

Citizenship in a communitarian perspective

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Ethnicities

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
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Abstract

This article argues that a good citizen accepts several basic responsibilities toward the common good of the nation, but is otherwise free to follow his or her own preferences. Thus all citizens may be called upon to serve in the armed forces or national service, be expected to vote and to serve on juries and obey the laws while having the freedom to worship as they wish, maintain secondary loyalty to their country of origin, and so on.

Keywords

citizenship tests, communal bonds, communitarian citizenship, diversity within unity, identity, libertarian citizenship, minorities, nation, national ethos, radical multiculturalism

The national community and subgroups

The term ‘national ethos’ refers to the particularistic values, traditions, identity and vision of the future (or ‘destiny’) of a given nation.¹ Nations are defined as communities invested in states. Communities are social collectivities whose members are tied to one another by bonds of affection and by at least a core of shared values (Etzioni, 1996). The term is best contrasted with the notion of national character, which tends to imply that all the members of a given nation have the same basic psychological profile and the same behavioural traits. In contrast to this term, ‘national ethos’ merely suggests that the relevant collectivity has the said attributes, but many members may not internalize them or view them in a positive light. The context of these deliberations are nations because despite strong arguments and major efforts to form more encompassing communities, especially in Europe, the nation continues to be the community that often commands the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the citizens in cases of conflict between the nation and these more extensive communities. As Anthony Smith of the London School of

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Economics put it 'who will feel European in the depths of their being, and who will willingly sacrifice themselves for so abstract an ideal? In short, who will die for Europe?' (Smith, 1995: 139). In contrast, MacIntyre's (1994: 303) statement that to ask people to die for their country is like asking them to die for the telephone company seems sociologically particularly uninformed.

True, less encompassing communities, especially ethnic groups such as the Basques, Scots and Walloons, often command even stronger loyalties than the nation. However, given that the matters at issue are sorted out largely in national courts and legislatures and more generally in national polities, the nation is for many countries the arena in which the issues at hand are worked out.

Abolish the ethos?

The thesis. Radical multiculturalists advocate resolving this tension by abolishing the particularistic values of nations, meaning those values which differentiate the one national community from another. This entails 'neutralizing' their distinct sense of history, identity and the future, in short their national ethos. They argue that the state should strive for normative neutrality centred around the protection of rights that all share and should not foster a distinct conception of the common good and the particularistic commitments it entails. Or, that the values to be promoted should be those that ease the said conflict, such as tolerance, diversity, rights and due process.

To illustrate: in 1999, the prominent British historian Linda Colley as part of then Prime Minister Tony Blair's series of 'Millennium Lectures', argued that given an increasingly diverse population and the bitterness and alienation caused by the 'ancestral and visceral' idea of British identity, this identity should be discarded and replaced by a renovated 'political and functional' idea of British citizenship (Colley, 1999). A similar vision was promoted in 2002, when the political theorist Lord Bhikhu Parekh chaired the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain and its widely discussed report concluded that because the United Kingdom had become a territory that English, Scottish, Welsh, West Indian, Pakistani and other such ethnic groups inhabit like tribes living next to one another with little in common, and because people living in Britain cannot adhere to the 'values of one community', (Parekh, 2000: 53) in order to avoid offending or injuring any of these groups, the government should avoid promoting any 'fixed conception of national identity and culture' (Parekh, 2000: 36).

Political theorists like Etienne Tassin, in an effort to reconcile social inclusion and political legitimacy, have promoted a type of 'constitutional patriotism', which 'refuses any convergence between culture and politics' (Labordé, 2002: 596). According to these theorists, allegiance to institutions and respect for justice and rights should be valued over a sense of shared associations, language and culture.

Jamie Mayersfeld of the University of Washington goes farther than many radical multiculturalists, stating that almost all forms of group identity are undesirable, national identity being by far the worst. He suggests that people should be

motivated by a type of 'civic consciousness' in which citizens would be committed to political and legal institutions (Mayerfeld, 1998).

Empirical concerns

An empirical study on the matter of national ethos, I suggest, would show that although a national ethos can be edited or recast (in effect, it continually is), it cannot be abolished outright. A state cannot avoid institutionalizing one set of particularistic values or another.

