

## REPRESENTATION AS A FACTOR OF PROPENSITY FOR COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**Anna G. Smirnova**

Yaroslavl State University (Russia)

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### RESUMEN

En esta investigación utilizamos la cooperación de estados en la lucha contra el terrorismo internacional como un ejemplo de cooperación estatal. En el campo de las relaciones internacionales es habitual pensar que el deseo de cooperación entre los estados surge de la existencia de una amenaza común; se supone que la cooperación entre ellos como miembros de una unión antiterrorista sólo es fortalecida por la existencia de nuevas amenazas. Sin embargo, somos testigos de lo contrario: la unión antiterrorista de estados se desintegró poco después de su creación. En nuestra investigación comprobamos que el supuesto de que la existencia de un problema común, incluso una amenaza externa común, es un requisito pero no una condición suficiente para la emergencia de cooperación. Comparamos la representación de las amenazas terroristas de los líderes políticos de Rusia y EE.UU. como miembros de la coalición antiterrorista durante la operación militar en Irak en 2003.

### ABSTRACT

In our research, we use the cooperation of states in the fight against international terrorism as an example of state cooperation. In the field of international relations it is commonly thought that the desire for cooperation among states originates from the existence of a common threat. Following this logic, therefore, the cooperation of states as members of an antiterrorist coalition is supposed to be only strengthened in the light of emerging new threats. However, we witness just the opposite: the antiterrorist coalition of states disintegrated soon after its creation. In our research we test the assumption that the existence of a common problem, including a common external threat, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of cooperation. To underscore this supposition, we compare the representation of terrorist threats in the minds of the political leadership of Russia and the US as members of the antiterrorist coalition during the military operation in Iraq in 2003.

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**Key words:** cooperation, self-image of a state, terrorist threat, Iraqi crisis 2002-2003, Russia, the US

### **Introduction: new threats and the issue of cooperation among states**

Cooperation and development of partnership among states remain not only one of the major objectives in the practice of international relations but an urgent topic of scientific research as well.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the bipolar system of international relations, many experts stressed the emer-

gence of unprecedented opportunities for cooperation among states. Moreover, the distinguishing features of the new international environment, related to the increased interdependence of states, created greater incentives for cooperation rather than confrontation. Bearing this in mind, one can speak of six categories of threats to international security. Namely, R. Axelrod, in his report at the conference “Reconsidering modernity (Moscow, October, 2002), stressed the importance of the following ones: 1) technological threats conditioned by the modernization and updating computer technologies and the increasing role of information for the human being as its consumer; 2) problems of identity formation; 3) scarcity of natural resources and in particular –lack of oil; 4) changes in the distribution of power, status quo, connected with the accelerated development of the former outsiders; 5) economic difficulties and the expanding gap between rich and poor nations; 6) demographic changes (Reconsidering modernity, 2003: 14-16). The nature of the existing threats suggests that only the international community as whole, not individual states, is capable of counterbalancing them. “Global warming brings the increasing level of ocean not only near the USA, but near the far more distant countries as well; financial instability can strike the world economy” (Nye (Jr.) 2002: 237).

Along with the appearance of the new threats, previous and traditional ones connected with the spread of WMD and terrorism acquired new dimensions. In the new millennium, these threats acquired a number of peculiarities. First of all, according to the estimates of experts, as a result of the collapse of the system that contained the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the probability of its usage in the foreseeable future –30 years– is very high (Reconsidering modernity 2003: 17). Secondly, there is a considerable expansion in the geography of terrorist acts; terrorism acquired international status. Thirdly, threats in the modern world, including terrorism, are characterized by *desubjectivization*. (Reconsidering modernity 2003: 20). More often than not, it is not known who made decision about terrorist act, or who bears responsibility. Finally, threats of proliferation and use of WMD are considered interconnected.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and further comprehension of these threats, resulted in the establishment of a global antiterrorist coalition of states. For some time, the US-led antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan was considered as the standard example of cooperation among coalition members. Very soon thereafter, however, the coalition encountered difficulties and collapsed. The war in Iraq in 2003, under the military and political leadership of the USA, is a vivid example of the divergence of positions held by various members of the antiterrorist coalition.

