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SOCIAL TRUST AND POLITICAL PROTEST.
The mediating role of the value of Power Distance

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RESUMEN

Mientras el estudio de la confianza social ha sido trabajado tradicionalmente bajo el análisis del Capital Social, el de la protesta política lo ha sido en el área de los movimientos sociales y la participación política. Ambos grupos de teorías deben ser complementados con el análisis de la relación entre la confianza social y la protesta política. A pesar de la importancia que últimamente han recobrado los valores sociales a nivel transcultural, pocos trabajos se han dirigido al análisis del rol mediador de la Distancia de Poder entre la confianza social y la protesta política. Presentamos un trabajo, realizado con el tercer pase del World Values Survey, relacionando medidas de confianza social y protesta política con los índices nacionales de desarrollo socio-económico (Human Development Index), desarrollo democrático (Freedom House Index) y la Distancia de Poder. Los resultados muestran que la relación entre confianza social y protesta política es recíproca, que el valor cultural de distancia de poder añade poder explicativo a la relación y que media en dicha relación, mostrando la importancia de la dimensión cultural en la confianza social y en la protesta política.

ABSTRACT

While the study of Social Trust has pertained to the analysis of Social Capital, the study of political protest has been related to social movements and political participation. Both groups of theories need to be complemented with the analysis of the relationship between Social Trust and political protest. Moreover, in spite of the importance of the social values at a cross-cultural level, little work has been directed towards analyzing the mediating role of Power Distance on the relationship between Social Trust and political protest. A research project was conducted with WVS (World Values Survey 1995-8) relating means of Social Trust and Political Protest with a nations' socio-economic development (Human Development Index), democratic development (Freedom House index) and Power Distance. Results show that 1) the relationship between Social Trust and political protest is reciprocal; 2) the cultural value of Power Distance adds explanatory power to the relationship; and 3) Power Distance mediates on the relationship, showing the importance of the cultural dimension to both Social Trust and political protest.

Key words: political protest, power distance, social trust, self as social Representation

Social Trust and Political Mobilization

Generalized, or social, trust has been shown to be an important part of the political, social, and economic life of societies. Social trust refers to a person's belief that another person or a collective will perform actions (in-

cluding providing information) that will prove helpful or at least not detrimental to him or her, thus permitting the establishment of a cooperative relationship (Gambetta, 1988, p. 217). The notion of trust lends itself to all kinds of social science debates. For example, Simmel (1950, p. 326) observed that trust is one of the more important synthetic forces in group life.
Studies of trust have become a growth industry in the social sciences. Trust has been considered a core concept in the theory of social capital which, in turn, is a necessary condition of social integration (Arrow 1972, p.357), economic efficiency (Coleman 1988, p.306), democratic performance (Putnam 1993; 2000) etc (see Sullivan & Transue 1999 for a review). Moreover, generalized or Social Trust has been shown to be related to many positive societal outcomes. They include economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000), solutions to many problems of collective action (Diekmann, 1993; Jordana, 1999; Rothstein, 2000), safer and more productive neighbourhoods (Putnam, 2000), healthier communities (Kawachi, 1997), well-being (Diener et al 1995) and better working democracies in general (Putnam, 1993).

As a whole, the importance of studies on trust appears to converge on the point that social capital may be a clue in how to solve various collective action problems inherent in contemporary democratic societies (Hardin 1998).

While there have been vigorous discussions about the analytic distinction of the concept of Social Trust, the empirical literature has shown that different dimensions of the concept are intertwined (Hardin 2001). Most, if not all, empirical studies employ the working definition of Social Trust, which is 'the attitudes toward other citizens and thus may be helpful in solving collective action problems' (Inglehart 1990; Brehm and Rahn 1997). Based on this working definition, studies have found that civic participation (associational membership) and interpersonal trust (social trust) have a reciprocal relationship (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Hetherington 1998). That is, the more citizens participate in their communities, the more that they learn to trust others. Conversely, the greater trust that citizens hold for others, the more likely they are to participate. However, these findings are restricted to the relation between institutionalized political participation and Social Trust.

