I . . . now see that our society does not often
produce or
even imagine genuinely antiracist white people.2
David Roediger has identified a central problem in the reception of "Whiteness
Studies," finding that such studies are "often read as if they derived
from a tame multiculturalist interest in difference rather than from analysis
of power and exploitation."3
My essay on "failing" white womanhood sets itself the task of producing
and imagining "genuinely" antiracist performances of whiteness through
the bodies of white women. Because this project is located within "whiteness
studies" and because it utilizes the structuring methodology and findings
of those studies, Roediger's caveat serves appropriate notice about the
continuing dangers attendant to the reception (and, sometimes, the production)
of such work. Indeed, that danger is real and pervasive enough, I believe,
to warrant a discussion of both the essay's methodology and its larger
social and political goals. As in race studies generally, the central methodological
imperative driving whiteness studies is to interrogate and, as this essay
will investigate, to re/perform race (especially, in this instance, whiteness)
as a social construction. Whatever the reception, at the level of production
the best of whiteness studies does demand that any exploration of the possibility
of "genuinely antiracist white people" begins precisely in the foregrounding
of "power and exploitation." As Jon Panish explains, a social constructionist
approach illuminates "the shifting historical relations" between peoples
of color and whites, as well as within what Richard Dyer calls the
"internal hierarchies of whiteness."4
By focusing specifically [End Page 183] on "racial difference as
a relational entity," this approach necessarily "makes power relations
a central feature of its analysis."5
Most important to my purpose here is that this relational approach affords
us a view of what Ruth Frankenberg terms "whiteness unfrozen."6
That is, when viewed as constructed, as relational, as "ensembles of local
phenomena complexly embedded in socioeconomic, sociocultural, and psychic
interrelations," whiteness productively emerges "as a process, not a 'thing,'
as plural rather than singular in nature."7
Produced, then, through a methodology that knows whiteness to be both relational
and overvalued within hierarchies of power and exploitation, the goal of
this study--the imagining and the performing of an antiracist white womanhood--really
can have virtually no shelf-life, and even less consumer appeal, as a "tame
multiculturalist interest in difference."
Alvin and Heidi Toffler write that when struggling to wage peace, "Anti-wars
must match the wars they are intended to prevent."8
Translating the Tofflers in the present context, I would argue that the
revolution in racial warfare in the United States since the New Deal requires
a matching revolution in racial "peacefare."9
If racist whiteness is a process, then the goal of antiracist
whiteness is most productively understood to be "a process, not a 'thing,'
as plural rather than singular in nature," as well. Specifically, if racist
whiteness is understood as constructed through the shifting historical
relations between peoples of color and whites, as well as within "the internal
hierarchies of whiteness," then it is crucial to develop understandings
of antiracist whiteness that match the performances of those historical
relations with corresponding performances of contemporary resistance. In
short, antiracist whiteness must perform new relations with the subjectivities,
the ideologies, and the material legacies of those historical relations.
Towards unpacking the idea of antiracist performance as process, as ongoing
negotiations in time and space of historically specific relations, this
essay is organized around one vastly complex, multivalent relation that
cuts across both the internal and external borders of whiteness. This is
the relation of white woman to "the family." Four performances of that
relation structure the essay: first, my own performance of professor-as-antiracist-white-woman
in the classroom; second, the performance of "the wife" in Steven Spielberg's
Saving
Private Ryan (1998); third, the performance of the sole white woman
of the "LA Riots" in Anna Deavere Smith's Twilight: Los Angeles 1992
(1993); and, fourth, an antecedent to "genuinely" antiracist performances
of white womanhood, the one-woman show of stand-up comic Kate Clinton.
Before turning to these performances, I need to expand upon the historical
relations they engage. All serious scholarship on whiteness comes to understand,
in Roediger's words, that "the central political implication arising from
the insight that race is [End Page 184] socially constructed is
the specific need to attack whiteness as a destructive ideology."10
George Lipsitz offers an eloquent rationale for this understanding when
he works through his enormously generative phrase "the possessive investment
in whiteness." He writes that "whiteness is, of course, a delusion, a scientific
and cultural fiction that like all racial identities has no valid foundation
in biology or anthropology."11
At the same time, however, he determines that whiteness is "a social fact,
an identity created and continued with all-too-real consequences for the
distribution of wealth, prestige, and opportunity."12
Explaining one of his keywords, Lipsitz remarks that he uses the adjective
"possessive" in an attempt to
stress the relationship between whiteness and
asset accumulation in our society, to connect attitudes to interests, to
demonstrate that white supremacy is usually less a matter of direct, referential,
and snarling contempt than a system for protecting the privileges of whites
by denying communities of color opportunities for asset accumulation and
upward mobility. Whiteness is invested in, like property, but it is also
a means of accumulating property and keeping it from others. While one
can possess one's investments, one can also be possessed by them. I contend
that the artificial construction of whiteness almost always comes to possess
white people themselves unless they develop antiracist identities, unless
they disinvest and divest themselves of their investment in white supremacy.13
Lipsitz's other keyword clarifies the precise contribution that his twinned
concepts of "asset accumulation" and "the possessive investment in whiteness"
make to the work of my essay, work that traces performances of white womanhood
as they both "invest" and "disinvest" in white supremacy. Lipsitz writes
that he uses the term "investment" to suggest the ways in which "social
and cultural forces encourage white people to expend time and energy on
the creation and re-creation of whiteness."14
By virtually all accounts, the single most important institution for "the
creation and re-creation of whiteness" is, of course, "the family," but
not just any family. This is a family with quite specific and predictable
characteristics. In fact, so specific and predictable are the tropes through
which this family is constituted that Frankenberg finds them to be "repetitive"
across time and space "to a degree that would be banal" were they not so
"devastating in their effects."15
Frankenberg composes a family picture, a "simple quartet"--White Man,
White Woman, Man of Color, Woman of Color--to suggest that these tropes
have been and are "coconstructed, and always hierarchically so." Demonstrating
the "complementarities" that give meaning to the tropes of White Man and
White Woman, Frankenberg observes:
White Man as Savior would founder without White-Woman-who-must-be-saved.
Similarly, without Man of Color as predator, White Man loses much of his
sense of worth and purpose. . . . White Woman's ambiguous and ambivalent
status in this family of tropes is striking: she is, on the one hand, accorded
privileges and status by this race/gender positioning, and, on the other
hand, confined by it. In any case she is advantaged only conditionally
on her acceptance of the terms of the contract. This includes especially
her [End Page 185] sexual practices, for the trope-ical family is
strictly heterosexual and monoracial in its coupling.16
As we shall see, when this essay examines white woman's relation to "the
family," the presence of all four members is "felt" even in performances
where a man or woman of color does not seem to be anywhere present. For
as scholars of color have long documented, Woman of Color (as trope) and
Man of Color (as trope), even in their putative absence, remain absolutely
crucial to the meanings and dynamics of "the (white) family."17
Woman of Color and Man of Color each constitutes a "not-I" that determines
the historical and ongoing contours of White Woman's performance of "I."
That is, White Woman's "nature" is constructed through historically specific
and predictable performances of relationality, through maneuverings for
best possible position within hierarchical scales of tropological value.
As Frankenberg's research acknowledges and as virtually the entire history
of writings by peoples of color in the United States documents, this is
a performance the history of which most "actual" white women continue to
know nothing about, or know a little about but are unable or unwilling
to see its present workings in their own personal "style," their own [End
Page 186] individual habits of being and believing. Rather it is White
Woman's "nature" of purity (in heart, mind, and most problematically, flesh18
), her "innocence," for which she is most known, and, perhaps, most knowable
to herself.
As Frankenberg's "complementarities" suggest, however, within a social
constructionist approach even that "essence" is understood to be formed
relationally. It is formed through explicit opposition to the indecorous
excesses of Woman of Color's "essence," in resistance to the predatory
appetites of Man of Color's "essence," and in hopes of the safe judgments
and protections of White Man's "essence." These relations produce White
Woman's meaning, and her "power" to either invest or disinvest in white
supremacy. Turning, then, to the four performances, I will examine the
performative trope that most forcefully carries, or embodies, White Woman's
"essence": the trope of "respectability." For each performance is structured
through this trope and its functioning in the dynamics of white supremacy.
Moreover, two of the performances, my own and stand-up comic Kate Clinton's,
interrogate two self-styled attempts at refusing White Woman's respectability
and the familial relations sedimented in it.
Race, Sex, and the Public Body
In the fall of 1996, two months into my first tenure-track job, I was charged
with sexual harassment. As the charge was originally articulated to me
by the school's Vice President for Human Resource Services, the suit was
filed by an older female student due to my teaching of Douglas Crimp's
"The Boys in My Bedroom" and Kobena Mercer's "Looking for Trouble," as
both are anthologized in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader.19
Of course, to be sure, I did do precisely what the charge alleged. In an
advanced second year course configured under the English department's general
rubric of "critical thinking," I mapped a course that would explore "Issues
in U.S. Multimedia Representations of Race and Sexuality." For eight weeks,
the class engaged the work of John Berger, bell hooks, Marilyn Frye, Audre
Lorde, Cherrie Moraga, Toni Morrison, Gayle Rubin, Cornel West, Linda Williams,
and various writers publishing in Race Traitor, the "journal of
the new abolitionism." Then, as happens in classrooms where critical thinking
is taking place, a "live" cultural debate walked in through the open door:
the United States Senate was once again deciding to fund or not to fund
the National Endowment for the Arts. So on a Tuesday morning in San Diego
County, California, at a college the mission of which is to serve the underserved
and the underrepresented, I taught the two texts as worthy exempla of the
histories, the stakes, the hopes (misplaced or not) of sexually explicit
representations. And by "taught," I mean to say that I encouraged, facilitated,
and participated in [End Page 187] a fiercely "dialogic" conversation
with them, with Crimp's appreciation of Robert Mapplethorpe's explicitly
homoerotic appropriation of the Eurocentric high art canon, and with Mercer's
disavowal of Mapplethorpe's complicity--intentional or not--in the white
supremacy of that very same tradition, specifically in its representations
of black male sexuality. That morning I also "taught" (in the same vein)
the current issue of Playboy, as well as the morning newspaper,
Frederick Hartt's two-volume history of Western art, a postcard of Michelangelo's
David,
Carrie Mae Weems' Kitchen Table series, and a recent billboard on
I-5 advertising a new brand of tequila.