The military solution of the Iraqi problem in 2002-2003 did not find support among Russian political leadership.

In the research we tackled the following questions: why didn't a military operation, presented to the world community as the antiterrorist one, find its advocates among the Russian political leadership? How was it possible that Russia and the US, which were fighting as allies against international terrorism only two years before, did not manage to continue their cooperation during the Iraq crisis? Which factors determine the prospect and perspectives of cooperation in the resolution of international problems?

### **The factors that determine cooperation of states**

To determine the reasons which could influence Russian-American cooperation during the Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003, it is useful to highlight some factors which determine the potential for cooperation in resolving international problems. A state's selection of an ally is influenced by a number of factors.

First of all, selection of allies shapes the security of a state. As it was pointed out by P. Dobb, "any coalition is not stronger than its weakest chain." (Dobb 2002). And results of empirical research dealing with the study and evaluation of the vital capacity of the created alliances demonstrate that in case of war states relieved their partners from the alliance only in 25 % of cases ( please, see Sabrosky 1980). In accordance with the results of research by B.A.Leeds, A.G. Long, S. M. McLaughlin, the index of *reliability* of an alliance constitutes 74,5% (Leeds et al. 2000). However, in this situation the state in 25% of cases can be left alone to cope with the imminent danger. Such circumstances make state officials more attentive to the choice of allies.

Secondly, the factors that influence the emergence of alliances determine the evolution of the international system in general (Walt 1994: 1), and are in turn determined by the system itself. States create alliances in order to respond to existing threats cooperatively. At the same time, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War led to a fundamental change of the international system. The world became a mosaic where threats proliferated and became diffuse. It is now much more difficult to assess threats and their origins, and which state could be considered a potential ally. These transformations resulted in a situation where the space of modern international relations becomes more individualized, and subjective factors which determine the actions of international actors became in-

creasingly salient. Thus, one can argue that the role of the subjective dimension in the creation of alliances is growing as well.

Which factors came to the foreground and became the main ones in the process of formation of relations between Russia and the USA during Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003?

To sum up the results of empirical research of American scholars (see, Lai, Reiter 2000; Walt 1994), one can distinguish the following variables which contribute to state cooperation in the resolution of international problems: 1) geographic position, 2) the commonality of culture, 3) learning, 4) similar social and political set up, 5) the availability of the common threat.

### *Geographical location*

The influence of this factor on the formation of alliance is estimated ambiguously by different researchers. For example, B. Lai and D. Reiter argue that the closer states are to each other geographically, the likelier it is that they become allies (Lai, Reiter 2000: 211). Friendly relations between neighboring states can remain unchanged even when these states have difficulties which might complicate their relations with other states. At the same time, the term *symbiosis with the rival*<sup>1</sup>, used by the advocates of psychodynamic approach in the study of international relations (Volkan 1991), enables us to suppose that neighboring states have a greater tendency to acquire the roles of opponents and enemies. Walt views the influence of geographic location in its interconnectedness with existing threats. He stresses the point that, under similar circumstances, states are more inclined to create alliances in response to threats emanating from neighboring states than from more geographically distant ones (Walt 1994: 23, 276). On the other hand, he also supports the assumption according to which alliances are created predominantly by neighboring states, because of common regional interests.

In the evaluation of geographic location as a factor affecting Russian-American cooperation in the framework of antiterrorist coalition in general and during the resolution of Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003 in particular, one can come to the conclusion about low significance of this factor. The coalition created in 2001 is characterized as global. The US' NATO's allies joined it,

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<sup>1</sup> The phenomenon of symbiosis with the rival characterizes the situation when nation on the conscious level aspires to distance from its enemy, and on the subconscious – it feels its resemblance with him because there is projection on the enemy of all negative qualities of a nation of one's own. In such a way, the "enemy" for the nation – it is the nation itself but with the symbol of minus. And nation perceives itself inseparably connected with its enemy and even experiences the dire need for the existence of this enemy.

as well as Japan and Australia. Also, Russia, the People's Republic of China, and Pakistan entered the coalition. The major international organizations like the UN, leaders of the Organization of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, some Muslim states denounced the terrorist acts. When the military operation in Iraq started in 2003, 49 states joined the coalition. In other words, the geography of states participating in this military operation was diverse enough to refute an explanation of alliance formation on the basis of geographic proximity in the lack of convergence of positions of Russia and the USA in the framework of antiterrorist coalition.

