GREEK PERCEPTIONS OF THE "EUROPEAN 9/11"
Costs in lives vs. costs to democracy

Papastamou, S.- Prodromitis,G.- Iatridis,T.
Panteion University, Athens.

RESUMEN	ABSTRACT
Nosotros defendemos que el ataque del 11 marzo de 2004 en Madrid fue un hecho que enmarcó distintos aspectos de las relaciones de autoridad e influencia, que son instrumentos para la percepción y el tratamiento ideológico de los fenómenos de violencia terrorista. En primer lugar presentamos un experimento, que se llevó a cabo en Grecia justo después del ataque, dónde se manipularon: a) la víctima del ataque (vidas humanas o democracia, b) la naturaleza de la implicación del Gobierno de Aznar con la guerra en Irak y c) la racionalidad de de la organización terrorista responsable del ataque. Las variables dependientes incluyeron la percepción de los terroristas, los derechos humanos y las interpretaciones de la actividad terrorista. Un segundo estudio investiga la afinidad política y la identidad izquierda o derecha de las interpretaciones del hecho, se describen los resultados. Estos confirman, en parte, las concepciones clásicas de la diferencia entre la izquierda y la derecha en su posicionamiento ideológico, pero estas concepciones son más amplias cuando se examinan las interpretaciones del terrorismo, sugiriendo así un modelo más diferenciado.	We argue that the 11 March 2004 bombing attacks in Madrid were an event that encapsulates several components in the relations of authority and influence that are instrumental for the reception and ideological treatment of phenomena of terrorist violence. First, we present an experiment that was carried out in Greece straight after the attack, where a) the victim of the attack (human lives or democracy itself), b) the nature of the Aznar Government's involvement with the war in Iraq and c) the "rationale" of the terrorist organization responsible for the attack were manipulated. Dependent variables included subjects' perceptions of terrorists, human rights and interpretations of terrorist activity. Second, we report on the results of a survey wherein political affinity and *left* or *right* identity of the event's interpretations were further examined. The results partially confirmed classical conceptions of *Left-wing-Right-wing* differences in terms of their ideological anchoring, yet they expand these conceptions by suggesting a more diverse pattern when interpretations of terrorism are examined.

Key words: terrorism, political affiliation, authority and influence, human rights, social justice

As government authorities, public opinion, and the scientific community face the actual impact and significance of terrorist acts –or the use of violence for political purposes generally– several dimensions of community life constitution and ideological investment become involved.

To begin with an utter moral disgust and intense emotional outrage is registered in the face of violent terrorist acts that create human victims. Through the activation of a mechanism of *secondary victimization* (Schmid, 1992) members of a community against which acts of violence have been perpetrated causing human victims, identify with the actual victims and, on the basis of common categorizations, develop negative affects (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, Gordijn, 2003; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, Wigboldus, 2002), which form a substrate predisposing towards action that is aimed at decreasing fear and regaining a sense of order, control, and security.

The *natural* consequences or side-effects of this type of socio-cognitive process include the tension of inter-group confrontation that arises in bystanders of terrorist acts, along with the actuation of negative stereotypes or prejudice against the perpetrators, and the emergence of nationalist tendencies, (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirklands and Lyon, 1990; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon and Breus, 1994; Schimel, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Waxmonski and Arndt, 1999; Johnson, 1994). The construction of the other's image as a hostile entity, in tandem with the figuration of a one-dimensional ethnocentric identity for oneself, and the imperativeness of restoring equity, all become the basis for legitimizing the violent reaction that seeks to punish and wreak vengeance on the perpetrators-violators of the vital aspects of a normal and secure existence (Berkowitz, 1993; Tedeschi and Felson, 1994; Crocker, Major and Steele, 1998; Tyler and Smith, 1998).

At the extreme opposite end, within the worldview of terrorist groups, one can detect the active part played by a subjective sense of injustice, as the driving force in the perpetration of violent acts, with an ostensible aim of redressing justice. The needfulness of identifying such a sense of injustice as the central ideological strand, motive for action, and reason for choosing to engage in specific violent activities, is in fact raised by a number of researchers. They point to the urgency of engaging in a more valid critical approach by widening a focus that had been rather one-dimensional and limitative in its investigation of the psychological profile of terrorists, and by departing from an ideological one-sidedness that had sought to account for terrorist activity solely in terms of clinical psychopathology (Silke, 2004, 1998; Crenshaw, 2000; Sprinzak, 1990, 1991). The need of the social sciences to comprehend the worldview of terrorist individuals and groups is linked with the urgency of making an approach towards, and analysis of the ideological constructs that elicit the terrorists' reaction to

brutal governmental and institutional violence or repression: the *just cause* for their perpetration of violent acts.

The vindication of violence as a *natural* reaction to the violent conduct of *the other side*, whether as punishment of terrorists or as exercise of terrorist violence against an authoritarian and repressive regime, forcefully raises the issue of its procedural legitimacy (Tyler, 1997) but also the legitimization of such a rationale and its consequences on the symbolic-ideological plane. It involves a multidimensional socio-cognitive elaboration, of the social subject that is enmeshed in affective reactions, ideological schematizations and identification processes, which in their empirical aspect correspond to phenomena such as: the gradual breaking free from moral reservations in order to ensure that the violent attacker is actually punished (Bandura, 1990, 1999) who, on the symbolic plane, is in fact divested of humanity (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin and Rodriguez-Perez, 2000; Strutch and Schwartz, 1989), b) the differential appraisal of the nature and extent of the consequences of violence (Healy, Hoffman, Beer and Burne, 2002) and c) its value investment as a practice, which occasionally serves the manifestation of diverse values such as social justice, safety/security, and emancipation (Braud, 2004).

All the above delineate a more general dispute regarding the political function of violence: a dispute that revolves around cardinal considerations, i.e.: the *repressive* or *liberating* function of violence; safeguarding its formal legitimacy and its ideological legitimization under the light of investigating the relation between purported objectives and the means employed to achieve them.

In other words, an issue is posed here that has long occupied social theory, not to mention philosophical and political thought, in respect of whether or not conflict is to be resorted to, in order to regulate human coexistence. In the context of this debate, the ascription of meaning to, and the evaluation of political violence emerges as a crucial gamble, in view of the wide acceptance, *in abstracto* at least, gained by the model of democratic dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes (Russett, 1993; for a discussion of the philosophical issues at stake see Arendt, 1969). Within the context of bourgeois liberal democracy the population or the people are the central component of the field of mutual interaction, to the degree that it constitutes the collective subject, in whose name violence is resorted to, and on whose assent the legitimization of the use of violence with political content ultimately depends.