In the literature on trust there is, however, a forgotten side: political mobilization. While it can be asserted that we live in a "movement society" (Tarrow 1994), little work has been directed to the understanding of political mobilization or political protest in spite of the profusion of these new forms of political action (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2001). In addition to

the literature on trust having relatively ignored the issue of political mobilization (for exception, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995), the social movement literature has yet to examine the association between movements and trust. What of the less institutional participation? There is a pronounced lack of studies on the relationship between political protest participation and trust. This paper addresses this problem by focusing on the relationship between political protest and Social Trust.

There is general agreement among the scholars of democracy, from Jean Jacques Rousseau to John Stuart Mill, Robert Dahl or Benjamin Barber, that mass participation is essential to the life of a representative democracy. In this sense, political participation is the critical link between the citizenry and the governing process. In the words of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, "political participation provides the mechanism by which citizens can communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs and generate pressure to respond" (1995, 1).

The relationship between Interpersonal Trust and political participation was a *key element* of Almond and Verba's civic culture (1963: 261-99), the relationship between a high level of Social Trust and participation. They argue that it is equally important for this trust to penetrate into the realm of political relationships. This enables the citizens to influence the government by creating ad hoc political structures. Trust is important for political bargaining and consensus building. Failure to attain this, Almond and Verba argue, leads to the imbalance between consensus and cleavage. This idea was borrowed by Inglehart (1990, 44). His research on advanced industrial countries offers a civic culture hypothesis with a model that relates a stable democracy secondarily to differentiated social structures and primarily to a political culture of civicness, as indexed by interpersonal trust (and two other components: life satisfaction and revolutionary societal change); where economic development contributes positively to social structures and civic culture, but not directly to democratic stability. This work was criticized by Muller and Seligson (1994), who argued that interpersonal trust is a consequence, not a cause, of democratic rule. Inglehart (1977, 174) has responded that his model is relevant to the stability of democracy not to the short-term but to the long-term, with data from 43 countries' World Values Survey reflecting the important role of interpersonal trust. For example, a correlation of 0.72 between stable democracy and interpersonal trust was found (1997, 174).

Political protest is a less popular method of political participation than voting behaviour. Moreover, engaging in political protest is problematic because of the costs levied on participants and the benefits that might be

expected from the protest. This means that there is more uncertainty related to political protest than to institutional participation in both costs and impact. The uncertainty of taking part in protest, however, depends on the expectation of how many people will take part. Generalised trust fosters movement participation. As Coleman (1990) posits, "a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust" (304). Moreover, people who trust are able to make estimations about the likelihood of success in protest with more confidence than people who don't, because trust allows them to form expectations about the actions of other (Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 1988) As Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994, p. 131) point out, "trust provides a solution to the problem caused by social uncertainty."

The likelihood of taking part in protest has been related in the academic literature to the individual's resources for participation (Verba, et al 1996), the grievances toward the regime associated with others (Klandermans 1984, Valencia 1994) and the tolerance displayed by the regime (Tarrow 1998). More recently, the likelihood of taking part in protest has been also related to interpersonal trust (Benson & Rochon 2004). No works, however, have analysed in depth the relationship between political protest and the cultural dimension of Power Distance.

The problems of the dimensions inside non institutional political participation has not at all been researched when compared to the dimensions underlying institutional participation (see the seminal work of Verba & Nie 1972 or Milbrath 1981, for more). Usually political protest has been used as an index consisting of the sum of factors for either theoretical reasons (e.g. Barnes & Kaase 1979, because they used Guttman's scale) or for practical reasons (creating a "potential" of political protest). The few works in this area, however, have found that even using different statistical strategies, two main dimensions appear: legal and illegal forms in the first author, illegal vs. radical forms in the second and the same in the third author (see for example Sabucedo & Arce 1991; Schmidtche & Uhlinger, 1983; Valencia 1990 or Cohen and Valencia 2008). In the work of the WVS few works have addressed this problem and the few works that have, used factor analysis showing only one dimension (See for example Norris 2003; Benson & 2004 for their analysis of the WVS 1990).