#### *Commonality of culture*

The influence of this factor becomes apparent when states which are characterized by the commonness of language, ethnicity and religion, are more likely to become allies.

Also, the global character of the antiterrorist coalition is connected with unprecedented cultural diversity. This circumstance does not speak in favor that language and religious differences prevent cooperation of Russia and the USA, supposing that they have a lesser cultural commonality than, for instance, the USA and Albania or Rwanda which position themselves as members of antiterrorist coalition (Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003).

#### *Sameness of political systems*

B. Lai and D. Reiter, using data about interaction of states in the period 1816-1992, demonstrated that after 1945 states with similar types of social and political set up are more likely to create alliances with each other. At the same time, these researchers showed the baselessness of the democratic peace theory, which holds that that democracies are more inclined to mutual cooperation than authoritarian regimes (Lai, Reiter 2000: 222).

What are the foundations of the hypothesis about the influence of resemblance of political systems? Walt, using the notion of ideological solidarity, proves that, first of all, the creation of alliances with the like-minded states can be considered as the means of protecting political principles. If political leaders believe that their political system is in its essence a fair and just one, then the objective of defense of states with the similar political systems should be considered as a significant goal. Secondly, states with similar political systems are less afraid of one another because they believe that it would be more difficult for other states with similar political constitution to display aggressive behavior towards them. Thirdly, alliances of states with a similar social and political set up can strengthen the legitimacy

of weak regimes at the expense of their acceptance of the popular and shared principles and ideas (Walt 1994: 33-35).

As far as the role of this factor in building cooperation between Russia and the USA in the period of Iraqi crisis concerns, we can argue that, like the other factors mentioned before, the given factor is not very helpful in clarifying the situation about the lack of coincidence of the positions between Russia and the US toward Iraq. In 2003 Russia's political system corresponded much more to the democratic standards than the political system of the USSR during the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990-1991, when both the US and the Soviet Union condemned the Iraqi aggression of Kuwait and supported the decision of the UN Security Council about the use of force to settle the crisis.

### *Learning*

The very fact of mentioning the Kuwaiti crisis of 1990-1991 allows us to focus our attention on another factor that contributes to the formation of alliances – the influence of previous experience. Russia and the US had some common experience in fighting international terrorism (antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan conducted in November, 2001), and in the resolution of Iraqi problem during Kuwaiti crisis. In addition, the political leadership of the USSR and the US both acknowledged that resolution of Kuwaiti crisis was of great significance for the development of new relations between the two countries. During that period the cooperation between the USSR and the USA was characterized as unprecedented. And the situation in the Persian Gulf was named as the laboratory where our efforts in the creation of new world order after the end of the Cold War were tested (Primakov, 1990).

However, the Russia's position towards the situation in Iraq in 2002-2003 leads to the conclusion that previous experience not only helped but rather prevented further cooperation between Russia and the USA in that period. In particular, the military operation in Iraq was considered by the Russian political leadership as conducted in defiance of the principles which laid the foundation of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. Thus the Iraqi crisis was perceived in opposition to the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2001.

### *Presence of common threat*

States create alliances in order to resist a common threat. Depending on the character of the threats and status of states, they can strive to contain the hostile state or eliminate the threat by joining the winner.

To what extent is this factor significant in explaining Russian-American relations during the Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003? According to the logic that states are more likely to become allies if they confront a common threat, the cooperation between Russia and the US should have only strengthened with the emergence of new threats, such as international terrorism. However in practice we saw the opposite: the antiterrorist coalition came apart.

This circumstance allows us to infer that the presence of common threat is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of cooperation. The leaders of Russian and the US should have a shared understanding of the problem under solution.