During the ensuing three-month investigation, I was told by administrative
allies and skeptics alike that it was the "sexuality" of the class and,
perhaps, of the professor herself, an out queer on campus, that was under
scrutiny. The Vice President called me at home to say that whatever I had
done in the classroom I "shouldn't have done" because whether it wound
up being criminal or not, it was, at the very least, "inappropriate." I
was reminded to keep my office door open when students came by, and not
to touch or look at them inappropriately, and, of course, never to socialize
with them. This series of commands conflates, of course, academic freedom
and intellectual property with sexualized predation, yet this is how a
public contest over meanings and methodologies--an ideological, epistemological
conflict--is shrunk to an institutionally manageable (read: winnable) size:
it is declared a matter of private shame.
I have chosen the sexual harassment case against me, including the "act"
that resulted in the charge, as the performance with which to inaugurate
this discussion of White Woman, her respectability, and its centrality
to White Woman's place within the family because the case so fully gives
shape to what Kate Davy calls the "dynamics of the politics of respectability."
As she puts it, an "analysis that employs, as a tool, the dynamics of the
politics of respectability assists in the project of making visible the
politics of race and opens spaces for further exploration and intervention."20
I hope to use, then, this analysis of my own performance, this public announcement
of private shame, as a means both of explicating and of asking for sustained
critical attention to Davy's focus on those dynamics, especially as they
secure the racial as well as sexual compliance of white womanhood in the
service and institutions of white supremacy. What I mean to emphasize here
is that for three months I believed that the issue in this sexual harassment
case was "sex," whether queer sex, public sex, sexually explicit sex, or
some combination of the above. And because I, like everyone I've ever known
who has come anywhere near such a charge, did take it quite seriously,
I thought hard about whether or not I had unwittingly and inappropriately
sexualized the classroom. But I now believe that I was wrong at the time
in the very premise of my thinking about the sexual harassment case against
me as primarily "sexual." Or, at the very least, I believe that premise
to be wildly incomplete in its understandings of sexuality and race as
truly interwoven, interdependent discourses: I was not only a queer
woman in class; I was a queer white woman. The class was not only
engaging sexually explicit images, but it was engaging the racially
specific imperatives structuring those sexually explicit images, their
production and reception. One would be hard-pressed, I had to admit, to
call the class--or my performance in it--"respectable." [End Page 188]
After the investigation, my assistant professorship--whether the action
of "demotion or dismissal" was to be taken against it--was a final agenda
item at the next Board of Governors meeting. The student who had filed
the complaint was given the floor and introduced herself as a returning
student, a mother, a self-employed businesswoman, a member of church and
community. She spoke of how sexually explicit images degrade women. She
spoke of her plans for her future education as a mental health professional.
Finally, though, she found and gave voice to what I believe was the core
of her complaint with the class and my performance in it. She explained
that she was forced to read writers she had "never heard of" and "couldn't
understand," writers who urged her to critique whiteness, to become a "traitor"
to its codes, practices, and ideologies. The student then announced that
her great-grandfather was black and that even so she had never suffered
discrimination of any sort. She reiterated that she has a place within
the community, a respectable position within civil society, and sat down.
I had been counseled to wear a dress and hold my silence, to perform, in
other words, a femininity whose unimpeachable respectability was equal
to that of my student.
Due to the efforts of my department, my dean, the academic senate, the
other students in the class--in addition to the determination made by the
school's attorneys that my pedagogy simply did not, in jurisprudential
terms, constitute sexual harassment--I was exonerated of the charge. But
the specificity of the charge continues to challenge my thinking today
because it was, after all, a "sexual" charge. And I don't think it was
"sexual" just because there is no "the-professor-is-a-traitor-to-whiteness"
charge (well, not currently in the state of California). I believe
the student chose a "sexual" charge because that description was as nearly
accurate of the site of my transgression as the student could locate within
current discursive regimes. The transgression was "sexual" because I had
profoundly betrayed that student on both a personal and cultural level,
and I had betrayed her precisely by refusing to seduce her, by refusing
to reproduce through and with her willing, desiring self the canons and
codes of educated, polite, successful, bourgeois society--the very society,
that is, of my student's imaginary--the respectable society in which she
could be recognized as a respectable woman, or, perhaps, simply as Woman.
The canons and codes I call forth here comprise what Dreama Moon terms
"Whitespeak."21
Whitespeak is framed within the "discursive repertoire" of "color- and
power-evasiveness" identified by Frankenberg in her groundbreaking study
of "actual" white women."Color- and power-evasiveness" is a
repertoire that attempts to abolish race difference
by means of evading the naming of differences of power organized by racial
category and simultaneously evading acknowledgment of individual complicity
with those very same differences of power or privilege.22[End
Page 189]
Moon finds that Whitespeak, then, is a "racialized form of euphemistic
language in which what is not said . . . is often far more revealing
than what is said."23
Its function and effect is to maintain the speaker's and listener's "discursive
and psychic distance from matters of race."24
In addition to such euphemistic evasions as saying "separate" when meaning
"segregated," practitioners of Whitespeak employ a host of other racially
erasing elements to maintain the "bourgeois decorum" of polite conversation.
For instance, Moon finds that "subjectifying" race and racism renders concepts
the agentive subjects rather than the people embodying those concepts.
That is to say, Whitespeak allows that "[r]acism is a problem in the U.S."
but not that "[t]he people who employ the tools of racism are a problem."
Similarly, Moon determines that employing "anonymous agents" in racialized
discussions leads to racial "disembodiment."25
For example, media reports of school shootings continue to speak of anonymous
"killer children" thereby disembodying the racial and gender specificity
of those "child perpetrators" as uniformly white and male. Finally, Moon
finds that a racialized use of the passive voice serves to make "the agent
of an action . . . disappear completely."26
Thus while the proposition "Thai women are exploited in Los Angeles's garment
industry" is certainly a "truth," the salient fact of "by whom" (and its
corollary, "for whom") is glaringly and consistently absent in Whitespeak.
(As Frankenberg's research cogently suggests, this sort of passive evasion
of agency happens just as frequently in the "liberal" discourses that putatively
interrogate racial structures--it is so much easier to say "Asian women
are exoticized in sexually explicit representation" than "White supremacist
Eurocentric media produces orientalist fantasies of Asian women, and 'we'
consume those fantasies voraciously, or, at least, indiscriminately." I
contend that the former version is "easier" to say not only because of
the word count but also because there is no one's agency to determine,
interrogate, or indict, one's own included.) Given that these and other
"truths" are disseminated widely across various racial and ethnic lines
by virtue of communications and information technologies, "Whitespeak"
clearly stands at the ready to serve the interests of hegemonic, institutionalized
whiteness whether the racial identification of the speaker is white or
not.
I can make no claims, finally, about the racial identification of the
student who lodged a sexual harassment complaint against me. But I will
advance the suggestion that whatever her racial self-identification (or
identifications) may be, her response to both me and the "discursive repertoires"
that were critiqued through the syllabus had to do with my specific and
explicit performance of professorial white womanhood. I failed in my performance
of White Woman, especially in her reproductive capacity, at least to some
extent, by actively, willfully, and, yes, joyfully transgressing the borders
of her historical relations. Neither the syllabus nor the professor's engagement
with its many voices, its urgent voices speaking "race" and "sexuality"
could ever be counted as money in the bank by my student. To participate
in the syllabus's breakdown, its realigning of the "trope-ical" family's
historical relations was a profound embarrassment, not an asset, to my
student. To develop the languages of antiracist cultural [End Page 190]
critique was not the cultural capital that she expected and demanded to
purchase at an English department in an institution of "higher learning,"
a cultural site that most any student in the U.S. could rightly anticipate
to be the very repository, as Toni Morrison has so eloquently shown, of
Whitespeak and its corollary, the white imagination.27
While I have to acknowledge that my student did not get what she bargained
for (although I have to hope that had she stayed in the class, perhaps
she would have gotten more), I still do mark some small satisfaction
in this particular performance of failure. I mark it as a measure of some
success in my own rapidly accelerating coming to consciousness about the
"dynamics of the politics of respectability" in my own life (including
its role in my ability to earn a wage), and in my ability to make visible
those dynamics through performing and privileging new relations within
the "trope-ical family."