If Tarrow's argument (2001) that face-to-face interaction with fellow citizens is in fact the true determinant of Social Trust underlying political participation is correct, it follows that political participation involving greater interaction will depend more on the "institutionalized" (Tarrow

1994) political networks than the forms of political participation that involve less face-to-face interaction. Thus, the institutionalized movement activities involve less face-to-face interaction than the non institutionalized ones.

Culture, Trust and Political Action

We will now examine theory and data concerning the role of the cultural value of Power Distance on the relationship between Social Trust and political action.

Culture is defined as a set of denotative (what is, or beliefs), connotative (what should be, or attitudes, norms and values) and pragmatic (how things are done, or procedural rules) knowledge, shared by a group of individuals who have a common history and participate in a social structure. In this sense, shared values play key roles in the individuals' psychological functioning in society. Core cultural values are reflected in key collective texts and in collective behaviour - cultural plots or scripts (Inkeless and Levinson, 1969; Schooler, 1996; Triandis, 1995). Inkeless and Levinson (1969) concluded that there are three basic problems that all cultures have to deal with: a) the relationship with authority; b) the concept of the self or person, which includes, b.i) the relationship between the person and society and b.ii) the person's concept of masculinity and femininity; and c) conflicts and their resolution (expression versus inhibition of emotions, including the control of aggression). Hofstede (1991) conducted a seminal survey on work values and empirically identified, by means of collective factor analysis using nations as units and means as scores, a four dimension solution which fits with Inkeles and Levinson's basic social problems: Power Distance, Individualism-Collectivism, Masculinity-Femininity and Uncertainty Avoidance.

Hofstede defined culture as "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another" (1991; 5) and consists of shared values, beliefs and norms. These mental constructs influence how people socialized within a particular culture perceive events; they also help to determine what behaviours are considered appropriate or inappropriate in various social situations. Since the mental programming is shared, i.e. developed through years of socialization within a culture, it results in relatively predictable responses to commonly experienced social situations or contexts. These characteristic patterns of behaviour create differences between cultures that may be observed and the influence of cultural differences on social processes such as political par-

ticipation and interpersonal trust may be predicted if the underlying social values and norms are known.

Even though the survey was conducted over 25 years ago, Hofstede's scores show high concurrent validity with current cross-cultural research (Miller-Loesi, 1995; Bond & Smith, 1996; Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina & Nicholson, 1997). For example, Fiske et al conclude that Power Distance (along with individualism) stands out as a more important cultural dimension affecting psychological processes (Fiske, Markus, Kitayama & Nisbbett, 1998).

Power Distance refers to the extent to which national cultures expect and accept that power is distributed unequally in society. Low Power Distance countries are Denmark and New Zealand. High Power Distance ones are Malaysia and Guatemala. In high Power Distance societies, an important emotional distance separates subordinates from authorities. Respect and formal deference for people with higher status (i.e. parents, elders, etc.) is valued.

To the extent that Power Distance refers to how much less powerful members expect and accept unequal power distribution within a culture, Hofstede (1991, 37, 43) claims that in the realm of politics, low and high Power Distance countries have the following characteristics:

Characteristics Expected in Low Power Distance Countries	*Characteristics Expected in High Power Distance Countries*
The use of power should be legitimate and is subject to criteria of good and evil	Might prevails over right: whoever holds the power is right and good
Skills, wealth, power, and status need not go together	Skills, wealth, power, and status should go together
The middle class is large	The middle class is small
All should have equal rights	The powerful have privileges
Powerful people try to look less powerful than they are	Powerful people try to look as impressive as possible
Power is based on formal position, expertise, and ability to give rewards	Power is based on family or friends, charisma, and ability to use force
Change in a political system is caused by changing the rules (evolution)	The way to change a political system is by changing the people at the top (revolution)
The use of violence in domestic politics is rare	Domestic political conflicts frequently lead to violence
Pluralist governments based on outcome of majority votes	Autocratic or oligarchic governments based on cooptation
Political spectrum shows strong centre and weak right and left wings	Political spectrum, if allowed to be manifested, shows weak centre and strong wings
Small income differentials in society, further reduced by the tax system	Large income differentials in society, further increased by the tax system