According to the definition, *coalition* is a union of states to reach common objectives (Short dictionary of political terms 1988: 166-167). As it was mentioned earlier by the national security advisor of the US, C. Rice, soon after the beginning of the military operation in Iraq the members of antiterrorist alliance did have the shared understanding of common goals: "... many members of the coalition became the victims of terror by themselves; all of them understand the horrible price of terrorism and possible catastrophic danger coming from the spread of WMD" (Rice 2003). Goals, like the struggle against terrorism and nonproliferation of WMD, were shared by the Russian political leadership, but Russia was not considered by the US as a member of the coalition. The reason has to do with the fact that a coalition entails not only common goals, but also shared principles (Dibb 2002). This aspect of Russian-American relations was absent. The existence of this mismatch in actions of Russia and the USA as members of the antiterrorist coalition during the period of Iraqi crisis 2002-2003 was conditioned by the differences in the perception of Iraqi problem and political universe in general among Russian and American political leadership.

Therefore, one can suppose that the correspondence of problem representation in the politician's mind is a decisive factor of the formation of partnership relations between states.

### **Subjective representation of a problem as a factor of cooperation of states**

The validity of the claim which holds that the correspondence of representations of a problem in the mind of politicians can become a factor in the formation of partnership relations among states is confirmed by the studies and research of the foreign policy decision making (Sylvan and Voss, 1998). These studies demonstrated that representation of a problem is

the basis for different decisions politicians can make through a change in the representation of a particular problem. (McDermott, 1994).

The above mentioned scientific publications are devoted to the study of the process of decision-making at the individual level of analysis. However, cooperation among states in the framework of a coalition presupposes the implementation of concerted actions and decisions of political leaders from various countries. This feature makes it very important to consider the correspondence of problem representations among various actors in the framework of international organizations.

From the point of view of the classic definition, an organization can be interpreted as a number of procedures by means of which its members achieve the concerted goals to control over the state of uncertainty. In this case the potential of cooperation is determined by the maintenance of norms and agreements which regulate international relations and make them predictable. Ineffectiveness of an organization can be explained by the fact that there is no fine tuning of international relations.

Scholars who study cognitive processes do not share this view in the explanation of failures of international organizations during resolution of international problems. If states cannot act in a coordinated manner in the framework of an organization, then we can not speak of the existence of the organization as such. In fact, an organization is more the result and consequence of the cooperative actions of states.

The above mentioned ideas reveal the cognitive approach to understanding of the emergence and functioning of international organizations (Shih 1992). At the foundation of this approach lies the claim that organizations do not presuppose the initial presence of the goals which the states should reach. Rather, organizations arise from the existence of incompatible goals. That is why the notion of an organization, from the *cognitive* approach, consists in a reconciliation of contradictions, a search for some suitable approach, a creation for the framework of the issue under discussion, but not to aim the behavior of a particular state in the direction of previously agreed principles. Cooperation among states (even when it does not entail the formation of a formal organization) is constructed in accordance with the same principle: states should create a shared reality; the level of their understanding of a given problem should be the same.

Generalization of results of empirical research devoted to the study of the influence of the self-image of a state on foreign policy, realized by political leadership (Kiselev, Smirnova 2003; Kiselev, Smirnova 2004), enables us to come to the conclusion that the potential to create reality, shared by



states, depends on the differences in the strength of images which are constructed by the leaders of those states.

The influence of self-image becomes apparent in the fact that it appears as the major factor in the representation of a problem in the politician's mind. State self-image consists of three components –identity, status and role– where every component is characterized by positive, negative or ambivalent coloring. This vision enabled us to formulate the following *mechanism of representation of a problem in the consciousness of a politician*. The dominant status, identity or role component of self-image of state determines what attributes of the problem situation are considered as the leading ones and which characteristics are ignored. In other words, the study of the state image allows us to build a hierarchy of priorities or values of political leadership which influences its preferences in decision-making. Emotional coloring of an image influences the representation of a given problem from the point of view of gains and losses associated with the given issue.

Cooperation between states originates when problem representation is adjusted at the expense of feedback from partners. However, as the practice of international relations demonstrates, it is very difficult to come to a shared understanding of a given problem. And actions of actors during resolution of international problems often reflect the existence of not coinciding viewpoints.