The ideological activity and conduct of a population, regarded variously as *Public Opinion* and as the *electorate*, constitutes –beyond what is

at stake in terms of political activity– the main object of study of Social Psychology, especially the kind of Social Psychology that aspires to contribute to an understanding of the ideological mechanisms and socio-cognitive processes that come into play in the legitimization of political violence. A socio-psychological investigation of the content, texture, and outcome of such complex socio-cognitive innervation of the population should be undertaken under a perspective that links a variety of analytical planes (intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-group and ideological, see Doise, 1982); it should focus on real contexts of interaction between authority –population– organised groups in pursuit of confrontational claims (Papastamou, 1979; Mugny, 1982), and, in research terms, it should utilise diverse components in empirical event and field morphology.

The 11 March 2004 bombing attacks on the railway stations of Atocha, Santa Eugenia, and El Pozo were just such an event, where one could detect several components in the relations of authority and influence that are instrumental for the reception and ideological treatment of phenomena of terrorist violence. Several aspects of those events, also of the debates and repercussions they incurred, attract our interest from a socio-psychological vantage point: using them for research purposes may prove especially fruitful. Aspects such as the intense emotional reaction that was occasioned by the violent killing of 200 persons and the injuries sustained by another 1500; the Aznar government blaming ETA; distrust towards official explanations; the attack's connection with the Aznar government's contribution to the war in Iraq, despite mounting reaction coming from practically the entire spectrum of public opinion in Spain; there being no rally effect around the leader (otherwise so commonly observed in times of national crisis or sudden external attack: see for instance Schubert, Stewart and Curran, 2002); the gradual loss of confidence in Aznar as a person; finally the unexpected reversal of the election outcome in favour of the PSOE, all signify that this terrorist attack was invested with meaning not only in respect of its violence and high cost in terms of human life, but also for its catalytic effect on the modalities of the relationship between authority and the population. Indeed, as became evident through the concatenation of actual events, the attack had a direct effect on the electoral outcome, and the development of political affairs in Spain generally.

In order to investigate the reception and treatment of events, we initially looked into the role of certain focalisations upon the main parameters of the actual situation after the blow. We used experimental field research methodology to look into the interactions of three specific dimensions: a) the victim of the attack, b) the nature of Aznar government's involvement

with the war in Iraq, and c) the concomitant *rationale* of the terrorist or-
ganization responsible for the attack, *illuminating* them in each instance in
a certain fashion, so that varying descriptions of the overall event might
unlock distinct dynamics of ideological treatment.

For the second stage, we conducted a survey of a representative sample
of Greek population, in which political affinity and *left* or *right* identity of
the event's interpretations were examined, along with the more generalised
significations of terrorism as a term, with regard to its phenomenology,
rationales for dealing with it, and its explanations in social thought.

The main purpose of this combinative research approach was to set
down and weigh as many aspects as possible of the socio-psychological
reception of events of political violence, in a way that would transcend the
patently obvious in *matter-of-course* reactions of moral outrage, and reveal,
so far as this is possible, certain latent mechanisms in the ideological opera-
tion of social thinking, that are always put in motion at the moment when
specific type events occur.

The Experiment

Data for the experiment was collected some days after 11 March, spe-
cifically in the period from 17 to 23 March. As previously stated, our ex-
perimental investigation of a terrorist attack's reception was based on the
combinative presentation to the participants of three main issues (victim of
attack, nature of Aznar government's involvement with the war in Iraq, and
concomitant rationale of the terrorist organization responsible for the at-
tack), under a particular illumination and signification in each instance. The
victims are held to be either the *human lives that perished,* or *democracy
itself*, that suffered a blow as the terrorist attack changed the electoral out-
come, and thus *falsified* popular will, or, at any rate, exerted undue influ-
ence upon it. *The nature of Aznar government's involvement with the war
in Iraq,* is presented half of the time as *active military support of U.S. ex-
pansionist policies*, while for the remainder it is described as *active military
support to the U.S. and G.W. Bush in the fight against international terror-
ism. The root cause of the terrorist attack* is presented to all participants as
being the military involvement of the Aznar Government. However to half
of the participants, *this involvement is presented as the pretext or alibi used
by the terrorist organization for unleashing its terrorist attack,* while to the
other half, this same *involvement is presented as having caused the under-
standable rage of the terrorist organization thus occasioning the terrorist
attack as a means of punishing the Aznar Government.*

Method

Experimental Design and Participants

Eight different versions of the event arise from the combination of the three issues wherein the responsibility of Premier Aznar grows or diminishes, the *rationale* of the terrorist attack varies, and the chief victim is differentiated. Each of the eight different scenarios describing the terrorist attack constitutes the experimental stimulus in a 2 (human victims / democracy as the victim) x 2 (support of U.S. imperialist policies / military assistance to fight international terrorism) x 2 (military involvement serves as pretext for terrorists / military involvement is reason to mete out punishment through the terrorist attack) experimental design distributed to the subjects. One hundred sixty five (165) participants (87 male and 78 female, with an average age of 16.58 years and SD of 0.94 years) were allocated to the eight experimental conditions.

Procedure

Initially all respondents answered on bipolar 7-point scales, regarding the degree to which terrorism, in their opinion, constitutes *a political crime or an ordinary criminal offence* (M = 3.43 SD = 1.98), the degree to which it is *an act possessed of or lacking any political motivation* (M = 2.82 SD = 1.87) and the degree to which it is *excusable or indefensible* (M = 4.78 SD = 2.08). Since the third item displayed a tendency toward distortion within the context of the interaction between the nature of military involvement with the rationale of the terrorist attack in response to it (F 1/163 = 2.80, p<096) it was used as a covariate in all analyses.

Subsequently, and depending on the experimental condition, the participants read the text presenting the event and were asked to express the degree of their agreement (on a 7-point scale where 1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree).

After expressing their degree of personal agreement, respondents were asked to describe somebody who would support the view of the terrorist attack reflected in the stimulus text. On 10-point bipolar scales, respondents had to describe purported supporters as Left-wing – Right-wing, anti-terrorist - pro-terrorist, conservative - progressive, defenders – enemies of Democracy, defenders – enemies of Human Rights, pursuing their personal – the collective interest.

The next measure concerned whether to deprive the perpetrators of the terrorist attack of their human rights, in the event of their arrest. Out of a list of fourteen fundamental rights, respondents had to choose up to eight

rights that, in their view, should be withheld in the event that the perpetrators of the Madrid terrorist attacks were to be arrested.

The final measure concerned a general explanation of terrorist activity. Respondents were asked to state (on a 6-point bipolar scale) whether *ideology or psychological make-up* was the aspect that best explained why certain people engage in terrorist activity.