In this context, it becomes clear that to envision antiracist whiteness
as a process of performing new relations is to envision a radically new
public body for white women. Michael Warner writes that the historic and
hegemonic public sphere has been occupied by a public body that, while
mythologized as "abstract," is in fact "the male, the white, the middle-class,
the normal."28
This exclusion from ever "being" the public body does not mean, of course,
that White Woman has no privileged relation to it. While White Man may
stand firmly entrenched at the apex of the network along which the assets
of whiteness are unevenly distributed, White Woman's very "conditional"
and "ambiguous" status demands that she maintains not only her own vested
interest in the flow of traffic on that network but her own vehicle through
which she negotiates it. In my discussion of the next two performances,
I will explore how White Woman secures her place in the family and its
network of assets through the vehicle of heterosexuality. It is worth noting,
then, that my own performance could be similarly explored. Although White
Woman has been excluded from the hegemonic and bourgeois public body, that
exclusion has produced its own form of participation in the public sphere,
even though that participation is not so much one of occupying the public
body as it is one of being occupied by that body, a relationship
that can best be described in terms of historic and hegemonic heterosexuality.29
Through my performance of respectability (complete with skin color, silence,
and a dress) before a Whitespeaking (and -hearing) Board, I was allowed
to buy this queer white woman her next paycheck, and (so far) the
ones after that. My multiply articulated respectability, my demure respectfulness
for the proceedings, all signaled my "attachment," in Marilyn Frye's words,
to the ways and means of White Man, to the system of rewards and punishments,
the asset distribution, of the "trope-ical family."30
In short, I, a queer [End Page 191] woman, performed a truly convincing
heterosexuality. I performed White Woman's historical and heterosexual
relation to White Man much as it was satirized quite succinctly by Virginia
Woolf in 1929. With withering irony, Woolf lauds women's "magic and delicious
power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size" and, with
quiet precision, she connects woman's need or desire to do so with her
constant threat of an empty purse.31
Frye brings a racialized specificity to these twinned aspects of White
Woman's heterosexual commitment when she writes that White Woman's "attachments"
to White Man have "a great deal to do with our race privilege"--the tangible
and intangible rewards of white supremacy--as well as with racism.32
Through the following two performances, I hope to further track these
"attachments" toward a map of their exchanges. If White Woman reflects
White Man at twice his natural size, what in the way of "race privilege"
has she purchased? And, to invert the question, if White Woman secures
her own "race privilege" through her heterosexual attachment to White Man,
what does her "attention," her reflection secure him?
The Good (White) Girl
In a previous article on "Queer White Woman as Spectator," I sought to
advance an antiracist spectatorial position for queer white women by challenging
the "dangerous presumption" that a queer spectatorship is
de facto
a racially transformative spectatorship.33
I looked specifically at cherished queer (white) performances of early
1990s films such as the characters Idgie in Fried Green Tomatoes
(1991) and Lt. Ripley in Alien 3 (1992) and explored the premise
"that my queer look at the movies is not separable from my white woman's
ways of knowing and seeing; from, in other words, my white woman's ways
of queer desire itself."34
Moreover, those performances were located within narrative and filmic conventions
that were "dependent on certain historical and predictable states of relationality
between white womanhood and people of color."35
In short, I found that a queer white woman's spectatorship is often a white
supremacist spectatorship, locating its pleasure and its so-called "emancipation"
in filmic performances that are structured through conventions of diegesis,
point of view, focalization, and others congruent to those that construct
white masculine heroes.36
While I am, here, still highlighting my spectatorial positioning as that
of a queer white woman maneuvering her way through more or less useful
antiracist practices, I am no longer looking for the putatively bad girls
of queer iconography. Now I am looking for good girls, the very
good girls who exemplify respectable "family" values. Before addressing,
then, in the final performance of this essay, whether stand-up comic Kate
Clinton fares any better than I in disrupting White [End Page 192]
Woman's structuring relation of heterosexuality or its most rewarded performative
trope, respectability, I turn to Saving Private Ryan and Twilight:
Los Angeles 1992 to put more flesh on the bone, as it were, on this
emerging image of White Woman and the exchanges through which she "becomes"
a racially privileged subject. For to present a successful bid for racial
value, White Woman must meet three critical terms of the white supremacist
contract--she must offer a reproductive sexuality (reproductive, that is,
of the "trope-ical family"), a heterosexual sexuality (as much in terms
of affiliations and alliances as of bodily "desire"), and a presentation
of self that honors the decorum with which White Man invests all his self-reflective
institutions, even (or especially) White Woman.
Saving Private Ryan stands as Steven Spielberg's vaunted contribution
to fin de siècle meditations on "the greatest generation."37
For while it is the story of the guts and dogged tenacity of the everyman
soldier, it is likewise the story of arguably the most revered public body
of the twentieth century, or, at least the public body most immune to critical
historical revision, the American GI of World War II.38
It is quite remarkable, then, that virtually no synopsis of the movie's
plot would even recall the character on whom this discussion now focuses,
the GI's wife. Of course, that oversight would seem to be duly warranted
by the film's narrative--after surviving D-Day, a group of ragtag soldiers
led by Captain John H. Miller (Tom Hanks) is ordered to search out another
soldier, a stranger to all of them, in order to bring him out of battle.
The soldier, young Private Ryan (Matt Damon), is being sent home because
the Army realizes that his family has already lost three sons in the war.
Tragically, in successfully completing its mission, the squad is decimated
and Captain Miller is killed in battle. But the film doesn't end in World
War II. After Miller's death it cuts to contemporary time in the cemetery
at Normandy. And importantly it is there, in that time and space, that
the film constructs the rhetoric of its two final moments.
There are really two endings to Saving Private Ryan. The first
ending is a scene that mirrors the film's opening scene in which an anonymous,
white family silently follows its patriarch to a grave marked with a Christian
cross. When the father crumples in grief before the tombstone, the story
of saving Private Ryan begins in flashback. Echoing that opening, the final
scene shows the labored self-reflection of the father, whom we now know
to be the former private, some fifty years later, at the grave of Captain
Miller. Likewise, the film's second ending is an image that also mirrors
the very opening image of the film, an American flag. In the film's final
shot, the flag emerges through a dissolve from the captain's white cross
to a brilliantly backlit vision of a wind-stirred Stars and Stripes. Combined,
the two endings take less than four minutes of an almost three hour film.
Their centrality to the film's meanings, then, is a [End Page 193]
testament to the compression and reliability of their symbols, not the
least of which is White Woman.
The first scene is framed, in several shots, by Ryan's family. For while
the family is always in the background, it is nonetheless in motion--one
member moving from left to right, a child being picked up--so that the
spectator's eye is constantly drawn to it. This is the white patriarchal
family, that bedrock of respectable society, which functions as an authorizing
and seemingly "necessary" discourse, across various media, in representations
of American cultural, economic, political, and military supremacy. Yet
while "the family" in this film may be monoracial and the very image of
authorized society, its symbolic value is mobilized only through the figure
of White Woman and her various refusals within the explicitly racialized
"trope-ical family." White Woman literally embodies both a meditation on
and a mediation between the white patriarch and his life's meanings, as
those meanings are stored in the family he was apparently saved to reproduce.
One of the ways White Woman fulfills this function is through the film's
positioning of the white actress (Kathleen Byron) within the depth of field--White
Woman occupies middle ground between the family and the patriarch, thereby
making visible and simply "making" the relationships between the two, a
task she accomplishes by being the only body that actually moves between
the family and Ryan. In other words, it is White Woman who enacts the real
"saving" of Private Ryan. For it is she who embodies and articulates White
Man's symbolic worth in Spielberg's (re)vision of the twentieth century.
As with other of Hollywood's culturally sensitive historical revisions
of the 1990s (Unforgiven, Heaven and Earth, among others),
the narrative space and filmic trope of White Woman in Saving Private
Ryan remain startlingly unrevised:
Scene:The Allied Forces cemetery
at Normandy, fifty years later. Wife joins husband at the graveside
of his fallen commander.
Wife:(addressing her husband)
James. (Following his eyeline to the tombstone, she reads the name)
Captain John H. Miller.
Private Ryan:(looking into
wife's eyes) Tell me I've led a good life.
Wife:(incredulously) What?
Private Ryan: Tell me I'm a good
man.
Wife:(looking first at the
grave, then at her husband) You are.
In this exchange, which contains the sum total of the unnamed wife's four
lines of dialogue, White Woman connects the dots, giving the spectator
a strong outline of exactly what has been saved at this moment in American
history. She familializes "the soldier" of a war distant in both
time and place by calling him by his "Christian" name. Her mise en scène
may be a soldier's graveyard in France with its palimpsestic layerings
of nationality, history, identity, and loss, but Hollywood's White Woman
transforms it into a kind of interior space of confession and self-renewal
for the "American" family and its patriarch. When Ryan's wife calls her
husband's name, she shifts the film's temporal focus--along with spectatorial
empathy--to Ryan's "here and now," the privileged tense of American cultural
memory. By next placing Captain Miller's public, formal name in the context
of her husband's intimate, familial name, she effects a "deterritorializing"
of the past. White Woman yanks Captain Miller from his historical moorings.
By setting him loose from his historical specificity, which might very
well include a sense of the futility of his sacrifice in terms of his own
life, White Woman makes the fallen soldier available to function, at film's
end, as what [End Page 194] Dyer calls "the white ideal."39
He now can represent a more universal sacrifice. He now can signify that
which is Christlike in the figure of White Man, for, wrenched from his
moment, he no longer embodies the specific strife or loss of actual battle,
but, more universally, the "dynamic of aspiration, of striving to be, to
transcend, and to go on striving in the face of the impossibility of transcendence."40
Most significant to my reading of this scene, though, is that it is White
Woman who effects this transformation in the nature of Captain Miller's
sacrifice. It is White Woman's words that transform the sacrifice of Miller's
life for Ryan's into an ahistorical sacrifice, a universal striving for
transcendence. It is, finally, White Woman's words that absolve White Man
from any specific historical debt, or burden, or guilt that he might reasonably
be expected to feel.
By placing the two lines of dialogue ("James" and "Captain John H. Miller")
in the mouth of White Woman, the scene provides the context for an evolutionary,
teleologic reading of the film's temporalities--the historical time of
WWII with its sacrifices and obligations, the vaguely contemporary time
of the grave scene with its assessments of a life's worth, and the abstracted
patriotic time of the final image of the American flag, with its powerful
suggestion of the "American Century." White Man himself is uncertain whether
the relations among these temporalities are teleologic. He is unsure whether
he has indeed "earned" this life purchased by the deaths of so many, as
his dying captain's final words exhort him to do. Only White Woman brooks
no doubt that the history of the twentieth century has led inevitably and
correctly to this present moment in her family's life and to their future
moments as imagined in the brilliantly lit emblem of the American Century.