The issue at hand can be readily illustrated by exploring national policies regarding the weekly day of rest. The state could become neutral on this matter by allowing for those who prefer to open their businesses on Sunday as long as they close it on some other day of the week. However, given that public institutions such as government offices, courts, mail delivery, and so on will be closed on Sunday, along with the majority of businesses if we are dealing with a nation in which there is a Christian majority, minorities would still feel out of place. Only if all shops, especially all public offices, were closed on all three rest days observed by the three major religions (Sunday for Christians, Saturday for Jews and Friday for Muslims) would the state attain the kind of neutrality sought by radical multiculturalists – with regard to rest days.

Nor can one neutralize the particularistic effects of the 'mother' tongue (or tongues). Multiculturalists correctly point out that the primary language of a given nation contains a particularistic bias. If the tongue is English, people will be more inclined to read books, magazines, follow the news of and even identify with nations whose primary language is English. In contrast, if it is French, Russian, Chinese or some other language, their biases would run in a different direction. Hence, conflicts over which language should be the dominant one tend to be highly emotional and on occasion violent.² Attempts to neutralize the issue by making two or more languages co-equal (e.g. this was done in Canada and in Switzerland) still leave a particularistic bias (due to those languages not chosen) and tend to fail, as one language remains dominant (e.g. English in Canada and German in Switzerland). In short, the rights of the members of minorities can be fully respected, however, from an empirical perspective, the particularistic conceptions of the common good – invested in the national community, the national ethos – cannot be abolished. It can only be modified and attenuated.

Prudential concerns

In addition to the empirical concerns examined above, there are prudential reasons why not to seek to erase the national ethos despite its particularistic normative content. Public policies that seek to abolish the national ethos are perceived as a major attack on identity and psychological well-being by the majority of a given country's citizens (Huntingdon, 2004).

Further, radical multicultural drives have led to majorities in Europe supporting more conservative values typically with anti-immigrant positions. Thus, parties and policies that are perceived as attacking national identity -- and more generally, the national ethos -- add to other forces that are fanning xenophobia and nativism (Huntingdon, 2004; Pettigrew, 1998).

Given the very wide opposition to erasing the national ethos, even if such public policies were somehow introduced, they would be unlikely to be sustained. Indeed, Tony Blair, a master politician, flirted with Linda Colley's ideas on vacating Britishness for only a very short period, and no other public leader of any import has picked them up in the UK in the following years. Lord Parekh's report was roundly criticized and its multicultural recommendations were not adopted or even seriously considered. On the contrary, citizenship tests that estimate the extent to which new immigrants show at least familiarity with the host country's particularistic culture have been introduced in Britain, Holland and Germany, among other nations.

Normative objections

Although a national ethos can be attenuated to some extent and often to good effect (e.g. when nationalism is reduced), and it can be recast over time, by taking into account of the values and preferences of minorities – if significantly eroded – the nation, as a community invested in a state, will lose its capacity to provide human nurturing and to contribute to human flourishing.

Mountains of data – recently reviewed and augmented by Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama, and long before them by Robert Bellah and his associates, and scores of other sociologists – show that when communities are thin or absent, people suffer physically and psychologically. The absence of communal bonds causes people to feel detached, alienated and powerless. Such a community deficit leads some to withdraw from society, or act in antisocial ways. For hundreds of millions of people, nations are a major source of communal affiliation, even if they are merely imagined communities.

Communitarians have long shown that individual identity – a core element of the liberal image of the person – is insufficiently explained by liberal philosophy and is profoundly linked to community. Michael Sandel notes that we cannot understand ourselves but 'as the particular persons we are – as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic' (Sandel, 1998: 179).

Our capacity to act as reasoned people relies greatly on our being anchored in relatively thick communities. Moreover, community-wide conceptions of the good provide criteria used in finding which shared decision-making and which public policies are legitimate. They thus help curb strife and gridlock.

Communities, importantly, also provide informal social controls that reinforce the moral commitments of their members and that in turn help make for a largely voluntary social order. The most effective way to reinforce norms of behaviour is to

build on the fact that people have a strong need for continuous approval from others, especially from those with whom they have affective bonds of attachment (Wrong, 1994). Thus, communities can strengthen their adherence to social norms. Neo-communitarians see this persuasive power as a key function of communities, in part because it allows the role of the state and its coercive means to be greatly curtailed, as it is replaced by drawing on informal social controls built into communities, to promote the common good. Given that the national ethos helps to maintain the national community, it also helps to maintain this source of human flourishing.