Results
Agreement with stimulus text

To begin with, a trend of increased agreement (F1/164 = 3.319, p<.07) emerges under versions of the event that stress the existence of human victims (M=5.405, against M=5.000 when Democracy is considered the victim of the attack): this fact expresses how bystanders of terrorist acts experience increased involvement that is based on their affective excitation, caused by the existence of innocent victims.

Table 1
Means of agreement with the text describing the terrorist attack in Madrid.
Number of subjects and standard deviations in parentheses.
(7-point scale: 1=totally disagree, 7=totally agree)

	IMPERIALISM	FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
PRETEXT	(n =44) 4.841 (1.90)	(n =40) 5.450 (1.28)
PUNISHMENT	(n =40) 5.450 (1.43)	(n =41) 5.073 (1.50)

Furthermore the degree of agreement with each version of the terrorist attack that we presented varied because of the interaction of the *nature of involvement* of the Aznar government with the concomitant rationale of the terrorists (F1/164 = 4.867, p<.028): greater agreement (cf. table 1) was secured by presenting the terrorist act as the outcome of the *handle* -pretext provided to the perpetrators by Aznar's active participation in the *fight against terror* (M = 5.450) and also by presenting it *as justified punishment for active military support offered by the Spanish Premier to U.S. expansionist policies* (M = 5.450). In this second instance, we might perhaps detect a tendency towards an indirect acceptance of the terrorist rationale as a means for retributive justice while the version that has the terrorist attack resulting from the alibi provided by Aznar's participation in the international war on terror seems to be credited as a realistically acceptable natural reaction of one embroiled party against the other.

Supporter's description of each version of the terrorist attack in Madrid

In what is now a classic question, regarding the image that is formed of the source of a message (in our case the alternative variant accounts of the terrorist attack in Madrid) some answers may be inferred as to how the politico-ideological identity of the presumed supporters of each variant is perceived. Factorial analysis into major components with varimax rotation of attributes describing the supporters of each account of the terrorist attack in Madrid (cf. table 2) provides two dimensions of reception: one that describes the presumed supporter as the exponent of a politically non-correct discourse and one that regards him as progressive–pro-terrorist.

Table 2
Principal component factor analysis (with varimax rotation) of attributes describing the supporters of each account of the terrorist attack in Madrid * (10-point bipolar scales)

	Component		
	Exponents of politically «non-correct» discourse	Progressive – Pro-terrorist	M
Defenders – Enemies of Democracy	.865		5.38
Defenders – Enemies of Human Rights	.842		5.29
Pursuing their Personal- Pursuing the Collective interest	-.750		4.88
Anti-terrorist – Pro-terrorist	.626	.496	5.37
Conservative – Progressive		.877	5.46
Left-wing – Right-wing			5.75
Eigenvalue	*2.485*	*1.121*	
% of explained variance	*41.410*	*18.676*	

    * loadings <.40 are omitted

Given that the attribute anti-terrorist–pro-terrorist weighs positively in both factors and does not correlate in any statistically significant manner with the dimension conservative–progressive ($r = 0.122$ ns), it was included under the first factor: after reversing the scale in the attribute "pursuing their personal – pursuing the collective interest" the index was calculated overall ($a = 0.790$) and proved sensitive to experimental manipulation.

Table 3

Means of perceptions of the supporter of each account of the terrorist attack in Madrid, as an exponent of politically *non-correct* discourse ("an enemy of democracy and of human rights", "in pursuit of personal interest" and "pro-terrorist"). Number of subjects and standard deviations in parentheses (10-point scale, where 10 equals maximum attribute)

	IMPERIALISM	WAR ON TERROR
HUMAN VICTIMS		
PRETEXT	(n =21) 6.666 (2.15)	(n =19) 4.802 (1.73)
PUNISHMENT	(n =20) 5.025 (2.59)	(n =19) 4.921 (2.95)
DEMOCRACY AS VICTIM		
PRETEXT	(n =23) 5.583 (2.55)	(n =21) 6.373 (2.20)
PUNISHMENT	(n =20) 6.200 (2.04)	(n =22) 4.466 (1.58)

Two main effects were produced, one in respect of the ostensible rationale behind the terrorist attack ($F1/164 = 3.754$, $p<.054$) and one in respect of the nature of the Aznar government's involvement in the war in Iraq ($F1/164 = 3.815$, $p<.052$). There is a tendency thus manifested of politico-ideological repudiation of the presentation of the terrorist attack as resulting from the alibi offered to the terrorists through the Aznar government's involvement in the war in Iraq ($M = 5.875$) by contrast to the version where the attack is presented as that government's justified punishment ($M = 5.138$). Also, the description of the attack as a reaction to Aznar's active contribution to American imperialist aspirations is received as the expression of a political discourse that is politically not-correct ($M = 5.868$) in comparison with the attack's description as a reaction to Aznar's active involvement in the war against terror ($M = 5.146$). On a moral-political level therefore, the existence of less depreciated versions is indicated (*the terrorist attack constitutes Aznar's justified punishment* and *Aznar's involvement was his active participation in the war against terror*) as well as of more depreciated versions (*the terrorist attack was carried out on the strength of the pretext – alibi provided by Aznar's active involvement* and *Aznar's involvement was an active contribution to U.S. imperialist aspirations*) a fact that is moot, to the degree that an emphasis of spe-

cific dimensions in its description occasions different ideological – political treatments.

The three-way interaction of the dimensions under which the terrorist attack is presented (F1/164 = 9.471, p<.002) illuminates in greater detail the ideological – political hue of the several versions, showing also the effect resulting from focusing on the concept of the victim of the terrorist attack (cf. table 3). Thus when the existence of human victims becomes manifest, the version in which *Aznar's contribution to U.S. imperialist aspirations offers an alibi to the terrorists*, constitutes an object of moral and political depreciation (M = 6.666, given that it is deemed that anyone propounding such a view generates discourse that is politically not-correct and is thus deemed to be an enemy of democracy and of human rights, in pursuit of mere personal interest and pro-terrorist) to a far greater degree, both in the version wherein Aznar's contribution to U.S. imperialist aspirations causes his justified punishment at the hands of the terrorists (M = 5.025) and also in the version in which Aznar's participation in the war against terror functions as a pretext for the terrorists' act (M = 4.802).