White Woman is absolutely central to the meaning-making apparatus of the
film, then, when she affirms to White Man and to the spectator that it
is indefensible even to question this singular truth: the individualized
American white patriarch--as well as his reproduction--is the deserved
beneficiary of the combined sacrifices of lives, materials, and nations
as represented by the cemetery at Normandy. It bears remarking that White
Woman reflects the size of White Man's contributions at some aggrandizing
level of magnification not only within the film's diegesis, but for the
spectator as well. White Woman sets the measure of White Man's very considerable
value in this film, and she does so not by virtue of particularly clever
dialogue or a deus ex machina, but by virtue only of the sheer workhorse
serviceability of White Woman as a barometer of White Man's worth. Within
the heterosexual economy of white supremacy, White Woman would seem to
be a bargain for White Man at twice the price.
In her final two lines of dialogue, White Woman addresses the questions
posed to her by White Man. While the history of
bildungsroman in
U.S. literature, among other genres, might seem to suggest otherwise, I
believe one might argue persuasively that [End Page 195] Ryan represents
the first generation of American White Man that has had to ask these questions
(Have I led a good life? Am I a good man?) against such a vast cacophony
of possible challenges to a self-affirming answer. For the "trope-ical
family" has a sizable population of survivors living in the diaspora, and
they have been serious about answering the Man's questions, whether or
not he can hear them. But discounting--or, more accurately, simply preempting--such
challenges is White Woman's incredulity that the White Man could even have
such doubts. The film utilizes, in other words, the historic and hegemonic
sociosymbolic weight of White Woman's moral--her racial and heterosexual--imperative
to refuse any interrogation whatsoever of the rights and responsibilities
of White Man. White Woman rescues--or "saves"--the sociosymbolic positionings
embodied by Ryan from the last forty years of multiple cultural critiques.
These are critiques, it goes without saying, that might not arrive at the
same conclusions White Woman does about the cultural position of White
Man or the global position of the America for which he served and in which
they both entrust their grandchildren's futures.
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson writes that having
"to 'have already forgotten' tragedies of which one needs unceasingly to
be 'reminded' turns out to be a characteristic device in the later construction
of national genealogies."41
This paradox of "memory and forgetting," he notes, can be accomplished
through "the reassurance of fratricide." As an example, he writes:
A vast pedagogical industry works ceaselessly
to oblige young Americans to remember/forget the hostilities of 1861-65
as a great 'civil' war between 'brothers' rather than between--as they
briefly were--two sovereign nation-states. (We can be sure, however, that
if the Confederacy had succeeded in maintaining its independence, this
'civil war' would have been replaced in memory by something quite unbrotherly.)42
To establish White Man and White Woman as the anointed progenitors of the
American national genealogy, which Spielberg does in the final scene of
Saving
Private Ryan, entails the very exercise of "memory and forgetting"
of which Anderson writes. The great wars between White Man and White Woman--witch
burnings, property rights, suffrage, educational access, pay equity, social
equity, reproductive rights, divorce rates, incidence of rape and domestic
abuse, among so many others--may be remembered and simultaneously forgotten
by being reduced to "fratricide," to "a series of antique slaughters which
are now inscribed as 'family history'"43
(Anderson 1991, 201). In popular culture, from sitcoms to newsmagazines,
these struggles are "remembered" (if at all) as family anecdotes featuring
individuals and their personal trials. They are "forgotten" as power struggles
over relative access to resources, the ability to distribute same, as well
as the recognition--or not--of sovereign, defensible borders.
What women of color have revealed, of course, about white feminist memory
is that it too forgets as much as it remembers. It too understands the
history between White Man and White Woman as (sadly) fratricidal but nonetheless
familial, and in doing so, [End Page 196] it remains committed to
the ongoing family project of whiteness: to reproduce itself, to reproduce
whiteness, especially in the form of its public body, White Man. To remember
or to produce White Man as (war) hero of the twentieth century, the unnamed
white wife of Saving Private Ryan must enact multiple moments of
"memory and forgetting." She remembers that he is a hero but forgets that
he went to war where others died so that he might survive. She remembers
that he is a "family man" but forgets that the term is an honorific maintained
by police actions where most bodies (her own included) are marked for exclusion,
sometimes extinction. It is central to the possibility of a genuinely antiracist
white womanhood to recognize, therefore, that what the unnamed White Woman
produces through this "memory and forgetting" is not only White Man's position
but her own relative "mobility" within the hierarchical relations she shares
with him. She righteously strides toward a place--her rightful place--of
proximity to the public body of White Man. For, really, we do know her
name, don't we? She is Mrs. James Ryan, U.S. Army, Ret. White Woman
has claimed for herself a body with both a name and a place (albeit once
removed) in the public history of the twentieth century.44
The Too Good (White) Girl
In the late spring of 1993, Anna Deavere Smith previewed her one-woman
show Twilight: Los Angeles 1992 at the Mark Taper Forum in downtown
Los Angeles. Her subject, of course, was the beating of Rodney King, the
rebellion following the first verdict which cleared the officers of wrongdoing,
and the rebellion's aftermath. In her hallmark "journalistic" or "reportorial"
style, Smith interviewed participants in these events, then enacted portions
of those interviews "verbatim" as monologues.45
Among [End Page 197] the interviewees who made the cut and appeared
as characters during the preview performance that I first attended were
Rodney King's aunt, Angela King; Daryl Gates, the Chief of the Los Angeles
Police Department at the time of King's arrest and beating; Reginald Denny,
the white trucker pulled from his rig at Florence and Normandy, the rebellion's
ground zero in South Central; as well as Korean-American shopowners; a
white male juror from the Simi Valley trial of the four white male police
officers; an African-American female juror from the federal trial; a pregnant
Latina whose fetus suffered a bullet wound to its elbow; and a white male
talent agent in Hollywood. In my interrogation of the performance of respectability
by White Woman, there is, then, a singularly striking fact about this riveting
tour
de force of performance and text. Of the twenty-seven characters with
whom Smith opened this studiously multivocal show, only one was a white
woman. Eight were white men.
In an interview conducted a few months after the opening, Smith sifted
through the issues raised by that sole representation of white womanhood:
[T]he one white woman who is represented . .
. shows the Denny beating when she talks about it, and she's really, really
disgusted by it, and very disillusioned, and basically says, "As far [as]
I'm concerned they can all go out and work for a living now." And many
people applauded after her speech where she says, you know, white people
are getting really, really angry. She speaks of a white rage which I think
is a real rage, but I think probably what I have to do is go back into
the field and try to find out a little bit more about white women's fear.
What I'm curious about is, whenever I hear something, I just wonder how
much--this is all conjecture; it's probably dangerous to talk about on
tape--but I wonder how much white women feel empowered to talk about black
men in particular, and there's no way you can really talk about this story
without talking about black men.
What I'm learning is there's different ways
that I would like to understand more what the protocol is in the white
community. When the white man speaks, to what extent does he protect the
white woman from speech, even?46
Throughout, this essay has read performances of white womanhood through
two related questions concerning the "protocol" of white speech. First,
what indeed is that protocol in the white community in regard to
White Woman's speech? And, second, to whose benefit does White Woman follow
protocol; to whose benefit does she speak? Turning now to Smith's performance,
I would argue that its distinct value is, in no small measure, the sheer
discomfort produced by its explicit answers to the questions. The process
of engagement with the White Woman of Smith's performance is quite different
than it is when interrogating Mrs. Ryan. To grapple with Mrs. Ryan is to
come to terms with a central icon of American nostalgia: the (white) grandmother,
who although no longer viable in the sexual economy is nonetheless fiercely
(and, as the affirming mythology goes, "blindly") protective of her man,
his accomplishments, and their family. To grapple with Smith's White Woman,
however, is in many ways more "immediately" difficult for any white woman
who has not yet achieved iconographic status, but who does have to earn
a wage, for Smith's White Woman is an aggressively [End Page 198]
contemporary woman, a woman whose racial politics are baldly matrixed within
a single working woman's drive to survive and thrive in a bewilderingly
competitive, hostile environment.
Listed in the preview program as "Ground reporter, LA News Service,"
Judith Tur appears midway through the show, one character after the white
Hollywood agent who is listed as "Anonymous Man #2." Although the man's
race is nowhere marked in the program, it is "readable" as white, however,
through Smith's physical vocabulary in imaging his voice, his taking up
of all available space (even while seated), his ease with success. More
importantly, though, the man's race is marked by the man himself--he has
not simply sequestered himself behind a barrier of racial fear. Rather
he has ventured out into the various images and experiences of the rebellion
to learn something. He has learned to see whiteness. White Man himself
ponders the threat of the violence spreading to his neighborhood and asks,
"Do I deserve this? I mean me personally? No. Me generically? Maybe." And
White Man himself complicates the conundrum of why "they" are destroying
their own neighborhoods and not "ours." He reaches this epiphany: "I began
to absorb a little guilt. And I deserve this."
Against this theatrically and socially powerful moment in which White
Man takes a first step toward becoming "a white man" (a "genuinely" antiracist
white person), the next white person, the only white female, enters the
conversation. In direct contrast to White Man's coming to terms with his
racial specificity, arrogance, and privilege, Judith Tur frames her experience
by pronouncing, "People are people." White Woman thus mobilizes the bourgeois
myth of the public body as an unembodied body, the myth that says, as Warner
puts it, the "white male qua public person [is] only abstract rather
than white and male."47
Tur mobilizes this myth in an attempt to disarm the political rhetoric
and cultural context of the rebellion in which the fact that some bodies
are racially marked for policing actions is held up for public scrutiny.