Theoretically, a loss of national ethos can be compensated for by providing a new community that is more encompassing, say a regional one like the EU. But, so far, all such community-building endeavours have failed to provide a new community thick enough to provide the kind of flourishing that national communities provide. Furthermore, as the EU's difficulties in making Turkey a member and in absorbing nations such as Romania and Bulgaria make clear, regional communities have a particularistic ethos of their own.

To the extent that attempts are made to replace the national ethos with those of smaller communities within one and the same state, one finds that such developments lead to difficulties in forming state-wide policies, which require shared core values and a commitment to the common good to justify inevitable sacrifices. At worst, such developments invite secession and civil war. The first situation is illustrated by Belgium. The second by the breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as the civil wars that rage among ethnic, confessional and other tribal-like communities in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, in parts of Pakistan and in other states in which the national community is weak.

Finally, it is hard to see principled reasons that the sensibilities of the majority should be disregarded as the way to address those of the minorities. This is especially true because there are other ways to proceed, as we shall see shortly. To reiterate once more, reference here is not to rights. The rights of all members of minority groups are to be fully respected, whether or not such an observation discomforts the majority. Minority groups should not be denied the right to vote, assemble, worship, speak and so on, even if, for example, the majority fears that a given minority will use these rights in order to promote terrorism.³

Given, as we have seen, that the flourishing of all people entails nurturing communities, societal designs that combine the nurturing communities of both minorities and of the majority are more conducive to flourishing than those that require abolishing the national ethos and that offend the sensibilities of the majority.

Diversity Within Unity (DWU)

Diversity Within Unity (DWU) is a societal design that meets the requirement just laid out.⁴ Essentially it assumes that all citizens will embrace a core of values (the unity element) while being not just allowed, but welcomed, to follow their own

subcultures on other matters (the diversity elements). The DWU thus differs from both radical multiculturalism (which maximizes diversity) and full-blown assimilation (which maximizes unity). (Diversity Within Unity is not to be confused with unity in diversity, which is one of those oxymorons only a politician could love. It implies that increased diversity by itself will lead to greater unity, which is at least a very different idea from the one advanced here.)

I already outlined in some detail the reasons for which radical multiculturalism should be rejected. The same holds for full-blown assimilation, which demands that immigrants and other minority members assimilate to the point that they become indistinct from native citizens (a common expectation in France, for instance). Such a degree of assimilation is often difficult to achieve and unnecessary for social peace and community building, and it entails sacrificing the culturally enriching effects of diversity.

The images used for depicting these positions are telling. The melting pot is used to depict a society in which all differences are melted down. A salad bowl is used to depict a society in which various groups are tossed together but each maintains its original colour and flavour. Diversity Within Unity is akin to a mosaic that is richer for the difference in size and colour of its pieces but that also has a shared frame and glue, which can be recast but not abandoned.

Next, a list is provided as to which elements belong on the unity side and which on the diversity side. However, it is important to keep in mind that: (a) even if one divides this list in a different manner, the approach itself may still be of merit; (b) the elements that are considered essential for the unity part itself can be recast over time; and (c) finally, one should acknowledge that although I suggest that DWU is a preferable societal design compared to the others already cited, it is not likely to satisfy fully either the minorities or the majority, as it seeks adaptations from both sides.

The next step is to sort out which elements are part of the framework, and which can be particularized or remain particularistic. On the unity side: minorities must accept the core values of the society, obey the laws (until they are changed, if a given minority considers them a violation of their values), learn the nation's language(s), and share not only in the assets that history has bequeathed to the nation, but also in its burdens. For example, as an immigrant to America I cannot claim that I had nothing to do with slavery, and yet also claim that I am entitled to the rights that the Founding Fathers institutionalized. Similarly, a new German cannot pride himself on the achievements of Kant, Goethe and Bach without also sharing responsibility for the Holocaust.

On the diversity side: there is no sociological reason to prevent people from practicing their own religion or studying a second language that appeals to them either as the language of the country of origin (in the case of immigrants) or that to which they have historical attachments (e.g. native minorities such as the Catalans). Similarly, differences in cuisine, dance, the arts and music enrich the national community rather than undermine it. Personal legal matters and personal disputes can be settled by various ethnic/religious/tribal authorities, including marriage, divorce,

burial and mediation, as long as: (a) all the parties involved truly consent to submit to these authorities; and (b) no individual rights are violated.

DWU favours allowing minorities institutionalized opportunities to promote changes in all these elements through actions that range from seeking to change the laws to reconstructing and revising the national history (for instance, by changing the textbooks used to teach it); from adjusting their new nation's relationship to other nations of particular interest to fighting for social justice. However, as long as such changes have not been adopted, the relevant laws and public policies must be heeded.