It is apparently the exact opposite dynamic that prevails in the case where emphasis is lent to the view that the real victim of the terrorist attacks is democracy, given that the incitement, offered as a pretext to the terrorists, of Aznar's contribution to U.S. imperialist aspirations, has the tendency of producing weaker deprecatory assessments (M = 5.583, always in terms of a pro-terrorist, individualist, anti-democratic and anti-humanitarian rationale) than in the case of like incitement, serving again as pretext, due –this time– to Aznar's participation in the war against terror (M = 6.373) or also in the case that Aznar's contribution has caused his justified punishment in the hands of the terrorists (M = 6.200). Finally, it is interesting to note that the greater moral and political approbation found amongst the versions that present democracy as the substantive victim of the terrorist attacks, is given to the one maintaining that Aznar's participation in the war against terror caused the justified punishment meted out by the terrorists (M = 4.466).

Depriving the perpetrators of the terrorist attack of their human rights in the event of their arrest

Findings from measuring willingness to deprive the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks of their human rights may perhaps enlighten us further in respect of the nature and intensity of the ideological-political treatment released by each account of the terrorist attack. To begin with, we know that despite protestations of adherence to human rights –couched in rather

general terms– the deprivation of a certain content of rights (on a symbolic or actual plane) comes as a result of the process of focusing on specific fields, in which conflict is entailed between opposing social polarities, while a sense that collective injustice has been suffered also emerges (Doise, Spini and Clemence, 1999; Doise, 2001).

In this particular instance, the apparent willingness to withhold rights is focused solely and exclusively on excluding the terrorists from the domain of public communication (sixth factor derived from the principal component factor analysis, cf. table 4) and this under certain circumstances, which are determined by the different modalities of *shedding light* on the terrorist attack in Madrid, as becomes apparent in the statistically significant interaction of our three independent variables (cf. table 5, F1/164 = 7.763, p<.006).

Table 4

Principal component factor analysis (with varimax rotation) of human rights that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Madrid should be deprived of in the event of their arrest *

	Component					
	Political rights	Individual civil rights	Equitable treatment before the law	Individual rights before law enforcement authorities	Rights of a personal psychosomatic nature	Exclusion from public communication fora
Right to vote	.876					
Right to stand for office	.841					
Freedom of opinion – expression		.737				
Right to education – training		.731				
Equity before the law		.567				
Right to a fair trial			.780			
Right to defence in court			.719			
Protection from arbitrary arrest				.749		
Protection from intrusions into private life				.698		
Protection from property deprivation					-.671	

Protection from torture					.641	
Protection from attacks against human dignity					.513	
Privacy of correspondence – telephone conversations						.779
Right to seek – propagate ideas						.714
Eigenvalue	1.649	1.553	1.521	1.495	1.292	1.229
% of explained variance	11.781	11.092	10.862	10.681	9.229	8.777

* loadings <.40 are omitted

Table 5

Mean factorial scores of the sixth factor, comprising the rights of access to a public communication forum (the "+" sign corresponds to an increased willingness to deprive the perpetrators of the terrorist attack of those specific rights, in the course of an eventual arrest). Number of subjects and standard deviations in parentheses

HUMAN VICTIMS		
	IMPERIALISM	WAR ON TERROR
PRETEXT	(n =21) 0.218 (0.95)	(n =19) -0.222 (1.03)
PUNISHMENT	(n =20) -0.390 (0.80)	(n =19) 0.256 (0.99)
DEMOCRACY AS VICTIM		
PRETEXT	(n =23) -0.249 (1.22)	(n =21) 0.287 (0.84)
PUNISHMENT	(n =20) 0.037 (1.06)	(n =22) 0.025 (0.93)

We realise indeed that along general lines the conditions constituting an object of relatively increased moral and political disapprobation are those in which there is a more marked willingness to withhold rights that touch on the terrorists' access to the public sphere of communication. An exception is noted in the situation wherein *Aznar's participation in the war on terror caused a just punishment to be meted out by the terrorists that had the consequence of producing human victims* which even though it constitutes the object of reduced moral and political disapprobation (cf. table 4) does provoke, in the social subject, an intense desire to exclude the terrorists from having access to a forum of public communication. Such an ap-

parent asymmetry or contradiction with the remaining findings may eventually be accounted for on the basis of the different ways in which subjects understand the root causes that determine whether or not a given individual will show a tendency to resort to terrorist activity.

Ideology vs. psychological attributes as the explicatory dimension of the manifestation of terrorist activity

Indeed the following can be observed (cf. results of three-way interaction in table 6, where $F1/164 = 4.869$, $p<.028$): a) as regards the conditions where the humanity of the terrorist attack's victims is underscored, the conditions that bring about an increased willingness to prevent terrorists from communicating in a public forum are those in which there is a prevalent sense that terrorist activity has ideological underpinnings: by contrast when the opportunity for the terrorists to access the sphere of public communication remains unrestricted, a psychology based explication of terrorist activity is prevalent (Papastamou, 1986); b) in respect of the account wherein democracy is presented as the main victim of the terrorist attack in Madrid, the developing socio-psychological dynamic before the specific event appears even more complicated, given that in one instance the marked willingness to deprive terrorists of free access to the public sphere seems to be due to a generalised ideological reductionism of terrorist activity, whereas in the other it is due to an equally overwhelming psychological reductionism. It may thus be supposed that, in themselves, the results in respect of depriving the perpetrators of the terrorist attack of their specific human rights, and always considering the democratic regime to have been the victim, may be accounted for through two dissimilar rationales.

Table 6

Mean responses on ideology vs. psychological attributes as explicatory dimension for the manifestation of terrorist acts (6-point scale: 1 = ideology, 6 = psychological characteristics). Number of subjects and standard deviation in parentheses

HUMAN VICTIMS		
	IMPERIALISM	WAR ON TERROR
PRETEXT	(n =21) 2.523 (1.93)	(n =19) 3.256 (1.85)
PUNISHMENT	(n =20) 3.093 (1.68)	(n =19) 2.049 (1.17)
DEMOCRACY AS VICTIM		
PRETEXT	(n =23) 3.391 (1.92)	(n =21) 3.380 (1.71)
PUNISHMENT	(n =20) 2.543 (1.50)	(n =22) 3.176 (1.47)

Certain findings in the opinion survey will shed further light on this phenomenon, indicating that as different as those two rationales may seem to be, they certainly continue to share a common ideological provenance as their common denominator. In this sense we might perhaps express the view that in adducing as the causes of terrorist activity ideology or psychological attributes we are looking at two sides of a single coin.