To our minds, the Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003 is an example of this lack of convergence of problem representations in the minds of Russian and American political leaders. In spite of the fact that the Russian and American presidents declared mutual cooperation in the framework of antiterrorist coalition, from the point of view of cognitive approach to the formation of international organizations, Russia and the USA did not manage to create a coalition capable of operating effectively.

### **Major attributes of state image and image of the world in speeches of Russian president V.V. Putin and president of the USA G. Bush during the period of Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003**

Taking into account the influence of peculiarities of problem representation in consciousness as the main factor that predetermines the cooperation of states, one can formulate the hypothesis that Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003 is characterized by the lack of convergence of problem representations in the minds of Russian and American political leaders and their un-


willingness to correct the existing representations on the basis of the feedback they received.

In the result of our research, a content analysis of 385 statements by the US president G. Bush and 264 statements by Russian president V.V. Putin, which characterize crisis in 2002-2003, was performed. Due to the fact that we consider the problem representation in the context of the main components of self-image of a state, the statements were coded as having relevant information about the status, identity and role of Russia and the US, and also –about its emotional coloring. In order to discover the images of the political world constructed by the Russian and American presidents, methodic of content-analysis *Verb in the context* of St. Walker was used (Walker 1998).

To process the results, the social statistic package SPSS for Windows was used; the statistical criterion U Mann-Whitney, Wilcoxon T-criterion, descriptive statistic were used.

**Figure 1**

Frequency of occurrence of identity, status and role statements in speeches of the USA and Russian presidents in the period of Iraqi crisis 2002-2003



1 – identity statements; 2 – status statements; 3 – role statements

In accordance with the results of content-analysis of speeches of the presidents of Russia and the US dealing with the Iraqi crisis, the images of Russia and the USA are characterized by the preponderance of the role


component. On average in the sample the frequency of occurrence of the role statements in speeches of the Russian president constitutes 56,71%. Then, following the frequency of appearance in the texts come status (40,86%) and identity statements (2,43%). In the statements of the USA president the role statements constituted 44,16% of all statements. Then, following the frequency of mentioning in the texts come status statements – 30,91% and identity statements– 24,93%.

A Comparison of the frequency of appearance of identity, status and role statements in speeches of the American and Russian presidents with the help of the criterion U Mann-Whitney allows us come to the conclusion about reliable differences in the frequency of appearance of identity statements ( $p = 0,029$ ) and status statements ( $p = 0,07$ ).

Self-image of Russia and self-image of the USA is characterized by the positive emotional coloring.

**Figure 2**

Frequency of appearance of positive, negative and ambivalent statements in speeches of the American and Russian presidents during the period of Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003



1 – positive statements; 2 – negative statements; 3 – ambivalent statements

At the same time, however, there are some differences. In texts of speeches of the president G. Bush there are more positive statements than in statements made by V.V. Putin: 69,12% and 57,71% respectively. At the same time, however, the USA president uses more negative statements than the Russian president: 22,38% and 15% respectively. However, the above mentioned differences are statistically unreliable. Emotional coloring of the self-image of Russia as compared to the self-image of the USA differs and has more ambivalent estimates: 27,29% and 8,5% respectively. Differences are statistically reliable: U Mann-Whitney criterion is significant on the level 0,029.

### *Images of world*

The worldviews constructed by the presidents of Russia and the US in the period of Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003 also differ considerably. Here the most significant differences appear in the so-called philosophical beliefs – beliefs about how the political universe is composed.

If the world image, constructed in public speeches of the USA president G.W. Bush is categorized mainly as conflictual ( $P-1 = -0,17$ ), the world image in speeches of the Russian president is presented as cooperative. Average value of the index P-1 (nature of political universe) in general in the Russian sample constitutes 0,4. Differences are statistically reliable. U Mann-Whitney criterion is significant on the level 0,014.

The president of Russia is also more optimistic in his estimates of possibilities of realization of political values than the president of the US. Average value of the index P-2 (realization of political values) for the Russian sample constitutes 0,41, and for the American one -0,16. The differences are statistically reliable. U Mann-Whitney criterion is significant on the level 0,021.