At the same time, every group in society is free to maintain its distinct subculture – those policies, habits, and institutions that do not conflict with the shared core – as well as a strong measure of loyalty to its country of origin, as long as this does not trump loyalty to the society in which it lives if these loyalties come into conflict. Similarly, the *addition* of ethnic holidays to the national, 'unity' holidays enriches, for instance, the celebration of St Patrick's Day and Cinco de Mayo (Etzioni, 2004).

It is true that if the DWU design is applied, then the members of many minorities will tend to exhibit some sense of deprivation, based in whole or in part on societal realities. These realities can be addressed, for instance by certain kinds of affirmative action as well as by various rituals and even reparations. However, one should recognize that although these societal realities – and the sentiments that they generate – can be treated, they may persist to some extent for considerable periods of time.

The DWU design often benefits when considerable local autonomy is granted to those minorities that are concentrated in given areas. Examples include British devolution to the Scots and Welsh, Canadian devolution to the Quebecois, and Spanish devolution to the Basques and Catalans. However, this assumes that these minorities will refrain from violence, not secede (as the Slovaks did in Czechoslovakia), and will embrace the unity elements. Attempts to form separate sovereign territories for minority groups within the nation-state in which they constitute a minority violate the basic DWU design.

Whilst the DWU design is familiar to Americans to the point that it may be considered a natural part of social reality, a fair number of limited attempts have been made in the United States to break away from this design and to move towards other ones. Other nations, including most European ones and Japan, find the DWU design much more alien, one that may suit 'immigration societies' like the United States, but not their nations. They tend to favour strong assimilationist designs, especially in France, where even the collection of information along racial lines is illegal and minorities are given little autonomy. However, growing immigration and increased minority membership is forcing these nations to consider changes in their societal designs and move towards that of the DWU, whether or not they welcome these changes. At the same time, attempts to treat the problem at hand by trying to abolish the national ethos have practically died out, a loss – for reasons laid out in the first part of this essay – that should not be mourned.

Citizenship tests

Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have recently introduced classes in the host country's history, culture and language. In Germany, for instance, as of January 2005, would-be citizens and as many as 60,000 foreigners who have already entered the country must attend 600 hours of German-language instruction and an additional 30 hours of culture, history and civics classes (Hartnell, 2006). Unlike the state-by-state citizenship tests, these nationwide classes were introduced with the goal of integration.

Once in the Netherlands, in order to prepare for the main citizenship test, 'Newcomers are offered an integration program by the municipality in which they live. This program deals mainly with the language, but also with the way in which Dutch society functions.'⁵ Immigrants in the Netherlands who choose not to take part in the integration programme must find alternative methods of preparation.

In the United States, such classes – especially the teaching of English and pre-test preparation – have been provided for a long time largely by civil society bodies such as ethnic, religious and immigration groups. This is in contrast to Europe, where these classes are most often provided by the government. In both cases, the scope, amount and quality of the preparations provided are short of what is needed.

Some command of English is a prerequisite for gaining American citizenship. Various anti-immigration writers, campaigners and activists have argued that many immigrants, especially Hispanics and in particular Mexicans, refuse to learn English (Huntingdon, 2004). In actuality, immigrants are very keen to learn English, yet there is a great shortage of English classes for adults and there are long waiting lines where they do exist. For instance, a case study by the Maryland Department of Education found that although a million adults state-wide needed high school diplomas or English-language instruction, a shortage of teachers and funds was resulting in a waiting list of over 5000 for English as a Second Language (ESL) courses (Trijos, 2006). Such reports are common nationwide. In short, in the United States, the main issue is not the immigrants' refusal to learn English or to prepare for citizenship, but the lack of the means and resources to proceed with language instruction. The same holds for all other preparations for citizenship. For example, 600 hours may well not suffice to prepare immigrants from different cultures for German citizenship. In addition, the classes are provided by personnel who often have few qualifications (Ohlinger, 2006). In general, if a much more thorough citizenship preparation were to be provided, the test would become less onerous, less discriminatory and less anti-immigration. For those subject to these tests, the key question is not merely how much more taxing the new US and European tests are in content and format but, rather, whether the introduction of new and more demanding tests is accompanied by more and better resources for preparation.