Prevailing religions and philosophical systems stress equality	Prevailing religions and philosophical systems stress hierarchy and stratification
Prevailing political ideologies stress and practice power sharing	Prevailing political ideologies stress and practice power struggle
Local management theories focus on role of employees	Local management theories focus on role of managers

Triandis (1995) has called these values as a "cultural syndrome": "A cultural syndrome is a pattern characterized by shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles and values that are organized around a theme and that can be found in certain geographic regions during a particular historic period" (pp. 43). In the same sense that individualism-collectivism is this kind of pattern consisting of shared beliefs and norms and organized around the self, Power Distance can be considered in a similar way: shared beliefs and norms and values organized around power and hierarchy in society. Thus, this kind of "cultural syndrome," organized around power, can be considered shared or social representation, representing the organizing principles of the symbolic relations between individuals and groups (Doise et al 1993).

The Power Distance cultural syndrome is partly associated with economic and political factors. For example, Hofstede (2001) posits that countries high in Power Distance have low levels of economic development because cultures with hierarchical distance are characterized by large income differences between social strata. Several works have found that Power Distance is related to low GNP and low HDI as well as low freedom development (Gouveia & Ross 2000, Basabe & Ross 2005; see also Diener et al 1995, Basabe et al 2002).

Few works, however, have related Power Distance with Social Trust. Mackie's provocative essay (2001) is the exception. According to his work, the micro-foundations of the differences in trust across Europe are based in different styles of family formation -*Social Trust gradient*- which corresponds to Hofstede's Power Distance dimension (Mackie, 2001, 255-8). Concretely, his work on trust has a correlation of -0.60 with Hofstede's Power Distance (1991, 256). In the same vein, Inglehart (1997, 352) found that Social Trust was correlated with income equality as well as with Hofstede's Power Distance.

In summary, available data and a theoretical analysis of cultural dimensions support the assumption that Power Distance is higher in less individualistic countries with less democratic and economic development as compared to low Power Distance countries.

This work is aimed at analyzing, by using collective-level survey data, 1) the relationship between political protest and Social Trust using the third

wave of World Values Surveys, as well as 2) the mediating role of Power Distance on the relationship between Social Trust and political protest.

Table 1
Social Trust and Political Protest differentials and Hofstede's PD Index

Nations	1995		
	Trust [a]	PP [b]	PD [c]
Andalusia	21,8	1,49	2
Argentina	17,6	1,42	1
Armenia	23,5	1,54	
Australia	40	1,81	1
Azerbaijan	19,4	1,3	
Bangladesh	20,5	1,61	3
Basque	39,4	1,9	2
Belarus	23	1,33	
Bosnia	26,9	1,65	3
Brazil	2,8	1,62	3
Britain	29,1	.	1
Bulgaria	23,7	1,43	3
Chile	20,9	1,39	2
China	52,3	.	3
Colombia	10,7	1,47	3
Croatia	25,1	1,67	3
Dominic Rep	25,2	1,59	
E Germany	24,3	1,73	1
Estonia	21,1	1,45	1
Finland	47,9	1,61	1
Galicia	28,6	1,76	2
Georgia	21,4	1,36	
Ghana	22,5	1,49	3
India	32,8	1,6	3
Japan	42,3	1,63	2
Latvia	23,9	1,54	
Lithuania	21,3	1,54	
Macedonia	7,5	1,55	3
Mexico	26,4	1,62	3
Moldova	21,8	1,3	
Montenegro	30,4	1,49	3
Nigeria	19,2	1,44	3
Pakistan	18,7	.	2
Peru	4,9	1,4	2
Philippine	5,5	1,26	3
Poland	16,9	1,44	3
Puerto Rico	6	1,47	