Yet as we learn that she once had to work at a grocery store after being
saddled with the debts of a husband who died before she could divorce him,
Tur's own racially specific understandings, her racially specific habits
of "memory and forgetting" begin to emerge. For as she rewinds and plays,
over and over, the beating of Denny (by "real brave men, right?"), Tur
presents herself as someone who has endured the indignities of menial labor,
who has persevered against great emotional and material odds in order,
finally, to earn a hard-won voice in the public sphere as a professional
news reporter. Tur presents herself, in other words, as someone whose experience
is similar to that of the folks participating in the rebellion, similar
with one glaring difference: she actually worked hard and got ahead. It
is this similarity/difference that provokes White Woman to say, "Let them
go out and work for a living. I'm sick of it."
I attended the opening run of Twilight twice. The first time
was the preview show when Smith was still "on book," reading directly from
the script for much of the show, as well as choreographing the show's blocking.
The second time was six weeks later. Much had changed in the interim: the
video montage of the beating, verdicts, and rebellion was not only shortened
but moved from a position as prologue to a sort of brief intermission;
some characters were either dropped or abridged, and others were added.
White Woman's segment was itself abbreviated, not only in the text but
also in [End Page 199] a more economical blocking of the stage business
with the Denny video. One of the few things that remained absolutely constant,
then, was the meaning of white womanhood in the rebellion. Like
Smith, I too remember scattered but significant pockets of spectatorial
agreement when Judith Tur proclaims white rage. What I also remember, though,
in both performances, is the almost virtual silence that greeted
the
end of White Woman's segment. After having wildly applauded "Anonymous
[White] Man #2," his racial redemption, no one in the diverse audiences
could seem to find redemptive value in the show's, or the rebellion's,
White Woman. By the end of her segment, White Woman had been marked (had,
in fact, marked herself) as the show's, and the rebellion's, one completely
unredeemable racist. Why?
Even given the differences in "the content of their character," Mrs.
James Ryan and Judith Tur have much in common as narrative spaces. While
medium, genre, and spectatorial communities may make the two performances
"play" in radically different ways, each does figure White Woman in an
important revision of U.S. history. Each functions within a war genre (Spielberg's
1940s Hollywood war movie with 1990s hand-held technologies and Smith's
documentary, journalistic assemblage of interviews and battle footage),
and each thus carries the diegetic weight of White Woman within narratives
that are self-consciously revisionist and conflictual. Within this context,
the figure of White Woman embodies what Smith provocatively calls the "protocol"
for speaking whiteness. Yet while Mrs. Ryan effectively remembers to forget
whatever won't advance the status of her man, her family, her nation, or
herself, Judith Tur unforgivably forgets her place. Mrs. James Ryan may
not be loved, or even remembered, after one has viewed Spielberg's film,
but the object of her speaking--the aging veteran, the White Man of America's
century--is both remembered and revered (according to box office receipts,
popular reviews, and even Tom Hanks' campaign to fund a WWII memorial).
Judith Tur, on the other hand, is reviled as a racist. That is because
Tur's White Woman misspeaks. She uses a now-unspeakable form of Whitespeak:
overt racialization.48
Tur may begin in "people are people" but she cannot sustain the myth of
that abstraction in the face of the material fact that Smith's story, unlike
Spielberg's, actually has black folks in it. As Smith says, "there's no
way you can really talk about this story without talking about black men."
Presented with the concrete fact of the racially marked body (angry bodies,
at that), White Woman's Whitespeak cannot maintain the contradiction of
its structuring ideologies in bourgeois decorum--White Woman cannot maintain
the contradiction that demands that she speak a polite "color- and power-evasiveness"
in the literally racialized face of the rebellion. Because she is able
to read the historical and ongoing economic disenfranchisement of the peoples
of color who are committing acts of violence against people and property
on her television screen only through her own past experience of economic
vulnerability, Smith's White Woman reaches the conclusion about those people
that generations of whites have before her. The difference is that Judith
Tur [End Page 200] breaches the protocol of respectable white society
by actually speaking the (thinkable but publicly) unspeakable: Let them
go out and work for a living. I'm sick of it.
Ultimately, Whitespeak fails both white women as autonomous subjects,
for the narrative task of each White Woman's voice is to shore up White
Man. Mrs. Ryan accomplishes this in obvious fashion. Judith Tur accomplishes
this as much through her voice's placement within Smith's performance as
through her Whitespeaking itself. Placing a Whitespeaking White Woman directly
after the plain speaking white man (no caps--he's transforming from a racist
trope to a thinking man) serves to mark her racially as the carrier of
the white disease, a disease which only white man is capable of both diagnosing
and curing in himself. It is remarkable, to be sure, that one performance
is necessary to tell White Woman's story of the LA rebellion when it requires
eight white men, nearly a third of the show's characters, to represent
the vast range of White Man's participation in and responses to the rebellion.
Of course, each White Man has a separate story to tell, a story of individual
action, or self-discovery or racial revelation. In marked contrast, it
takes only one White Woman (whether revising the history of WWII or the
LA rebellion) to tell the story of what, in effect, is a relationship to
subjectivity. With neither the narrative nor the performative mobility
of Subject, White Woman is left to patrol the definitional boundaries of
Subject, policing its exclusions, mimicking its practices, and "being"
its excess. As singly represented by Tur, White Woman's only source of
social conflict or consciousness is gender, not race. Even gender manifests
as a source of oppression, rather than power, only upon the disruption
of White Woman's familial relation to White Man, only when the white wife
has to get a job upon the death of the white husband. Indeed, as long as
White Woman remains in relation to White Man (like Mrs. Ryan), her heterosexualized
gender is actually the locus of her power. Tur is racist, then, because
her one defining social relation is to White Man. And when White Man appears
under siege in a racial context (symbolically through the video of Reginald
Denny's beating, the countrapuntal video to King's beating), when White
Woman's source of social, sexual, symbolic, and economic identity is threatened,
White Woman's singular reaction is racialized fear and loathing: racism.
The Bad (White) Girl, or The Act of Becoming a CounterPublic
Body
Perhaps it is in the promise of disrupting this historical relationship
between White Man and White Woman that "queer" has the most to offer an
antiracist critique of white womanhood. Although, as my own performance
noisily attests, "queer" certainly doesn't work antiracist magic, it does
offer some practical tools in waging antiracist "peacefare" at the very
sites upon which racist warfare has been so successfully entrenched, even
escalated: White Woman's heterosexual and reproductive imperatives, as
well as her related respectability. Queer theory provides an analytic framework
in which hegemonic heterosexuality emerges as a knowable, though seemingly
infinite, set of ideologies, practices, and structures that are institutionalized
across multiple, often conflicting, identities, as well as across competing
sexual practices. To conscript this general critique of heterosexuality
into the special service of an antiracist white womanhood, though, is to
refocus much of queer theory. First, to juxtapose a critique of hegemonic
heterosexuality with a critique of White Woman brings into view the often
hidden ways in which both a hetero-desiring and homo-desiring White Woman
(re)produces hegemonic heterosexuality (namely, Mrs. [End Page 201]
Ryan and myself as, in many ways, equally successful practitioners of heterosexuality).
Second, this juxtaposition directs attention to the fact that neither our
inscription in nor our (re)production of hegemonic heterosexuality is the
"natural" performance of our bodies; rather it is the cultural tax exacted
from those female bodies for occupying the prime location of cultural proximity
to "the public body." Finally, to work with and within this juxtaposition
is to direct a new attention to the potential threat posed by an explicitly
queer/ed white womanhood. This is the threat that a white womanhood might
actually choose distance over proximity as its desired relation to the
hegemonic public body, and that it might do so in the service of an antiracist
whiteness specifically. For to embrace the distance that queer white womanhood
both suffers as punishment and enjoys as difference from heterosexual white
womanhood is to withdraw white womanhood's substantial and absolutely depended
upon attachment to the public body. It is to produce tears in that hugely
expensive social safety net protecting the public body, that grid of historical
relations sedimented in the "trope-ical family." To "queer" white womanhood
could well become, then, a serious challenge to hegemonic and bourgeois
whiteness itself.
Nancy Fraser speaks of the sociopolitical histories of "women, workers,
peoples of color, and gays and lesbians" as more or less successful examples
of what she calls "subaltern counterpublics."49
These are alternative discursive arenas, or oppositional public spheres,
where "members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses,
so as to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests,
and needs."50
Certainly, queer performance has been one such discursive sphere. As David
Román suggests:
Queer people know well that identities are dynamic
and contingent--and queer solo artists perform this fact and do so generously.
Queer solo performance comes out of a sense of community and thus helps
inform and shape our understanding of identity and community. Queer solo
performers trouble the comfort of community even as they invest in it .
. . . One could even argue that queer solo performers are often at the
frontiers of new social identities and more inclusive community formations.51
In queer performance, as in other queer political actions, to "trouble
the comfort of community" has been to engage with critiques of that community
such as Barbara Smith's when she writes that "today's
queer politicos
seem to operate in a historical and ideological vacuum. Queer activists
focus on queer issues, and racism, sexual oppression and economic
exploitation do not qualify, despite the fact that the majority of queers
are people of color, female or working class."52
Revolution, Smith determines, has become a "largely irrelevant concept"
to a queer movement where "radical grass-roots strategies to eradicate
oppression" have been "largely replaced by an assimilationist 'civil rights'
agenda" focused on discrimination not oppression. She further finds that
if "the word radical is used at all, it means confrontational, in
your face[End Page 202] tactics, not strategic organizing aimed
at the roots of oppression."53
While I would be unable to maintain a strict opposition between "in your
face tactics" and "organizing aimed at the roots of oppression," I do find
the conceptual distance Smith places between the two to be a provocative
move in discussing queer performance. For turning now to my final example
of performing white womanhood, I will trace the ways in which a performance
of White Woman might transform, consciously, explicitly, and, perhaps,
even "genuinely," into a performance of a queer white woman engaged in
antiracist realignments and refigurings of historical relations. An examination
of such a performance measured, then, against its contributions to an exploration
of the "roots of oppression" poses two salient questions about that performance:
in whose face are we performing and, lest we forget, whose face
are we saving?