Citizenship tests for alternative kinds of citizenship

Implicit in all the citizenship tests are distinct conceptions of what a good citizen makes. For the purpose at hand it suffices to list the differences among four concepts of citizenship, and the tests that reflect these conceptions and serve their implementation. (Because existing tests are not explicitly designed to reflect any particular political philosophy and often are the result of political give-and-take, they typically reflect a mixture of concepts of the requirements of citizenship, but still tend to lean towards one pure type or another.)

The *libertarian* approach to citizenship, in its purest form, views it as a status in a minimal state and accordingly limits what citizens' duties entail and the extent to which they are expected to participate in the state.⁶ Citizens should be able to vote (if they so desire), pay taxes (as few as possible) and obey the laws (which should be kept to a small number). Related citizenship tests are not only to be limited in scope but also largely cognitive; that is, they seek to establish people's knowledge of how to vote, what taxes are due and the content of basic laws, but little else. In short, such 'thin' citizenship requires but thin tests and relatively little preparation.

Another concept of citizenship essentially reflects a contemporary *liberal* precept. It focuses the questions on whether people are aware of their rights. Liberal citizenship may be understood as 'a set of rights enjoyed equally by every member of the society in question', writes TH Marshall (1992: 24). Liberal citizenship tests determine whether future citizens are aware of their right to free speech, and that it cannot be denied. They seek to ensure that citizens know that they are free to form any associations as they wish, practice their religion and so on. Writing on liberal citizenship, Rawls (1993: 26) asserts that citizens of a liberal state are political entities 'whose essential nature is most fully realized in a democratic society in which there is widespread and vigorous participation in political life'. Because immigrants are often unaware of their rights and what is to be done when these rights are violated, preparation for liberal citizenship needs to be quite extensive.

Some liberals go a step further and argue against all but the most basic impediments to naturalization (although for different reasons than libertarians). In a response to Noah Pickus, Joseph Carens posits that 'as a matter of fundamental justice, anyone who has resided lawfully in a liberal democratic state for an extended period of time (e.g. five years or more), ought to be entitled to become a citizen if he or she wishes to do so' (Carens, 1998: 143). At the heart of this line of reasoning lies 'the moral priority of civil society in relation to political society'. Once someone has lived in a country for a sufficient amount of time, his or her membership in that country's civil society outweighs his or her lack of political knowledge. This liberal view holds that while normative values such as loyalty, patriotism and identity should be encouraged, the state should not 'impose such an expectation' on immigrants but, rather, let those values come with time (Carens, 1998: 146).

A *neo-communitarian*⁷ concept of citizenship views citizens as both right-bearing individuals and as persons who must assume responsibilities toward each other and

toward the community at large. These communitarians draw a distinction between state and society (or community) and view the nation as a community invested in a state. Hence for the neo-communitarian, a citizen has responsibilities not merely toward the political entity (e.g. obeying the state's laws), but also toward the national community (e.g. supporting its core of shared values). Citizenship tests that are suitable from a neo-communitarian perspective must encompass normative commitments and not merely knowledge. They should test not just knowledge of one's rights, but also a readiness to assume responsibilities.

Preparation for neo-communitarian tests would include considerable efforts towards acculturation, but not the fostering of a melting pot or assimilation in the sense that it would encourage the eradication of subcultures of various immigrants. Generation after generation of immigrants who were first viewed as undermining American society and its core of shared values have become an integral part of it, including Jewish immigrants and immigrants from Catholic countries (especially from Ireland and Poland), without giving up their subcultures and ethnic identities. With regard to immigration to the United States, I see no compelling reasons to try to assimilate immigrants into one indistinguishable American blend. There is no need for Greek Americans, Polish Americans, Mexican Americans or any other group to see themselves as plain Americans without any particular distinction, unique ethnic history or subculture. As long as they accept the core of shared values and institutions, they are free to diverge on other matters. Hence a proper citizenship test should establish both whether they are acculturated (on some key fronts) and are fully aware of their right to keep their differences in many other areas of citizenship.

Finally, *authoritarian communitarians* view citizenship as being an integral part of the whole. They hold that to maintain social harmony, individual rights and political liberties must be curtailed. Some seek to rely heavily on the state to maintain social order (for instance, leaders and champions of the regimes in Singapore and Malaysia), and some on strong social bonds and moral culture (a position widely held in Japan). Authoritarian communitarians also maintain that the West's notion of liberty actually amounts to 'anarchy'; that strong economic growth requires limiting freedoms; and that the West uses its idea of legal and political rights to chastise other cultures that have inherent values of their own. Often, nations that ascribe to such a view of citizenship rely much more heavily on other means of immigration control than on demanding citizenship tests.