Russia	23,2	1,37	3
S Africa	15,4	1,46	1
S Korea	30,3	1,76	2
Serbia	28,4	1,45	3
Slovenia	15,5	1,56	3
Spain	28,7	1,46	2
Sweden	56,6	1,9	1
Switzerland	34,5	1,65	1
Taiwan	41,8	1,32	2
Tambov	22,1	1,44	3
Turkey	5,5	1,38	2
Ukraine	28,8	1,36	
Uruguay	21,1	1,47	2
USA	35,9	1,73	1
Valencia	20,8	1,62	2
Venezuela	13,7	1,34	3
W Germany	39,9	1,84	1

a) Trust refers to the Proportion of people that responds "More people can be trusted"
b) PP Refers to the summing up of the five items of Political Participation divided by 5.
c) PD refers to the Hofstede's Power Distance scores where 1 = ≤ .49; 2 = between .50 and .65 ; 3 = ≥ .66. Higher numbers mean higher Power Distance

Method

Procedure and Measures

Dependent Measures, Countries and Participants

Political Protest. For protest participation the five items measured in the 95's WVS were included (signed a petition, joined a boycott, attended a lawful demonstration, joined a unofficial strike, occupied a building of factory) where 1 = never, 2 = might do; 3 = I have done.

Interpersonal trust. The question about whether most people can be trusted from the 95`s world values survey was included where 2 = yes; 1 = can`t be too careful. We also computed the proportion of people (without missings) that reported yes.

Sample. 54 countries of the third wave of the WVS (See table 1): 42 countries with Power Distance indexes and 12 without them (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Dominic Republic, Puerto Rico).

Predictor Variables

Political factors. Freedom House´s scores on Civil Liberties and Political Rights (1-7 for each) from 1996 for each country where included in the matrix

Cultural factors. Hofstede's (1991) Individualism-Collectivism and Power Distance scores for the 54 nations of 95`s world values survey were computed (See also Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina and Nicholson, 1997). High scores mean high Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance (see table 1 for the nation's scores on Power Distance, political protest and Social Trust). Inglehart's materialism and postmaterialism scale by country that appeared in the 95`s world values survey were included (from 1 = materialism, 2 mixed, 3 = postmaterialism).

Socio-economic factors. Human Development Index: HDI measures national well-being and trends by combining three basic components of human development: longevity (mean life expectancy in the nation) knowledge (rate of literacy and school population) and standard of living (Gross National Product per person).

Human Development scores for each nation in 1996 were obtained from the United Nations-Program for Development (UNDP).

Results

First, to check the concurrent validity of the collective scores of Power Distance, correlations were performed between the standardized scores of Power Distance with the three scores of Hofstede's measures (Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity and Individualism), Triandis' scores of Individualism, Inglehart's scores of Postmaterialism, Freedom House's scores on Democratic Development (1996) and UNDP's scores on Human Development Index (1996).

Table 2
Correlations between Power Distance, Cultural, Development and Economic Factors,

	PDI	UAI	MAS	IDV	PRCL96	IDH96	Posmat
PDI	1						
	(45)						
UAI	,355*	1					
	(45)	(45)					
MAS	-,019	-,170	1				
	(45)	(45)	(45)				
IDV	-,737**	-,402**	,122	1			
	(45)	(45)	(45)	(45)			
PRCL96	,654**	,224	-,140	-,652**	1		
	(40)	(40)	(40)	(40)	(50)		
HDI96	-,545**	,230	-,054	,507**	-,548**	1	
	(35)	(35)	(35)	(35)	(44)	(44)	
postmat	-,726**	-,026	,299	,440*	-,523**	,687**	1
	(21)	(21)	(21)	(21)	(27)	(25)	(31)

a) PDI refers to the scores of Hofstede's Power Distance. higher punctuation means higher distance
b) UAI Refers to the scores of Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance. Higher score means higher avoidance
c) MAS Refers to the scores of Hofstede's Masculinity/Feminity Higher score means higher masculinity
d) IDV Refers to the scores of Hofstede's individualism-Collectivism. Higher score means higher individualism
e) PRCL refers to the sum up of the scores of Freedom House ratios of 1996 on Civil Liberties and Political Rigts. Higher score means lower freedom
f) HDI96 refers to the scores of UNDP of 1996 to the Human Development Index (1998)
g) Posmat refers to the mean scores by country of the four items of Inglehart's scale of the WVS 1995-8. Higher scores means higher postmaterialism