The Opinion Poll

The aim of this opinion poll is twofold. Given the topicality of the issue we are attempting to analyse (the terrorist attack of 11 March) and considering therefore the extremely volatile nature of the phenomena under investigation, we were initially obliged to control the external validity of our findings in our experimental field research, by putting the basic questions of our research to a representative sample of the general population in Greece. In our analysis we also had to include the political dimension Left-wing –Right-wing, which we had been unable to address in our experimental investigation on account of the special character of our experimental sample (male and female pupils of Athens high schools). Therefore, as we will see presently, the techniques we employed in the opinion poll were of course adjusted to the requirements of our specific methodology, though as a matter of fact we more or less replicated the research design used in the experiment described earlier.

Method

The opinion survey was conducted at the respondents' homes with personal interviews employing structured questionnaires eliciting closed responses. Data collection occurred in the period from 7 to 11 April 2004, exactly a month after parliamentary elections were held in Greece, from which the Nea Dimocratia party (belonging to the traditional Right) emerged victorious. Scientific responsibility for the survey lay with the Centre for Social Psychology and Public Opinion Surveys of the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences.

Participants

1500 enfranchised individuals, aged 18+, participated in the survey. The sample was representative of the country's general population and was weighted in respect of basic demographic variables (sex, age, education, profession, level of urbanization).

Measures

Apart from measuring classical demographic variables and voting intention (which are of no interest for the purpose of this analysis)[1], an initial measurement dealt with *respondents' preference for one of six variant accounts of the 11 March terrorist attack in Madrid.* The six variants resulted from a combination of two independent variables: the first concerned the presentation of the terrorist attack's victims either as *human victims* or as *democracy*, while the second involved casting the consequences of the Aznar government's active participation in the war in Iraq in a different light: 1) By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar caused the recent "Al Qaeda" attack in Madrid; 2) By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar provided "Al Qaeda" with an alibi for launching the Madrid attack; 3) By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar predictably angered "Al Qaeda", which sought to punish him through its recent attack in Madrid. The full formulation of those six variant accounts of the 11 March terrorist attack in Madrid is reproduced in table 8.

In a further measurement, participants were asked to choose from a series of 14 statements on terrorism (aspects covered by the statements dealt with various definitions of the phenomenon, ways for addressing it, as well as likely causes for it) the four with which they were most in agreement.

Finally, the last measurement asked participants to position themselves on a *Left-wing – Right-wing* scale (where 1 = Extreme Left, 10 = Extreme Right).

Results

Respondents' positioning on the Left-wing–Right-wing scale

Table 7

Distribution of respondents on the "Left-wing – Right-wing" scale based on their own definition

Extreme Left	4.93%
Left	17.27%
Centre	32.33%
Right	18.13%
Extreme Right	8.47%
No answer	18.87%

As shown in table 7, once the 10 points have been converted into a 5 grade scale (by unifying adjacent points in pairs) 4.93% of the respondents put themselves in the extreme Left, 17.27% put themselves in the Left, 32.33% percent occupied the centre, while 18.13% and 8.47% of the respondents were respectively found in the Right and extreme Right. Finally 18.87% percent refused to define themselves on the political scale.

"Alternative" accounts of the 11 March terrorist attack

Table 8
Distribution of respondents according to their preferred account
of the terrorist attack in Madrid

By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, *outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar caused the recent "Al Qaeda" attack in Madrid and is therefore fundamentally to blame for the deaths of 202 innocent victims and for injuries sustained by more than 1000*	28.73%
By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, *outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar caused the recent "Al Qaeda" attack in Madrid and is fundamentally responsible for the violation of Democracy in his country, given that the election outcome changed at the last moment because of the attack*	10.27%
By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, *outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar provided "Al Qaeda" with an alibi for launching the Madrid attack. Therefore Aznar is fundamentally responsible for the deaths of 202 innocent victims and for injuries sustained by more than 1000*	14.07%
By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, *outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar provided "Al Qaeda" with an alibi for launching the Madrid attack. Therefore Aznar is fundamentally responsible for the violation of Democracy in his country, given that the election outcome changed at the last moment because of the attack*	11.33%
By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, *outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar predictably angered "Al Qaeda"*, which sought to punish him through its recent attack in Madrid. *Therefore Aznar is fundamentally responsible for the deaths of 202 innocent victims and for injuries sustained by more than 1000*	13.93%
By providing military support to the U.S. and George Bush for the war in Iraq, outgoing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar predictably angered "Al Qaeda", which sought to punish him through its recent attack in Madrid. Therefore Aznar is fundamentally responsible for the violation of Democracy in his country, given that the election outcome changed at the last moment because of the attack	8.53%
No response	13.13%

To begin with we observe (cf. table 8) that the most neutral and –in a sense– most obvious account (which confines itself to suggesting that the Aznar government's military contribution to the war in Iraq caused the terrorist attack, resulting in the death of a large number of people) gathers the relative majority of preference (28.73%). Also, higher percentages are given to descriptions focusing on human victims in comparison to those that suggest democracy to have been the victim of the terrorist attack. At first sight therefore, the account that is apparently favoured overall by Greek public opinion, is the one involving human victims, with its obvious emotional dimension, which in fact international mass media also emphasised the most. However the actual interest of this opinion poll rests in the political identity of those that opt for one account against another.

Figure 1. Factorial plan (1,2) of the multiple correspondence analysis.

Note. Variables represent respondents' self definition on the political spectrum and their preferred account of the 11 March terrorist attack.

To begin with we find that in the first axis (11.08% of explained inertia) there is definitely a contrast between the two Right-wing groups and the other political groupings. This axis also pits accounts that present democratic functions as the chief victim of the March 11 terrorist attack, against those accounts that above all consider the attack as having caused human victims. In other words, we see that it is predominantly the people that define themselves as belonging to the extended spectrum of the Centre and the Left that focus on the human dimension of the victims, whereas those who appear as particularly sensitive to the political aspect of the terrorist attack's consequences describe themselves as Right or Ultra Right-wing. It is even more interesting to note that the account holding the attack

as having been somehow deserved was mainly espoused by the Extreme Right, whose preferred scenario presents Aznar's general attitude as having driven the terrorists to inflict deserved retribution. Conversely, amongst mainstream Right-wingers, credence was generally given either to the account in which Aznar's attitude merely served as a pretext, or simply to the descriptively mechanistic one. In the Centre and Left the matter seems less differentiated. To begin with we find that a descriptively mechanistic version (provocation/human victims) constitutes the common locus for the specific range of the political spectrum. However, a certain degree of differentiation has been noted between the Centre and the two Left-wing groups, the Centre apparently monopolising the emphasis on the ostensible consequences of Aznar's conduct, and the Left and Extreme Left both asserting that the Aznar government's attitude incurred the deserved punishment that was inflicted by the terrorists.

Views on terrorism and their political determinism

Following a hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward's method), seven groups of subjects emerged whose technical characteristics are summarised in table 9.