The work of stand-up comic Kate Clinton is particularly germane to this
discussion. Clinton's career has been among the most long-lived (since
1981) and high-profile careers of any "out" performer, especially a performer
whose material is, and always has been, both explicitly queer and explicitly
political.54
Equally relevant here, though, is Clinton's stage persona itself--a Los
Angeles Times reviewer once said, "Kate Clinton is the lesbian you
want to take home to meet your parents."55
In The New York Times review of Clinton's off-Broadway one-woman
show, Out Is In, Ben Brantley declares Clinton to be "accessible
to most audiences this side of Jesse Helms" and, undoubtedly, the title
of his review says it best: "Lesbian Humor, Sunny and Sharp."56
"Sunny" would not pass a Rorschach test for its associations with "in your
face tactics" and there is something about Clinton's stage persona that
is just so very good (white) girl, so very respectable that not "liking"
her would be "impossible."57
Clinton is obviously not "the menopausal gentleman" or "the lady dick"--the
"killer lesbians" of queer performance.58
Unlike other queer white women such as Peggy Shaw and Holly [End Page
203] Hughes who perform consistently and distinctly disreputable "femininities,"
Clinton's stock in trade is precisely her "respectability." But to overlook
her work in searching for antiracist performance because the comic trades
in the cultural currency of respectability is to miss the double meaning
of the pun. To say that Clinton "trades in" respectability is to say not
only that she cashes in on its drawing power to attract audiences but that
she literally trades in her respectability, she exchanges it, for something
else altogether. And that "something else" is not, I will argue, the "racial
privilege" of hegemonic white femininity.
Over its nearly twenty year span, Clinton's work has engaged in its
own historical revisions, the most noticeable of which are the comic's
two versions of that venerable queer chestnut, the coming out story. For
Jill Dolan, the lesbian coming out story has played only too well in the
bourgeois realist traditions of theatre because "the focus on such a transitional
moment within the realist text traps the lesbian in a negative relation
to heterosexual culture and disallows a full exploration of alternative
lifestyles and sexuality."59
In the "classic" texts of lesbian coming out that Dolan reviews, bourgeois
realism performs at least two acts of violence against the lesbian. First,
it "reinstates" the lesbian in its own terms of subjecthood as "unitary"
and "transcendent," and, second, it locates that subject in a "binary opposition
with heterosexuality."60
Further, Dolan finds that coming out, like all crises within bourgeois
realism, must become a "fait accompli, the problem resolved, the
deed completed by the narrative's end."61
This imperative to resolution elides the material reality of most lesbian
lives where "coming out narratives lack closure, since the dominant culture
operates under a heterosexual assumption that forces lesbians to continually
reassert their resistant identities."62
The title of Clinton's 1985 coming out story, "Straightening Up," refers,
of course, to the process some lesbians go through to "de-dyke" their homes
when "the folks" come to visit. The title of this performance alone would
seem, then, to textualize Dolan's findings, for it would seem to trap the
lesbian in a "negative relation to heterosexual culture" and to preempt
a "full exploration of alternative lifestyles and sexuality." At the same
time, however, "straightening up" qua queer process does hint at
the unresolvability of the coming out "crisis," its resistance to closure,
and the unavailability of "lesbian" to re-casting as the universal subject
within the heteronormative narrative of bourgeois realism. [End Page
204]
Clinton begins the bit with an exhortation to her audience: "You
know. You gotta look at your place with new eyes. You gotta check
it out!":63
You go through your bookshelves. You take all
of the books out that say "lesbian" on them. You take them out and put
them in backwards. Right? You step back, you feel like you're on the wrong
side of a trick bookshelf. And then there is: "What to do with the fake
bedroom?" You've got to go into that bedroom and make it look like somebody
has been in there in the last two years. You know? "Yes, Mom, I know the
entire bed is made of cinderblocks, but that's just the way I like it"
. . . . You go through the place and you think you've got it covered and
there's stuff you don't even see anymore. You've left the feminist tarot
deck out, and your little four-year old niece who loves to play old maid
makes a bee-line for the cards and you've got to get those cards out of
her hands before she gets to the card of the lovers with the three women
making love. . . . The bathroom? You don't see any stuff in the bathroom.
You have an inflatable pillow in the bathtub. Oh, come on. There're candles
in the bathroom. It's wet in there. A little wind-up toy in the
soapdish? You don't even see it.
The historical moment of this piece is important in understanding its discourses.
The mid-1980s saw the drawing of lines in the sand within lesbian communities
over "the sex wars." These were battles that Lillian Faderman classifies
as being between cultural feminists and sexual radicals over appropriate
forms, practices, partners and ideologies of sex between women.64
In other words, these were battles over the very terms of identities (or
anti-identities) based in sexuality. Clinton's routine flirts with both
positions. On the one hand, this segment is in no way sexually explicit,
merely suggestive of a sort of romanticized erotic relationship, soft porn
perhaps--candles, bathtub pillows, wind-up water toys. On the other hand,
this routine does locate the impossibility of lesbian passing squarely
at the site of a queer sexuality: lesbians can no longer enter the heteronormative
narrative--we cannot pass--because our own sexual spaces, practices and
apparatuses mark our difference.
Clinton continues--telling of inviting friends over, "the mysterious
friends,"
to meet the folks:
Friends come in and, oh god, you're so proud
of them. They are trying to be so discreet and so wonderful. And first
of all, you notice that they're all women. Uh-oh. And a lot of them come
by twos. And you introduce them like it's one word: bonnieanddeidre, susieandkathy
. . . . They come in and they look great. They've
worked on this.
You didn't know that so many of your friends still owned skirts . . . .
They come in and first of all they see each other and give each other little
kisses and hugs, totally un-self-conscious. Un-believable. They
come in, they sit down on the couch, too close . . . . And they're talking
and they give each other little conversational squeezes on the arms. An
impromptu neck massage. Don't do that. Don't! But you could just die with
pride, though, because they're being so smug and so proud of themselves
that not once has one of them said that she's a lesbian.
Structuring, though not explicitly articulated in this sketch as such,
is a sense of lesbian as a subject colonized within the dominant cultural
discourse of heterosexuality. The colonized subject, in Homi Bhabha's words,
is the "subject of difference" from the [End Page 205] universal
subject, a subject who is "almost the same, but not quite."65
In the normative codings of subject/object in bourgeois realism, heterosexuality
is the subject, while lesbian is the crisis, the almost, but not quite,
that must be resolved. Trapped, then, as Dolan says, by a form in which
difference is introduced only to consolidate the power of the subject,
and in which heterosexuality is the subject, Clinton can only evoke
but never fully exercise, or fully explore, the power of the colonized,
the ways of knowing and being of "the other."
Clinton does not at this point restructure or reclaim the heteronormative
narrative itself. While she does resists its closure, its re-casting of
lesbian as more universal and less different, she does not yet mark this
resistance as a failure on the part of the colonizing heteronarrative to
remake the queer woman in its own image. Instead the lesbian's resistance
to universal subjecthood and narrative closure remains a failure, a "lack"
(however celebrated), on the part of the lesbian; it is not a problem with
the bourgeois realist narrative itself. Thus positioned in subject/object
binary opposition to heterosexuality, Clinton's work in a bourgeois realist
narrative can (at best) only posit lesbian as a site of refusal (as resisting
object); it cannot offer lesbian as a site of heterocritique (as agentive
subject).
Almost a decade later, however, "the folks" pay another visit in "A
Family Outing" (1992):66
When I first came out to them they shunned me,
which, when I think about, I kind of enjoyed. I mean, I had more time then.
Now they want to come and visit. Now we're getting to be friends. I'm not
sure if I like this. When they first would come and visit I would go through
that whole thing where you go around and you de-dyke the apartment. We
call it "straightening up." Yes, homophobia does begin at home. I used
to go through that whole thing and friends would come over and they would
want to give a good impression to Mom and Dad. They would be like Eddie
Haskell lesbians . . . . My family had a great time. Now I get calls from
them: [Mom's voice:] "Well, honey, we got the super saver ticket and we're
going to be there from Tuesday to Tuesday next." Two weeks? I don't think
so. Now I notice that instead of de-dyking the apartment, I crank it up.
Leave out old copies of On Our Backs . . . open, around the house.
It begins dialogue. [Deepens voice:] "Well, Mom, I don't know how
anybody could get their legs behind their ears like that. She is
clean, you're absolutely right. No, I've never done anything like that
. . . well, not kneeling."
And then you leave out a big 10-speed variable
vibrator by the bed, invite Dad in: [Deeper still:] "Yeah, Dad, give it
a whirl. It's a Black & Decker. Go ahead big fella. Come on, get your
safety glasses on, things are gonna fly . . . ." Then you bring him into
the bedroom and there's a huge leather harness over the bed. "Yeah,
Dad, I rigged it up by myself, it's a beauty, isn't it? I did not do the
leather work, no, but I did put all the electrical in. It's a beautiful
thing. It goes back and forth. It's on that track up there. It operates
on this little box right here. Watch. I can go in the other room. Pick
mom right out of a chair." And, suddenly, you've got a mom piñata.
This part of the show gets so hostile I can't
even stand it. And then I picture hitting the mom piñata.
And the child within falls out.
Look at all the therapists here. They're goin'
[Therapist's voice: deeper, aroused in its disapproval:] "Ooeeeee, have
we got one here! We could put a porch on the house with this stuff." But
it works. It does work. They came on Tuesday, they were gone on Friday.
My mother said, "Um, honey, I've got a sweater soaking at home. We'd better
go."[End Page 206]
I agree with Clinton. Something does work in this performance: if in the
first coming out story, Clinton comes out to the family as a lesbian
with (more or less) presentable friends, in the second story she comes
out at the family as a power/tool wielding provocateur of disreputable
practices and their ideologies. In the process, the comic refigures coming
out. It is no longer a bourgeois realist text--a crisis for the queer.