Power Distance correlates negatively as expected (See Table 2), and significantly, with the two measures of Individualism-Collectivism ($r(28) = -.70$, $p \leq .000$ and $r(45) = -.74$, $p \leq .000$ respectively with Triandis and Hofstede's scores), and Inglehart's Post-Materialism scores ($r(21) = -.73$, $p \leq .000$). Correlation with Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance is positive ($r(45) = .35$, $p \leq .02$), and no correlation was found for Masculinity-Femininity. In relation to the economic and political development indexes, Power Distance correlates as expected, significantly and positively with low political freedom ($r(40) = .65$, $p \leq .00$) and negatively with economic development ($r(35) = .54$, $p \leq .00$). These results confirm the validity of the nation's Power Distance score.

Table 3
Interpersonal trust, political protest and economic, political and value correlates

	PP	Social Trust
PP	1	,587**
	(52)	(52)
Social Trust	,587**	1
	(52)	(55)
HDI096	,384*	,298*
	(41)	(44)
PRCL96	-,442**	-,232
	(47)	(50)
IDV	,550**	,435**
	(42)	(45)
PDI	-,568**	-,489**
	(42)	(45)

a) PP refers to the summing up of the 5 items of the WVS (1995) of political non institutional participation divided by 5.
b) Social Trust refers to the item Interpersonal Trust of the WVS (1995)
c) HDI refers to scores of Human Development Index
d) PRCL refers to the Civil Rights and Political Rights scores of Freedom House.
e) IDV refers to Hofstede's scores of Individualism-collectivism

Second, the relationship between predictor factors, Social Trust and political protest measures at the collective level were examined. Using nations as units of analysis and averaging HDI, Political Freedom and Hofstede's Power Distance scores, correlations at the collective level were performed with Social Trust and political protest (see table 3).

Figure 1
Positioning of countries in the relation between political protest and social trust



Political protest was significantly and positively related with Social Trust (r (52) =.59, p≤.00) (see also Figure 1) and Hofstede's Individualism (r(42) =.55, p≤.00), and negatively with Power Distance (r (42) = -.57, p≤.00). Participation was also significantly related to the Human Development Index (r (41) =.38, p≤.01) and negatively to the Freedom Development Index (r (47) = -.44, p≤.00).

Social Trust was also related positively to Hofstede's Individualism (r(45) =.43, p≤.00), and negatively to Power Distance (r (45) = -.49, p≤.00). In relation to the structural indexes, Social Trust was also related significantly with the Human Development Index (r(41) =.30, p≤.05) and negatively but not significantly with Freedom Development index (r (50) = -.23, p≤.10).

Third, in order to analyze the mediating role that Power Distance plays on the relationship between Social Trust and political participation, several strategies were used.

Table 4
Hierarchical Regression for Political Participation: HDI, Freedom and Power Distance as predictors of Political Protest

Variable	Step 1 Beta	Step 2 Beta	Step 3 Beta
HDI	0.07	-.09	-,010
Pr	-0.43**	-0.123	,113
PD		-0.59**	-,292
Social trust			,620**
Total R2	.23	.39	.58
Change in R	.23	.162	.19
Change in F	4,26**	7.45**	12.02**

Table 5
Hierarchical Regression for Social Trust: HDI, Freedom and Power Distance as predictors of Social Trust

Variable	Step 1 Beta	Step 2 Beta	Step 3 Beta
HDI	-,001	-,137	-,089
Pr	-,631**	-,380	-,318*
PD		-,475**	-,180
Pani			,503**
Total R2	.40	.51	.66
Change in R	.40	.11	.16
Change in F	9,58**	6.03**	12.46**