Table 9
Hierarchical cluster analysis (Wards method) classifying respondents on the strength of their responses regarding terrorism

Typical statements*	% frequency in the sample	% frequency in cluster	% cluster in frequency	Value-test	Probability
CLUSTER 1: ANTI-POWER DISCOURSE (40.73%)					
Safeguarding individual liberties and civil rights should be the principal priority in any civilised world	12.57	17.84	54.09	8.18	0.001
The only effective way to combat terrorism is to eliminate its causes: social inequity and social injustice	13.06	18.37	53.60	8.10	0.001
If certain people perpetrate terrorist acts, it is only because they want to point to the social injustice around them	6.89	10.56	58.44	7.42	0.001
Terrorism is an international phenomenon, and so is the fight against it	13.04	17.84	52.14	7.34	0.001
For terrorism to be combated effectively and substantially, it is first necessary essentially to remove social injustice and actively to promote social equity (e.g. by supporting the Welfare State).	11.79	15.96	51.61	6.66	0.001

The phenomenon of terrorism is perpetuated by authority so as to justify its arbitrariness and the violence it exerts.	5.41	7.45	52.48	4.60	0.001

CLUSTER 2: SOCIAL JUSTICE (11.87%)

If certain people perpetrate terrorist acts, it is only because of great inequity in the distribution of wealth and commodities.	5.52	28.76	72.06	21.76	0.001
If certain people perpetrate terrorist acts, it is only because they want to point to the social injustice around them.	6.89	9.69	19.48	2.77	0.003
The only effective way to combat terrorism is to eliminate its causes: social inequity and social injustice.	13.06	16.64	17.64	2.71	0.003
For terrorism to be combated effectively and substantially, it is first necessary essentially to remove social injustice and actively to promote social equity (e.g. by supporting the Welfare State).	11.79	14.86	17.46	2.43	0.007

CLUSTER 3: ETHNOCENTRIC TREATMENT OF TERRORISM (10.33%)

Terrorism is the affair of each country that faces it, and so is the fight against it	3.85	30.88	90.12	24.77	0.001

CLUSTER 4: "IDIOSYNCRATIC REDUCTIONISMS / GLOBALIZATION" (8.13%)

If certain people perpetrate terrorist acts it is only because they have limited mental ability.	4.12	30.27	66.30	19.88	0.001
Terrorism is an international phenomenon, and so is the fight against it.	13.04	17.12	11.84	2.40	0.008

CLUSTER 5: INCREASED POLICING / FOCUS ON SECURITY (11.60%)

When the collective security of the citizens is in jeopardy, individual rights and freedoms should come second.	4.47	23.30	63.50	17.69	0.001
For the phenomenon of terrorism to be dealt with properly, the surveillance of the citizens' everyday life should be allowed.	3.87	16.88	53.18	13.37	0.001
For the phenomenon of terrorism to be dealt with, it is necessary to tighten controls at all a country's access points (seaports, borders check points, airports).	10.33	17.43	20.56	5.37	0.001

CLUSTER 6: CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS (7.67%)

Terrorism will only be eradicated once one of the two opposing civilizations (Western – Islam) prevails over the other.	2.71	30.83	95.04	23.57	0.001

CLUSTER 7: IDIONSYNCRATIC REDUCTIONISMS / FOCUS ON SECURITY (7.07%)

If certain people perpetrate terrorist acts it is only because they compare unfavourably to others in respect of their physique.	2.37	32.62	100.0	24.15	0.001

If certain people perpetrate terrorist acts it is only because they have limited mental ability.	4.12	8.62	15.22	3.68	0.001
When the collective security of the citizens is in jeopardy, individual rights and freedoms should come second.	4.47	7.69	12.50	2.59	0.005
For the phenomenon of terrorism to be dealt with properly, the surveillance of the citizens' everyday life should be allowed.	3.87	6.77	12.72	2.48	0.006

NO RESPONSE (2.60%)

_____

*Statements that form typical group responses are presented under each cluster. In hierarchical cluster analysis (Lebart, Morineau and Piron, 1995) each cluster's "typical variables" are the ones of which the in-cluster percentage presents a statistically significant difference from the respective percentage in the overall sample.

On the basis of typical responses to the 14 statements on terrorism, the first group (constituting 40.73% of the overall sample) replicates anti-power discourse on terrorism; the second group (11.87% of the sample) raises social justice issues that need to be generally addressed in approaching and dealing with terrorism, while the third (10.33%) is in favour of an ethnocentric approach to terrorism, since it considers that how terrorism is to be dealt with is up to each country facing the problem. The fourth group (8.13% of the sample) favours an idiosyncratic type of reductionism, in seeking to account for terrorism, while it also appears particularly sensitive to its global dimension. The fifth group (11.60% of the sample) calls for increased policing as a means of fighting terrorism while it also displays so strong focus on security as would compromise human rights. The sixth group (7.67%) seems convinced that no resolution of the problem of terrorism can be achieved save through the *clash of civilizations*. The final group (7.07% of the sample) supports idiosyncratic accounts of the phenomenon of terrorism, while it opts for safeguarding the citizens' collective security to the detriment of their individual rights.

The emergence of subordinate dimensions and focalisations on specific contents of the issue of terrorism are directly linked to groupings in the political spectrum along the "Left-wing – Right-wing" axis.

This is precisely what emerges from the data of the correspondence analysis (q.v. chart 2). Indeed, along the first axis (10.74% of overall explained inertia), are ranged in opposition the extended Left-wing area on the one side, and Centre, Right-wing, and Extreme Right-wing groups on the other. The two Left-wing groups focus on the crucial responsibility of state authority in respect of maintaining or fighting terrorism. It is they also

that emphasise the critical parameter of social justice as being fundamentally at stake, in respect of both the emergence of terrorism and its eradication. Furthermore, on a less significant plane, both Left and extreme Left propose an ethnocentric way of dealing with the issue, as a reaction to any global imposition of anti-terrorist measures.

Figure 2. Factorial plan (1,2) of the multiple correspondence analysis.

Note. Variables represent respondents' self definition on the political spectrum and their grouping based on their views on terrorism

By contrast, what generally typifies the extended spectrum of the Right, and of the Centre to a somewhat lesser degree, is the preponderance of idiosyncratic reductionisms in their explications of the phenomenon of terrorism. However, what differentiates the extreme Right from the Right is that the former is known for a strong focus on security and is pressing for the problem of terrorism to be resolved through the taking of strict policing measures, whilst the latter views the phenomenon of terrorism as a part of globalisation and, within the context of the clash of civilizations that has already begun, regards as the sole means for its resolution the domination of western culture over Islam.