Coming out is now a hole, a rent in the very fabric of bourgeois realist
narrative--an unforeseen, unresolvable crisis (an "outing," a present progressive
process) for the family.
One of the things I find most valuable in thinking through the three
minutes and forty-five seconds of this neo-coming out performance is the
complexity of the human relations represented. There is no simple and binaristic
opposition between White Man and White Woman, with bad and good, powerfulness
and powerlessness, guilt and innocence lining up in easy-to-surveil couplets
like schoolchildren returning from recess. Rather, I believe this sketch
serves to make visible to the critical eye, rather than merely to reinscribe,
the historical relations of "complementarity" between man and woman, or
between queer white woman (daughter) and straight white woman
(mother). And by doing so, by critiquing those relations rather than reinscribing
them, this sketch gets in the face of queer white woman by refusing
to
save face for her when it comes to revealing her complicity in the
dynamics of the politics of respectability within the white bourgeois family.
In examining White Woman's role in colonialist narratives, Richard Dyer
concludes that "[d]oing nothing, nothing" provides "the basis for the complex
construction of a particular white femininity," for the White Woman of
such narratives comes face-to-face with the material, ideological and affective
legacies of institutional racism only to pronounce herself helpless in
the grip of such tenacious historical relations.67
Clinton's performance, in contrast, offers a queer white woman taking the
first step toward becoming an active agent of antiracist practice. Most
importantly to this exploration of the possibility of "genuinely antiracist
white people," Clinton explores the "roots of oppression" by examining
her
own position as "the child within" both respectable white femininity
and the family it (re)produces. For the comic may shatter the image of
White Woman in the form of the mom piñata, but what emerges is not
the daughter's absolution from the mother's historical burdens; instead,
what emerges is her very own "self." Clinton borrows the pop cultural metaphor
of "the inner child" and demonstrates what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick finds
as its meaning: to speak of one's "inner child" is to present "one's relation
to one's own past as a relationship, intersubjective as it is intergenerational."68
As Sedgwick suggests and Clinton enacts, queer white woman's relation to
her bourgeois family of origins is not only a relationship to that family,
a relationship from which the child could simply "fall out," but that relationship
is also to one's self, to the subject that was constructed through
that family. Most significantly, by virtue of Clinton's image of "the child
within," the pre-coming out past is not declared dead for queer
white woman. "Coming out" cannot be misconstrued as an event, finite in
time and space, through which emerges a privileged and brand new--or ahistorical--subject
of radical alterity. Instead "coming [End Page 207] out" is an ongoing
process of realigning historical relations. For queer white woman, "coming
out" comes with and through a past in the "trope-ical family's" bourgeois
ideology that requires attention and negotiation in the present.
Of the four performances of white womanhood discussed in this essay,
only Clinton's succeeds in utterly failing to reproduce. Quite literally,
the comic frees the queer white woman from the image of white motherhood
by smashing the "mom piñata." Of course, the comic effects this
refusal to reproduce the "trope-ical family" by using White Man's own tools--Clinton's
performance of queer white woman mimics white father in a "representation
of difference," to employ Bhabha's formulation, "that is itself a process
of disavowal."69
Clinton appropriates White Man's epistemologies and apparatuses of power
and control, yet when the daughter drops her voice to a masculine register,
it is not to become White Man but to seduce him (via Bhabha's
sense of mimicry as reassuring to the colonizer in its promise that queer
white woman will almost be White Man, but not quite). And
what Clinton seduces the White Man into is the role of spectator to her
performance. She forces the white family to look at queer white woman's
re-valuing of its most powerful tools. And what they see is those tools
being used to dismantle, not consolidate, the no longer stable edifices
of gender, sexuality, and class--the foundational discourses of respectability
that authorize the white family's primacy in the cultural imaginary. Admittedly,
the family sees all of this in a relatively small window of opportunity
before they retreat to the more pressing business of hand washables. Still,
in Clinton's imaginary, at least, when the queer white woman uses her cultural
currency to buy her own set of daddy's power/tools--and uses them against
the family not in alliance with its subject-building codes--"things
are gonna fly."
Ultimately, Kate Davy may well be quite correct when she writes:
Performative strategies that challenge the institution
of white womanhood are not inherently anti-racist. In order to function
in ways productive to an anti-racist project, challenges to white womanhood
must be foregrounded as such; that is, they must be marked in such a way
that the institutional apparatus of white womanhood in its effacing, obliterating
mode is, at the very least, exhumed from its status as unremarkable to
be re-marked.70
True, Clinton does not expressly place "A Family Outing" in the service
of antiracist whiteness. To do so is still undoubtedly not "funny" to many
in her audience, a fact that tells us a great deal about the genre of white
stand-up comedy particularly and the racialized structures of humor in
U.S. culture generally. Clinton's performance does not serve as an overarching
model for antiracist white performance. Unquestionably, in a culture of
multiply articulated and embodied white racisms, no single performance
could or should. What the comic's performance does offer, however, is one
powerful and compelling antecedent for work that engages the "roots of
oppression." Clinton's performance may not offer, then, a "failed" white
womanhood. Quite possibly, though, it gives us something more useful for
our time: a white womanhood in the process of failing. That is,
Clinton's queer white woman (likewise, and even more starkly, my own) does
not yet perform a new public body, a body completely and confidently separate
from and counter to hegemonic white masculinity [End Page 208] and
its supporting contexts of institutionalized respectability, helpmate femininity,
racial supremacy, and so on. But the value of Clinton's performance for
the future of a genuinely antiracist white womanhood may well be in its
performance of the present body of one queer white woman struggling with
her place in the family and its history. This, then, is a performance not
only about queer white woman's distances from, but also some of our structuring
intimacies within the "trope-ical family." Further this is a performance
that suggests the tension between those two positions must not be the dirty
racial secret that queer white woman keeps in the family to her racial
advantage. Rather that tension must be what queer white woman brings most
to the work of dismantling both "racial advantage" and the white womanhoods
jockeying for position within it. Such is the fundamentally necessary work
in which "outing"--not only of herself but of her historical relations--must
and can be revalued as one of queer white woman's most genuinely antiracist
power/tools.
Hilary
Harris is Assistant Professor of English at Palomar College.
Notes
1.
I am grateful to the many people who have read, thought about, and helped
clarify the argument this essay hopes to advance, and whose own work always
elevates mine, especially Jodi Brooks, Jon Panish, and Jen Reed. Enormous
thanks also to Lauren Walker whose daily acts of kindness granted me the
time to revise this essay for publication.
2.
George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People
Profit from Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1998), xiv.
3.
David R. Roediger, Towards the Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on Race,
Politics, and Working Class History (London and New York: Verso, 1994),
188.
4.
Jon Parish, The Color of Jazz: Race and Representation in Postwar American
Culture (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1997), xii; Richard
Dyer, White (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 19.
8.
Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn
of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 5.
9.
Ibid. For a discussion of the white supremacist racism of U.S. public policy
during this period, especially in matters concerning education, housing,
access to federal monies and legal remedies, as well as concerning the
status and function of the category "immigrant" in racially coded political
rhetoric, see Lipsitz.
17.
I hesitate to attempt a brief accounting here of such a vast body work,
or of its enormous impact. Perhaps it would be truer in tracing the structuring
contributions of that work to my own thinking in this essay to suggest
instead an outline, an admittedly elliptical, incomplete, and idiosyncratic
outline of this body of work's meanings to one white reader. As an example,
I would begin by acknowledging Toni Morrison's inestimable contribution
through her profoundly generative articulation of the white imagination's
reliance on "tropes of darkness" to effect a "meditation" on, and a construction
of, the white self, as well as her postcolonial insistence on the importance
of analyzing the object/s of that construction: white ways of knowing,
seeing, being, and desiring. At the same time that this essay responds
to the "white imagination" articulated by Morrison, it is also engaged
in a conversation with various white subjects as they are known by peoples
of color, including, among so many others, the once-kind white mistress
who succumbed to "the fatal poison of irresponsible power" in Frederick
Douglass's 1845 autobiography, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass,
an American Slave (Garden City, NJ: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973);
and "the white witch" who sees in Man of Color "the last besieged retreat
/ Of love relentless, lusty, fierce, / Love pain-ecstatic, cruel-sweet"
of James Weldon Johnson's Harlem Renaissance verse (see
Black Writers
of America: A Comprehensive Anthology, eds. Richard Barksdale and Keneth
Kinnamon [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972], 487); and the "dead drunk"
Mary whose lazy racial ignorance places Bigger Thomas in her white girl's
bedroom while the white family lies sleeping, a family from which the "native
son" is tragically excluded, in Richard Wright's 1940 novel Native Son
(New York: Harper & Row, 1966), and the white woman with her "kitchen
in Connecticut," a kitchen "all tricks and white enamel," that depends
for its meaning on the acquiescent presence of Lutie Johnson in Ann Petry's
1946 indictment of institutionalized racism (The Street [Boston:
Beacon Press, 1974], 56). For a theoretical understanding of the economic
dependency of White Woman on the "fact" of Woman of Color in the U.S. context,
this essay also draws on studies such as Lisa Lowe's exploration of Asian
American working women (see her chapter on "Work, Immigration, Gender"
in Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics [Durham:
Duke University Press, 1996]). As an excellent "local" exploration of the
social, political, and economic dependence of "white" on "non-white" (as
well as on the shifting internal hierarchies within whiteness), Rodolfo
Acuna's Anything But Mexican: Chicanos in Contemporary Los Angeles
(London and New York: Verso, 1996) also brings real weight to bear on the
methodologies and findings and motivations of this essay. And, of course,
bell hooks' work continues to challenge and educate white women specifically
to examine our methodologies and motivations at every turn in order not
to replace, as she wrote nearly two decades ago, "white male supremacist
rule with white female supremacist rule" (see hooks'
Feminist Theory:
From Margin to Center [Boston: South End Press, 1984], 70). Undoubtedly,
in this current era, when "whiteness studies" is becoming a consolidated,
recognizable field with its own canons, this call for responsibility
is more important than ever.