First, a series of regression analyses were carried out to analyze the explanatory power showed by Power Distance on political protest and Social Trust. For each of the dependent variables (Political Protest or Social Trust) we first entered the structural variables (HDI and Freedom House's indexes), then the cultural dimension of Power Distance and finally the more proximal variable (Political Protest or Social Trust, respectively). The analysis produced interesting findings (see tables 4 and 5). On one hand, in predicting both variables, Political Protest and Social Trust, the three steps were significant. The Power Distance scores added explained variance to the structural variables and the proximal variables had significant weights each other. On the other hand, in relation to the differences between the explanation of Political Protest and Social Trust, the structural variables produced a higher explained variance for Social Trust than for political participation (R^2 = .40 vs. R^2 = .23, respectively), the Power Distance scores added more explained variance for political participation than for Social Trust and the final step explained Social Trust more than it did political participation. For the 1996 survey and consistent with Tarrow's argument (2000), this result shows that more participation in various forms of social movements increases a country's likelihood of having Social Trust. Moreover, Social Trust has a positive and statistically significant effect on movement participation in the 1996 data. Consequently, we find that both Social Trust and Movement Participation have positive effects on each other. The level of participation in social movements are more likely to drive trust in other people, while at the same time trusting other people is more likely to increase levels of movement participation, which, in turn, may lead to a 'virtuous cycle' of movement participation and Social Trust.

Second, to analyze the mediating role of Power Distance on the relationship between Social Trust and political participation the before regression analysis is not enough. To test the mediating role of Power Distance we followed the procedure advocated by Baron & Kenny (1986, See also Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. 2004). Generally speaking, mediation can be said to occur when (1) the IV significantly affects the mediator, (2) the IV significantly affects the DV in the absence of the mediator, (3) the mediator has a significantly unique effect on the DV, and (4) the effect of the IV on the DV shrinks upon the addition of the mediator to the model.

Figure 2 displays the results. It first requires that the mediating variable (e.g., PDI) be related to the independent variable (e.g., Social Trust) and the dependent variable (e.g., Political Protest). As Figure 2 shows, the Social Trust scores have a significant effect on PDI (Unstandardized b: .405, *p* _ .001). PDI, in turn, is strongly predictive of Political Protest (Unstandard-

ized b .575, *p* _.001). This evidence means that PDI fulfils two initial requirements of a mediating variable. The final and most basic requirement specified by Baron and Kenny is that a mediating variable should predict the dependent variable (Political Protest) even when the independent variable (Social Trust) is statistically controlled, while the effect of the independent variable on the dependent measure should be substantially reduced when the mediating variable is statistically controlled. Figure 2 indicates that these requirements are fulfilled in the present case. The effect of Social Trust on Political Protest becomes lowered when PDI is statistically controlled (Unstandardized b: .42, *p* _ .001), but the effect of PDI on Political Protest remains significant even when academic major is statistically controlled (Unstandardized b.31, *p* _ .02). To test whether this pattern of results reflects a significant reduction in the variance accounted for by Social Trust, a *z*-score test was performed (Sobel test: Sobel 1988). The analysis produced a significant change, from .595 to .42. That means that the direct effect of Social Trust on Political Protest is .42 while the indirect effect through PDI is 16.5. In summary, the fact that we found significant correlation means that a partial mediation has occurred showing that the effect of Social Trust on Political Protest is partially mediated by PDI.

Figure 2

Power Distance (PDI) as a mediator of the effect of Social Trust (ST) on Political Protest (PP). Path weights are unstandardized. The path weights in parentheses do not control for the effect of the mediator



Conclusions and discussion

The purpose of this paper was twofold. First, the aim was to analyse the relationship between Social Trust and Political Protest and second, to examine the mediating role played by Power Distance. The topic is important for several theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, the work presented here can help to fill the gap in the existing literature examining the effect of non-institutional political participation on social capital and vice versa. Moreover, this relationship is mediated by the cultural value of Power Distance, meaning that the cultural dimension has to be taken into account when providing new solutions for the current problem of democracy around the world. In summary, this research has produced three interesting findings: the relationship between Social Trust and Political Protest, the mediating role of Power Distance and, even at a minor level, the concurrent validity of the Power Distance value.