Finally it is worth noting, that the refusal to place oneself on the political scale does not necessarily imply an ideological vacuum, but could signify either a measure of ideological confusion or the coexistence of opposing ideological stances. In fact, those who refused to define themselves on the political spectrum were focused (as reflected along the second axis, 9.59% of explained inertia) either on an ethnocentric – localised treatment of terrorism (which is a Left-wing attitude), or, by adducing idiosyncratic

type explications for the phenomenon, became proponents of securitization and policing as the means for any policy against terrorism (positions typical of the Right-wing throughout its breadth).

Discussion

The complex methodology that we followed for this research project, allowed us to demonstrate that, when social thinking is focused on different illuminations of one identical event, it releases a variety of dynamics for the event's ideological and political treatment (Doise, 1992). Such differential illumination of socio-political events actuates a multiplicity of attitudes towards them. In our case, we have dealt with the phenomenon of terrorism. Furthermore, the emergence of those positions is linked, to a great degree, with the dimension Left-wing–Right-wing, which constitutes a central axis for the structuring of the political field[2].

As we summarise the main findings of this research we come to certain conclusions that may perhaps serve as incitement towards further research on both a theoretical and a practical plane.

A) The affective excitation that is evidently generated by focusing on the human victims of a terrorist attack, constitutes the chief organizing principle, around which are structured the constituent elements of the representation of terrorism (definition, means to combat it, explanations–interpretations).

B) For that matter, the ideological underpinning to which the affective excitation directs us, forms a multifaceted prism of elaborations at multiple levels of socio-psychological reality, that do not always result in coherent practical outcomes. A typical example is the experimental condition within which 11 March appears to have caused human victims as a result of Aznar's deserved punishment due to his involvement in the international fight against terrorism. Whilst this version is not repudiated at a moral-political level –an ideological basis being indeed acknowledged for its validity– it does nonetheless provoke in the subjects a desire to deprive terrorists from access to the sphere of public communication, as a means of self-preservation and as a reassurance or safeguard of a normal and secure context for existence.

C) As to the political dimension Left-wing–Right-wing, apparently it impinges as a catalyst, upon the manner whereby social subjects decipher the reality that emerges under the existence of terrorism. Indeed we have seen that, along general lines, the Left puts emphasis on the victims' human dimension, while the Right focuses on the blow suffered by democratic polities as a result of the conflict between legitimate authority and terrorist

groups. At first sight this conclusion conforms with classical psychological approaches oriented toward the study of political phenomena (Tomkins, 1963), in which Left-wing thought is recognisable for its attachment to the concept of humanity, whilst Right-wing thought is imbued with inordinate zeal in defending abstract value schemes. Nonetheless, there are certain other findings that come to rectify or even enhance this initial impression given that, a) on the one hand Left-wingers, while showing sensibility towards the human victims of terrorist attacks are those who on the whole replicate anti-authoritarian discourse, consider the issue of social justice as being the corner stone of the confrontation between authority and terrorism, and acknowledge for the latter certain ideological grounds, which perhaps render terrorist activity a reaction dependent on the incidents of violence exercised by legitimate authority, b) and Right-wingers for their part, devoted as they are to the unhindered preservation of democratic institutions and their operation, offer blatantly anthropocentric interpretations for the phenomenon of terrorism (favouring reductionisms of an idiosyncratic type, q.v. also Gaffié, Marchand and Cassagne, 1997; Gaffié and Marchand, 2001), while sacrificing human rights to collective security by instituting draconian policing measures.

D) One last finding sheds light on still another asymmetry between Left and Right, and very probably merits further investigation. Indeed a) the distinction between Left and Extreme Left seems to be strictly limited to the level of the political scale on which respondents placed themselves whereas b) the distinction between Right-wingers and Extreme Right-wingers is accompanied by a clear differentiation in ideological content, given that the former evidently include the phenomenon of terrorism in their conception of globalization and hold that combating it must necessarily pass through the achievement of dominance for western thinking and the western way of life against their Islamic counterparts, while the latter are governed by ideological introversion and choose to focus on security and policing, respectively, as their point of reference or bastion against, and their way of dealing with terrorism.

In conclusion we would like to note that our research is an x-ray of the Greek reading, or reception of the Madrid attacks. Notwithstanding the unavoidable specificities of our approach that were dictated by our particular local historical and political situation, we believe that the findings suggest a number of issues that permeate not merely breaking-news politics, but also the organizational principles of social thinking within an area that ranges far beyond the borders of any one country.

Questions such as a) the role of authority, specifically in respect of the failures or side effects of its anti-terrorist efforts and policies, b) social justice, specifically in respect of how one defines it and what advisable ways there are to safeguard it, or achieve its restitution, and c) the dimension Left-wing–Right-wing: all these constitute salient issues for continued research, which within an intercultural context –and apart from any of the more obvious comparisons– might perhaps further contribute towards a fuller understanding of the manner in which social subjects experience, read, explain, and interpret terrorism, and the use of political violence generally.

Notes:
[1] Given that voting intention presents a solely anecdotal and local interest, and all the demographic variables, introduced as supplementary to our multi-dimensional correspondence analyses, do not incur any statistically significant difference. This realization is not devoid of some theoretical interest considering that, even if it does nothing else, it seems to refute claims that different reactions to foreign threat issues may be linked solely with the sex variable (for instance see Bourne et al., 1996). Nonetheless, since the present survey was not designed to control the interaction of demographic with other variables, we have to be particularly cautious insofar as regards the mentioned non-corroboration of the specific assumption.
[2] The question of the historical endurance, and also of the gradual modification of ideological content in the distinction "Left-wing – Right-wing" constitutes one of the focal problems of modern political and social theory (for instance see Giddens 1994, Bobbio 1987, Mouffe, 2000). In the context of the present contribution, and from the point of view of social psychology, the dimensions of investigative and theoretical approach that could be developed through an investigation of the question of reproduction of the distinction itself, and also of its function both on the inter-group and the ideological level of analysis, are far from being exhausted. For an investigative approach to the force and content of the distinction as an axis for structuring the socio-psychological field see for instance: Papastamou, Prodromitis and Iatridis, 2004, Marchand, 2003.