From the point of view of the Russian president V.V. Putin, the political future (predictability of others) is almost predictable ( $P-3 = 0,52$ ), and the American president perceives the future as unpredictable ( $P-3 = 0,2$ ). Differences are statistically reliable. U Mann-Whitney criterion is significant on the level 0,05.

Both presidents attach great importance to the role of chance in history. However, the average value of the index P-5 (role of chance) for the Russian sample (0,65) is lower, than for the American sample (0,87). The differences are statistically reliable. U Mann-Whitney criterion is significant on the level 0,04.

In spite of the existence of differences in the content of philosophical beliefs, there are no statistically reliable differences in the value of indexes

denoting instrumental beliefs. But the meaning of the index I-1 (approaches to goals-direction of strategy) gives us reason to believe that the basic attitude of V.V. Putin, directed to the interaction with the world, is more cooperative one ( $I-1 = 0,56$ ), as compared to that of G.W. Bush ( $I-1 = 0,33$ ).

Tactical priorities of the Russian president are also more cooperative. In the texts of statements of the Russian president there are practically no references to such means of realization of power as «punishment» (5%) and «threat» (6%) (index I-2: pursuit of goals – intensity of tactics). At the same time in the speeches of the American president these means constitute 14% and 16% correspondingly. The differences in the frequency of mentioning *punishment* as a means of pursuit of goals in the texts of the Russian and American presidents are statistically significant. U Mann-Whitney criterion is significant on the level 0,021. In general, the Russian president is more often uses *support* (35,29%) and *opposition* tactics (25,71%), and the American one - *support* (21,63%) and *reward* tactics (21,13%).

The Russian president in his speeches demonstrates a greater inclination to risk than the American president. The average value of the index I-3 (risk orientation: predictability tactics) for the Russian sample constitutes 0,41, and for the American one – 0,19. Also, the Russian president is less inclined to alterations in conflictual and cooperative behavior and statements about intentions and deeds. The average value of the index I-4a (timing of cooperation vs. conflict: ratio of conflictual and cooperative behavior) for the Russian sample constitutes 0,43, and for the American - 0,48. The average value of the index I-4b (timing of words vs. deeds: ration of words and deeds) for the Russian sample constitutes 0,64, and for the American sample - 0,71.

As far as the ratio of words and deeds in the Russian and American samples, one can argue that the Russian president V.V. Putin in his speeches uses more often *words* (54,14%), than *deeds* (45,86%). The ratio of *words and deeds* in speeches of the American president is the reverse. G.W. Bush more often appeals to the actions that have already took place (64,13%), than to words (35,88%). The comparison in the distribution of variables denoting frequency of mentioning “*words and deeds* with the help of Wilcoxon T-criterion gives us grounds to come to the conclusion about the existence of reliable differences in the frequency of statements which appeal to the words and deeds ( $p = 0,04$ ).

Our results lead to the conclusion that considerable differences exist in the images of countries and the worldviews of the Russian president V.V. Putin and the American president G. W. Bush during the Iraqi crisis in

2002-2003. One can therefore expect the existence of major differences in problem representation in the minds of politicians, in representation of the essence of the problem and the means of its resolution.

### **Problem representation as a factor of cooperation of Russia and the USA during Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003**

In order to test the hypothesis about differences in representation of Iraqi problem in minds of political leadership of Russia and the USA, and the lack of willingness of political leadership to correct their existing representations on the basis of feedback, it is necessary, first of all, to discover the peculiarities of representation of Iraqi problem in the consciousness of the Russian and American presidents, and, secondly, to evaluate the potential of the leaders of the two countries to correct the existing representation under the influence of the feedback they receive.

Let us begin with the consideration of the peculiarities of representation of Iraqi problem in the minds of the presidents of Russia and the USA.