First, in relation to the concurrent validity of Power Distance value, correlation analysis showed significant relationships with social trust, social development, political development and political protest. On one hand, as expected, Power Distance correlated negatively and significantly with the two measures of Individualism-Collectivism ($r(28) = -.70$, $p \leq .000$ and $r(45) = -.74$, $p \leq .000$ respectively with Triandis and Hofstede's scores) (See Table 2). Interestingly, the high correlation between Power Distance and Individualism adduces evidence for Triandis' outline of additional axes that may interface with individualism or collectivism (see review by Miller 2002). The overlap between individualism–collectivism with Power Distance had previously been found in the seminal work of Hofstede (1991), in which the two dimensions loaded onto the same factor. In this sense, social groups differ not only in the extent to which they focus attention on individual or collective values and goals but also in the extent to which differences in power, authority, and status are accepted as legitimate. The correlations, then, reveal more about the importance of the cultural dimension of the self than may be seen in the independent columns of a distribution table (Oyserman Kemmelmeyer & Coon, 2002). On the other hand, Power Distance was also negatively related to Inglehart's post-materialism scores (r (21) = -.73, $p \leq .000$), positively with Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance ($r(45) = .35$, $p \leq .02$) and no correlation was found for masculinity-femininity. In relation to the structural economic and political development indexes, Power Distance has a significantly positive correlation with low political freedom, as expected (r (40) = .65, $p \leq .00$), and negatively with economic development ($r(35) = .54$, $p \leq .00$). In sum, these results confirm the validity of the nation's Power Distance averages (Gouveia &

Ros, 2000, Basabe & Ros, 2005; Deiner, Deiner & Diener, 1995; Basabe et al, 2002).

Power distance was also significantly and negatively related to political protest ($r\ (42) = -.57$, $p \leq .00$) as well as with Social Trust ($r\ (45) = -.49$, $p \leq .00$), showing the main role that this cultural niche plays in the relationship between political participation and Social Trust for the development of countries' dynamics. In other words, the results of the study show that apart from the traditional elements that increase the likelihood of taking part in political protest (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Klandermans, 1984; Tarrow 1994; Benson & Rochon, 2004), the expectation and acceptance of unequal power distribution within a culture affects political protest.

As far as the relationship between Social Trust and political protest is concerned, regression analysis showed that for the third WVS – and consistent with Tarrow's (2000) argument – more participation in various forms of social movements increases a country's likelihood of having Social Trust: the effects of Social Trust on the likelihood of protest are found both in democratic countries and in those that are not free. Moreover, Social Trust has a positive and statistically significant effect on movement participation in the third WVS: protest is more common in those countries where Social Trust is more widespread. Consequently, we find that both Social Trust and Movement Participation have positive effects on each other. The level of participation in non-institutionalized social movements are more likely to drive trust in other people, while at the same time trust in other people is more likely to increase levels of movement participation, which may lead to a 'virtuous cycle' of movement participation and Social Trust. This 'virtuous cycle,' however, might convert into a 'vicious circle' to the extent that Social Trust is not equally distributed in a given society.

Finally, the study of the third wave of the World Values Survey shows the role that Power Distance plays in political protest. This kind of "cultural syndrome," organized around power and hierarchy in society, may be considered shared or social representations, the organizing principles of the symbolic relations between individuals and groups (Doise, Clemence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993). In fact, following Oyserman & Markus (1996: 108), the self as social representation is not more than the building blocks from which the sense of self is construed. In this sense, the self may be considered a kind of powerful cultural frame for "conditioned habitual culture-specific patterns of thinking, feeling and acting..., core cultural ideas about selfhood and the everyday social practice through which individuals live out these core ideas" (Holland & Quinn, 1987: 110-111).

In summary, results of this work show the seminal importance of the cultural dimension of (un)equal distribution of power to the explanation of political protest. This work can also help create bridges between the more sociological tradition of Social Capital and the more psychological tradition of political participation by means of complementing both group of theories with the analysis of the relationship between Social Trust and political protest, showing that Social Trust may be a clue to solving various collective action problems inherent in contemporary democratic societies.

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