References

Arendt, H. (1969): *On violence*. Harcourt Brace.
Bandura, A. (1990): Mechanisms of moral disengagement. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp. 161-191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bandura, A. (1999): Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3,* 193-209.
Berkowitz, L. (1993): *Aggression: Its causes, consequences and control*. NY: McGraw-Hill.
Bobbio, N. (1987): *The future of Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bourne, L. E., Jr., Sinclair, G. P., Healy, A. F., Beer, F. A. (1996): Peace and gender: Differential reactions to international treaty violations. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Pychology, 2,* 143-149.
Braud, P. (2004): *Violences politiques*. Paris: Seuil.
Crenshaw, M. (2000): The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. *Political Psychology*, 21, 2, 405-420.
Crocker, J., Major, B., Steele, C. (1998): Social Stigma. In: T. D. Gilbert, T. S. Fiske, G. Lindzey (Eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th edition, vol.2, p.p. 504 - 553. New York - Oxford: Oxford University Press, Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Doise, W. (1982): *L'explication en psychologie sociale*. Paris: Presses Univ. de France.

Doise, W. (1992): L'ancrage sur les études sur les représentations sociales. *Bulletin de Psychologie, 405*, 189-95.

Doise, W. (2001): *Droits de l' homme et force des idées*. Paris: Presses Univ. de France.

Doise, W., Spini, D., Clemence, A. (1999): Human rights studied as social representations in a cross-national context. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 19, 1-29.

Dumont, M., Yzerbyt, V., Wigboldus, D., Gordijn, E. (2003): Social Categorization and Fear Reactions to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29, 12, 1509-1520.

Gaffié, B., Marchand, P., Cassagne, J. M. (1997): Effect of Political Position on Group Perception. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 27,* 1-11.

Gaffié, B., Marchand, P. (2001): Dynamiques représentationneles et idéologie. In P. Moliner (Ed.), *La dynamique des représentations sociales* (pp. 195-244). Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.

Giddens, A. (1994): *Beyond Left and Right*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirklands, S., Lyon, D. (1990): Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. *Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 58,* 308–318.

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., Breus, M. (1994): Role of consciousness and accessibility of death-related thoughts in mortality salience effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*, 627–637.

Healy, A. F., Hoffman, J., Beer F. A., Bourne, L. E., Jr. (2002): Terrorists and Democrats: Individual Reactions to International Attacks. *Political Psychology*, 23, 3, 439-467.

Johnson, R., H. (1994): *Improbable dangers: U.S. conceptions of threat in the cold war and after.* New York: St. Martin's.

Lebart, L., Morineau, A., Piron, M. (1995): *Statistique Exploratoire Multidimensionnelle*, Paris: Dunod.

Leyens, J., Paladino, P. M., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., Rodriguez-Perez, A., et.al. (2000): The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. *Person. and Soc. Psych. Review, 4,* 186-197.

Marchand, P. (2003): Insertion socio-politique et construction de l'objet discursif. In: M. Bromberg and A. Trognon (Eds.): *Psychologie sociale et communication*. (pp. 63-73). Paris : Dunod.

Mouffe, C. (2000): *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.

Mugny, G. (1982): *The power of minorities*. London: Academic Press.

Papastamou, S. (1979): *Stratégies d'influence minoritaire et majoritaire*. Thèse de Doctorat de Troisième Cycle, Paris, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

Papastamou, S. (1986): *La psychologisation: us et abus des explications psychologiques dans l'apprehension des phenomenes de la persuasion.* Thèse de Doctorat d'Etat. Paris, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

Papastamou, S., Prodromitis G., Iatridis T. (2004): La distinction Gauche-Droite comme principe organisateur de perception et d'élaboration sociocognitif du champ politique. *Actes du 5ème Congrèss International en Psychologie Sociale en Langue Francaise*, p. 196, (Lausanne, 1-4 Septembre 2004).

Russett, B. M. (1993): *Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold War world.* Princeton University Press.

Schimel, J., Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Waxmonski, J., Arndt, J. (1999): Support for a functional perspective on stereotypes: Evidence that mortality salience enhances stereotypic thinking and preferences. *J. Per. Soc. Psych. 77,* 905–926

Schmid, A.P. (1992): Terrorism and the media: Freedom of information vs. freedom from intimidation. In L. Howard (Ed.), *Terrorism: Roots, impact, responses* (pp. 95–117). New York: Praeger.

Schubert, J. N., Stewart P., Curran, A. A. (2002): *Political Psychology*, 23, 3, 559-583.

Silke, A. (1998): Cheshire-cat logic: the reccurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research. *Psychology, Crime and Law,4,* 51-69.

Silke, A. (2004): Courage in Dark Places: Reflections on Terrorist Psychology. *Social Research, 71,* 177-198.

Sprinzak, E. (1990): The psychopolitical formation of extreme left terrorism in a democracy: The case of the Weathermen. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp. 65-85). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Sprinzak, E. (1991): The process of delegitimization: Towards a linkage theory of political terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence,7*(1), 17-43.

Strutch, N., Schwartz, S. H. (1989): Intergroup aggression – ist predictors and distinctness from in-group bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56,* 364-373.

Tedeschi, J. T. Felson, R. B. (1994): *Aggression and coercive actions: A social interactionist perspective.* Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Tomkins, S. S. (1963): Left and right. A basic dimension of ideology and personality. In R. W. White (Ed.), *The Study of Lives* (pp. 388-441). New York: Atherton.

Tyler, T. R. (1997): The psychology of legitimacy: A relational perspective on voluntary deference to authorities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1,* 323-345.

Tyler, T. R., Smith, H. J. (1998): Social Justice and Social Movements. In: T. D. Gilbert, T. S. Fiske and G. Lindzey (Eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th edition, vol.2, p.p. 595 - 629. New York - Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Yzerbyt, V., Dumont, M., Gordijn, E., Wigboldus, D. (2002): Intergroup emotions and self-categorization: The impact of perspective-taking on reactions to victims of harmful behaviors. In D. M. Mackie and E. R. Smith (Eds.): *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups* (pp. 67-88). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Stamos Papastamou is Professor of Experimental Social Psychology at the Department of Psychology at Panteion University of Athens-Greece. From September 2004 is the Rector of Panteion University. His major research interests focus on social influence processes, the mechanisms of formation, diffusion and change of social representations. Recent publication toghether G.Prodromitis is *Terrorism and power : the counter-argument of consistency.* stamospa@panteion

Gerasimos Prodromitis is Assistant Professor of Experimental Social Psychology at the Department of Psychology at Panteion University of Athens-Greece. His major research interests focus on social influence processes and on mechanisms of formation, diffusion and change of social representations. gprod@panteion.gr

Tilemachos Iatridis is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Psychology, Panteion University. He completed a PhD in experimental social psychology at Panteion University. Is author of Perceptions of anti-immigrant discrimination and immigrant status. *New Review of Social Psychology* 2, 2003. iatridis@panteion.gr

Address: G.Prodromitis, Panteion University, Syngrou Av. 136, 176 71 Athens, Greece.