18.
As Richard Dyer details most thoroughly in a section of White entitled
"The Embodiment of Whiteness," white racial ideology provokes "special
anxieties surrounding the whiteness of white women
vis-à-vis
sexuality" (29). On the one hand, it is white woman's "duty" to reproduce
the race. On the other, to have the sexual relations that reproduction,
generally speaking, still demands (or . . . allows) among heterosexuals
is to do what white woman is "least able to do and still be white" because
her "very whiteness," her very "refinement," renders "sexuality a disturbance"
to white woman's "racial purity" (ibid.).
19.
Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin, eds., The
Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader (London: Routledge, 1993). Douglas Crimp's
essay "The Boys in my Bedroom" (344-49) and Kobena Mercer's "Looking for
Trouble" (350-59) are both in this anthology.
20.
Kate Davy, "Outing Whiteness: A Feminist/Lesbian Project," Theatre Journal
47.3 (1995): 204.
21.
Dreama Moon, "White Enculturation and Bourgeois Ideology: The Discursive
Production of 'Good (White) Girls,'" Whiteness: The Communication of
Social Identity, eds. Thomas K. Nakayama and Judith N. Martin (Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1999), 188.
22.
Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 189.
27.
Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination
(New York: Vintage Books, 1993).
28.
Michael Warner, "The Mass Public and the Mass Subject" in The Phantom
Public Sphere, ed. Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1993), 240.
29.
In this instance, "heterosexuality" signifies not only, or not even, sexual
acts and practices, but institutional, personal, and community affiliations,
historical relations of power, expectations of gendered subjectivities,
and so on.
30.
See "On Being White," in Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays
in Feminist Theory (Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press, 1983), or for
her related use of the term "affiliation," see "White Woman Feminist: 1983-1992,"
in Frye's Willful Virgin: Essays In Feminism 1976-92 (Freedom, CA:
The Crossing Press, 1992).
31.
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1957), 35, 37.
36.
See also, of course, Dyer's discussion of white femininity and white masculinity
in film and for a critique of hegemonic whiteness that is contextualized
explicitly and importantly within an analysis of the global functioning
of whiteness (and its interface with "Eurocentrism"), see Ella Shohat's
and Robert Stam's Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the
Media (London: Routledge, 1997).
37.
In 1994, when NBC news anchor Tom Brokaw was sent to Normandy to cover
the fiftieth anniversary of the D-Day landing of allied troops, he was
so moved by the stories he encountered there, that he solicited them for
publication as The Greatest Generation (New York: Random House,
1998).
38.
My use of the terms "America" and "American" throughout this discussion
of Saving Private Ryan is not done unconsciously as part of the
ongoing inscription of the United States as the geocultural center of all
of the Americas and, thus, as the rightful (and sole) heir to the name.
Rather I use these terms in this section precisely to play on the swollen
connotative power they continue to exert in the U.S. cultural imaginary
concerning WWII and its "generation."
40.
While Dyer expressly does not argue that "Christianity is of its
essence white," he does argue that "not only did Christianity become the
religion, and religious export, of Europe, indelibly marking its culture
and consciousness, it has also been thought and felt in distinctly white
ways for most of its history, seen in relation to, for instance, the following:
the persistence of the Manichean dualism of black:white that could be mapped
on to skin color difference; the role of the Crusades in racialising the
idea of Christendom (making national/geographic others into enemies of
Christ); the gentilising and whitening of the image of Christ and the Virgin
in painting; [and] the ready appeal to the God of Christianity in the prosecution
of doctrines of racial superiority and imperialism" (17).
41.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities; Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 201.
44.
In a coda to this discussion of White Woman's function in saving Private
Ryan, I have to mark the stunning similarities between this scene in Spielberg's
film and the following, singularly representative "scene" from the Reagan
presidency. As Lipsitz notes, when the president participated in the ceremonies
marking the fortieth anniversary of the Normandy invasion in 1984, the
"imagery created by Reagan and his media strategists . . . encapsulates
the conflation of whiteness, masculinity, patriarchy, and heterosexuality
immanent in the patriotic renewal that revolved around the Reagan presidency"
(74). As he so often did, Reagan employed a personal anecdote of an American
citizen to give shape to that patriotism. He read a letter from the daughter
of a veteran who died shortly before the anniversary and, hence, was unable
to attend and place flowers at the grave of fallen comrades. In her letter,
the white daughter promised the white father that she would "never forget"
and that she would "always be proud" (cited in Lipsitz 74). Lipsitz comments:
In an image broadcast on network newscasts (and
featured repeatedly in an advertisement for the president's reelection
campaign that year), tears filled her eyes as the president read her words,
his voice quivering with emotion.
[74-75]
While Lipsitz rightly determines that this "drama of a father's military
service and a daughter's admiring gratitude reconciled genders and generations
. . . through a narrative of patriarchal protection and filial obligation"
(75), my own emphasis would clearly add that White Woman's investment in,
her attachment to, White Man is the absolutely crucial mise en scène
in which this drama can most effectively be played out.
45.
While Smith's technique is not the focus of this discussion, I bring attention
here to what has been called the "mimicry" quality of the actor's work.
Both the performer and most critics have understood her method to be that
of a "repeater," "an empty vessel." I, though, am challenged by Monica
Munoz Cortes' provocative analysis: "While Smith speaks the actual words
of her characters, her performance is still her perception of these people.
I would argue that her characters are also fictional because they are projections
of her vision. Smith still needs a technique to help her embody these characters--a
technique which can incorporate her artistic insights and the reality of
who these characters are . . . . The notion of the 'empty vessel' appears
inconsistent with the basis of Smith's technique. It is an aspect of her
method which I feel is overstated and perhaps implausible (http://www-mcnair.berkeley.edu
/95Journal/MonicaCortes.html).
48.
I do not mean to confuse Tur's form of overtly racialized seeing and speaking
with what Frankenberg privileges as "race cognizance." For that "discursive
repertoire" signals the white subject's understanding that "race makes
a difference in people's lives and second, that racism is a significant
factor in shaping contemporary U.S. society" (Frankenberg, White Women,
Race Matters, 157). While Tur's language certainly demonstrates those
structuring attributes of racial experience, it does not demonstrate, however,
that Tur understands those attributes or the experience they engender.
49.
Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique
of Actually Existing Democracy," in The Phantom Public Sphere, ed.
Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 14.
54.
According to CSTAR, Creative Stage Artists Management, in the last decade,
Clinton's one-woman shows have included Out Is In (1993), which
debuted at Highways in Santa Monica and moved to New York for a three-month,
held-over run at the Perry Street Theatre, an off-Broadway house; also
All
Het Up (1996), which toured nationally; and
Correct Me If I'm Right,
which recently premiered off-Broadway (http://www.cstartists.com/Pages/kate.html).
According to Comedians USA, an "entertainment broker/producer," in addition
to touring with her one-woman shows, Kate Clinton has appeared on Arsenio
Hall, Comedy Central, Good Morning, America, Nightline,
CNN, C-Span, Entertainment Tonight, TV Food Network, FX and PBS
(http://www.comedianusa.com/female/clinton_kate.html).
She has also hosted
In the Life, the gay news/variety show, collaborated
on WGBH's summer series, The World According to Us, and participated
in a staged reading of Tony Award-winner Tony Kushner's play, SLAVS!
with Olympia Dukakis, Tracey Ullman, and Madeline Kahn at the Walter Kerr
Theatre in New York. Clinton is also a featured columnist for The Progressive
and The Advocate, and she is the author of Don't Get Me Started
(Random House 1998). Clinton served as a writer on
The Rosie O'Donnell
Show during its roll-out period in 1996, and she has four comedy albums
to her credit, all on Whyscrack Records.
58.
Lynda Hart's evocative term "killer lesbian" derives from her analysis
of the ways in which "the woman of color, the prostitute, and the lesbian
have been intimately connected with each other, sometimes nearly conflated
in the imagination of the white hetero-patriarchy," because each exists
in an "ideological web" in which "all three, separately and therefore together,"
do not "facilitate the reproduction of white man" (see Fatal Women:
Lesbian Sexuality and the Mark of Aggression [Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994], 120). The white lesbian, in particular, is the
"secret" within whiteness itself, the threat from within. Citing the killer
white women of Hollywood movies, women such as Sharon Stone's character
in Basic Instinct, Hart finds that because white lesbians are the
threat harbored within whiteness itself, the figure of the "killer" white
woman enters representation as a white lesbian, or through white lesbian
performative codes. As Davy notes, white lesbian performance (such as Shaw's
and Hughes's) has often worked (or re-worked) this deep mine of pop cultural
anxiety about lesbians in order to enact "disreputable" femininities, or,
in a word, "killer lesbians." Davy's own work, of course, questions whether
a "disreputable" femininity is, by definition, an antiracist femininity
in specifically white performance. My analysis of the work of Kate
Clinton takes up Davy's question and, I hope, helps to expand its set of
possible answers.
59.
Jill Dolan, "'Lesbian' Subjectivity in Realism: Dragging at the Margins
of Structure and Ideology," in Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical
Theory and Theatre, ed. Sue-Ellen Case (Baltimore and London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 49, n.24.
63.
Adapted from Making Waves (1985), recorded live at Mt. Holyoke College.
Produced by Kate Clinton and Trudy Wood on Whyscrack Records, Provincetown,
MA.
64.
See Lillian Faderman's Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers: A History of Lesbian
Life in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Penguin, 1991).
65.
Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,"
October
28 (1984): 126.
66.
Adapted from Babes in Joyland (1992), recorded live at Club Cabaret,
Boston, MA. Produced by Kate Clinton and Trudy Woods on Whyscrack Records,
Provincetown, MA.