Actual tests: Varying composites

To reiterate, none of the citizenship tests currently in use have been drafted to adhere to any of the conceptions of four types of citizenship just listed. Indeed, often one and the same test reflects various strands, although the tests tend to lean towards one conception of citizenship or another. For instance, the current American test is thin and largely cognitive. Thus, it asks applicants the colours of the American flag and what the Fourth of July denotes, but does not even try to

assess whether the responders have developed any commitments to individual rights or to shared American values. One could know what the colours of the American flag are and when Independence Day is celebrated without having acquired any commitment to the state or to the society at large. Furthermore, the current American test asks very little about rights. In short, it is basically a thin, libertarian test.

The new British citizenship test introduced in 2005 contains many questions that stress basic knowledge about Britain, some familiarity with British history and social knowledge. It also tests applicants on some aspects of their rights and responsibilities as British citizens (Home Office, 2007). For those with lower levels of English, applicants can choose to pass a language and citizenship course (Home Office, 2003).

The Dutch use two tests. The test to become a naturalized Dutch citizen is similar to the British one, in that it asks about basic knowledge of Dutch language, culture, history and civics. A second test – a pre-arrival exam – incorporates the controversial *Coming to the Netherlands* video, with its sexually explicit scenes as well as depictions of crime-ridden immigrant ghettos in the Netherlands. It focuses largely on the acceptance of key values, but mostly on those that are related to rights (e.g. tolerance, the rights of women and freedom of expression) and not to shared responsibilities (such as a willingness to serve in the armed forces and fight for one's new nation).

The new American citizenship test, introduced on a nationwide level in 2008, still contains numerous factual questions, such as how many Senators serve in Congress and how long a presidential term is.⁸ At the same time, the new test is much more neo-communitarian than the old one, in that it quizzes applicants not only on their knowledge of their rights as Americans, but also on their responsibilities. Among the questions about rights are: 'Name two rights that are only for United States citizens' and 'What are inalienable rights?' Some questions concern responsibilities to the state: 'Name one responsibility that is only for United States citizens' and 'Name one promise you make when you say the Oath of Allegiance.' To the extent that the new test incorporates dialogue about civic responsibility, it echoes the intent of some of the United States' earliest naturalization courses (as opposed to tests), which Noah Pickus found were designed to 'inculcate a basic conceptual understanding of democratic principles' and to 'emphasiz[e] the importance of political and social participation' (Pickus, 2007: 123). However, the test contains no questions about volunteerism, communal service, how to be a good neighbour, or even responsibility towards one's children and elders, not to mention towards those most in need. It has no questions similar to the British one about promoting community cohesion.

If the kind of citizenship tests used is not aligned with the governing conception of citizenship, testing will tend to undermine rather than help implement that conception. Thus, if a nation seeks that all its new citizens will be tolerant but it tests only for basic knowledge, more and more citizens will not abide by the governing norms. Whether one favours or opposes such 'subversive' citizenship tests

depends on the ways in which one values the governing conception of citizenship. Thus, one may favour libertarian tests for Singapore but not purely knowledge-based ones for well-established democracies.

In nations, however, if the tests are not to act as anti-immigration and discriminatory measures, they must be coupled with suitably extensive and qualified opportunities for citizenship education and for test preparation. The limited data briefly cited here strongly suggests that neither is currently the case in any of the nations under study.

Notes

- 1 This paper draws substantively on two previously published articles (Etzioni, 2007, 2009).
- 2 Reuters (1986) and *Washington Post* (1986).
- 3 As the solution that this article proposes rests on the assumption that the basic rights of minority groups will be fully respected, those who live in constitutional democracies will more easily relate to it than people in theocracies. Regardless, this is a normative article, and should apply to all peoples.
- 4 Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies (2002).
- 5 Immigranten Naturalisierungsdienst (2006).
- 6 For more on libertarian citizenship, especially the rights and responsibilities of citizens of a libertarian state, see Boaz (1997), Chapters 3 and 7.
- 7 I include myself in this category. See Etzioni (2006a), Etzioni (2006b) and Etzioni (1996). For more on communitarianism, see Communitarian Network (2011). For a more wide-ranging comparison of liberal versus communitarian models of citizenship, see Mulhall and Swift (1992).
- 8 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (2011).

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