As mentioned above, the self-images of Russia and the USA are characterized by the preponderance of the role component. This means that both presidents in their consciousness frame the situation in Iraq in the context of its duties and obligations which these states have chosen for themselves on the international arena. However, from the point of view of the content, the representations of Russia and the USA about their duties and responsibilities in the world differ substantially. For the Russian president resolution of Iraqi problem was limited to the securing of the activities of the UNO's inspectors (18,18% of statements about roles) and disarmament of Iraq (14,55%), and after the beginning of military actions – to resolution of humanitarian problems of Iraqi people (10,91%). To reach the above mentioned goals, as the most effective means were considered politico-diplomatic methods (9,87% statements about principles of realization of roles) in the framework of the resolutions of the UNO's Security Council (34,55%), which could be realized with the participation of the major partners of Russia on the international arena (8,64%).

The main goal of the USA was connected with the overthrow of regime of Saddam Hussein (38,23%). Together with the fight against terrorism (8,33%), this goal was presented together with the provision of international security and national security of the US (2,78%).

The determinants of role preferences of Russia and the USA also differ considerably. The selection of the US of its roles during Iraqi crisis is conditioned by the threats they met on the international arena. The sources of

these threats, in its turn, are conditioned by the content of the identification component of the self-image of the USA.

In his speeches dealing with the Iraqi problem G. Bush stresses the point that the US is vulnerable to threats coming from regime of S. Hussein (55,56% of statements about threats) and international terrorism (18,06% of statements about threats). And these threats are often perceived as interconnected. Therefore, in the conscious of the American president was constructed the image of the enemy against whom the USA were fighting in general and in particular during the military operation in Iraq.

In its turn the image of enemy laid the foundation for the worldviews and the image of the world. The enemy despises American values. The key element of the identity of the US is the value of freedom (20,83% statements about identity), that often goes together with *opportunities* (2,08%), *hopes* (4,17%), *peace* (4,17%). In his radio address (March 1, 2003) G. Bush stressed the fact that these values mean very little to S. Hussein, but they do mean a great deal to the US (Bush 2003). That is why the enemy should be overthrown. In this sense the assertion of the president, that values (identity) and interests (role) of the US lead the country in one direction becomes of utmost importance.

Problem representation in the mind of Russian political leadership is realized on a completely different foundation. Selection of roles, as in the case with the USA, is done on the basis of threat perception. The content of existing threats is in turn determined by the nonobservance of the principles of the formation of international relations which V.V. Putin positioned as the main ones.

In the statements of Russian president, the idea is stressed that that threat is connected with the appearance of unipolar, unified world (16% of statements about threats). The inevitable consequence of this is the collapse of the established system of international security (16% of statements about threats). Therefore, in spite of the fact that Russia for a number of times underscored the emergence of threats connected with the possibility of existence of WMD in Iraq (20%), she was against the military actions and favored a resolution of all issues around Iraq on the basis of resolutions of the UN Security Council. The principles of the formation of international relations postulating multipolarity (23,81% of statements about principles of the international relations), necessity of collective decision-making (9,52%), unreasonableness to impose one's own worldview and values to the other international actors brought to the emergence of the new problem representation, in the center of which there were the actions of the US and

coalition forces in Iraq, but not the initial goal connected with the disarmament of Iraq and bringing it back to the sphere of action of the UNO's Security Council resolutions.

In such a way the political leaders of Russia and the USA perceived the essence of the Iraqi problem in a different way and formulated the distinguishing from each other means of its resolutions. This circumstance enables us to come to the conclusion that the main condition of cooperation of states presupposes the creation of the shared vision of the problem, and this condition was not realized in the practice of interaction of Russia and the USA.

Besides differences in the perception of the problem itself, the very attributes of the self-images of Russia and the US bring us to the conclusion about insignificant potential of these states to correct their existing worldviews under the influence of the feedback they receive. When saying this we are of the opinion that it is necessary to pay attention to the following three points.

The first point is connected with the peculiarities of status perceptions of Russia and the USA, and namely, relations with the other international actors. In spite of the obvious difficulties in building relations with the US in the period of the unfolding Iraqi crisis (17,65% of statements about relations with the other states), the Russian president, nevertheless, considers the US as the main partner of Russia in the resolution of this crisis and in the struggle against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (47,06%). At the same time, in the speeches that were under our study, G.Bush did not mention a single time about Russia in connection with the situation in Iraq and did not comment on the position of Russia, Germany and France as far as their attitude to Iraq concerns. In fact in this case there is no correction of the USA 's position on the basis of the feedback.

