurado
Stef Tijs
Cooperative Game Theory with an Open Eye Outside
The talk On a Ruckle Problem in Discrete Games of Ambush by Fernandez Saez, M.J, Zoroa, N. And Zoroa, P, changes from Topics in Non-Cooperative Games II to Topics in Non-Cooperative Games I
In Bargaining II there is a new talk:
The semi-reactive bargaining set by
Potters, J. and Sudholter, P.