The second aspect is connected with the peculiarities of the identification component, mainly, the US self-image and emotional coloring of images. The importance of the identification component of the US image in representation of Iraqi problem was mentioned earlier. The introduction of the identification component in itself into the conflict transforms this conflict into the struggle for the basic values which determine the uniqueness of a nation and constitute the foundation of its *self-esteem*. Such conflicts are really very hard, it is difficult to solve them because nobody wants to renounce its values. In particular, one could hardly expect this from the situation when the feedback came from the loser –the Cod War rival– Rus-



sia <sup>2</sup>. Against the background of positive emotional coloring of the self-image there was formed in the USA in its way the ideology that provide them with the feeling of rightness in respect of the actions they perform. In this case one could hardly expect from the USA any correction of the attitude to Iraq.

At last, the peculiarities of the image of Russia and the worldview constructed by the Russian president bring us to conclusion about insignificant inclination of V.V. Putin to correct his attitude and position as far as Iraq concern. We have already mentioned the existence of significant differences in the beliefs of the Russian and American presidents about the political world. To the Russian president, the political world is characterized as cooperative, predictable and creating opportunities for the realization of political goals. In other words, the situation in Iraq looks like a problem that needs a solution but does not presupposes fundamental changes in the existing world order. As it was stressed by the deputy of Russian foreign minister A. Saltanov, "our interests are more broad than the issue of Iraq. The issue consists in the fact at what world we will live in the future" (Saltanov, 2003 ).

The world view constructed by the US president G.W. Bush during the period of Iraqi crisis 2002-2003 is characterized as conflictual; the existence of various obstacles from the outside international actors on the way of realization of the USA of its political goals is stressed. To put it differently, in the minds of American political leadership, there are forces of disorder in the world; to fight these forces it is necessary to use extraordinary measures. Only then will it be possible to change the existing world order. However, as it was pointed out by the director of the legal department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation R.A. Kolodin, Russia could hardly benefit not only from war, but from the world order favored by the Bush administration as well (Kolodin, 2003). In other words, US actions were considered by the Russian political leadership through the prism of losses and consequently one could hardly expect changes in the position identified earlier.

Therefore, the president of Russia V.V. Putin and the president of the USA G.W. Bush demonstrated minor potential for the correction of existing representations of Iraqi problem under the influence of the feedback they

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<sup>2</sup> To the minds of some researchers and public figures (see, Iakovlev, 1992; Baker, 1992), the Cold War could be characterized as the war of identities, this war was lost by the USSR (and Russia as its assignee). This circumstance in fact meant triumph of American values and provided the USA with the feeling of rightfulness in its actions.

receive. Consequently, the second condition for the formation of the relations of cooperation was not realized either.

To sum up the above mentioned considerations, we come to the conclusion that the Russian and American political leaders in the situation of Iraqi crisis 2002-2003 demonstrated various patterns in the representation of the problem under consideration in their consciousness. From the point of view of the cognitive approach to the functioning of international organizations, in the relationships between Russia and the USA there emerged the situation where the goals of self-realization and maintenance of self-images dominated considerably above the process of looking for a shared world view. Thus, in mutual relations between Russia and the USA during the period of Iraqi crisis, the basic conditions for the emergence of cooperation were absent. Also, the results of our research give us reason to consider the peculiarities of problem representation in the mind of politicians as a factor that determines the propensity of states to cooperate in resolution of international problems.

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<p><b>Anna G. Smirnova</b> is PhD in Political Psychology. Department of Psychology, Chair of Social and Political Psychology (Yaroslavl State University, Russia). She's co-author with I. Kiselev of <i>Topical Issues of Political Psychology</i>. agsmirnova2001@mail.ru Address: Yaroslavl State University (Russia) .Yaroslavl, ul. Sovetskaya, 14. Russia, 150000</p>
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