Department: Economic Analysis Area: Foundations of Economic Analysis Teaching Unit: Economic Theory

Syllabus

ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS II

DEGREE IN ECONOMICS

Academic Course 2009-2010

Core Course Second Cycle, 4° year, 2° semester Credits: 4,5

Teacher: Amparo Urbano Office: 3C08 Office hours: Thursday: 9:30-12:30 Friday: 9:30-12:30

TEXT BOOKS

Gravelle, H. y Rees, R. (GR) (1992), *Microeconomics*, 2nd ed., London:Longman.

Varian, Hal R. (V) (1992), "Microeconomic Analysis" (W.W. Norton, 3e: 1992). Varian is known for being very clear and to-the-point. Less formal than MWG and more selective in content

Mas-Colell / Whinston / Green (MWG) "*Microeconomic Theory*" (Oxford, 1e: 1995) *The indispensable standard. You'll read it cover to cover, probably more than once.*

Jehle, G.A. y Reny, P.J. (2000), *Advanced Microeconomic Theory*, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 2°-edition.

Although an advanced undergraduate text, it covers similar content to MWG and can serve as an introduction.

Silberberg, E. (1990), *The Structure of Economics. A Mathematical Analysis*, 2nd ed., New York:McGraw-Hill

SYLLABUS

Lesson 1. General Equilibrium I: Walrasian Equilibrium

1.1 Introduction.

1.2 Walrasian Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy.

1.3 Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium.

References: (GR) 3E, 16C and Appendix. (V) 17.1-17.4

Lesson 2. General Equilibrium II: Edgeworth's Theory of Exchange

2.1 Edgeworth's Theory of Exchange2.2 Walrasian Equilibrium and Core2.3 Replica Economies and the contraction of the Core.

References: (V) pages. 378-380 y 21.1

Lesson 3. Economics of Welfare

- 3.1 The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare.
- 3.2 Social Welfare functions.
- 3.3 Arrow's impossibility Theorem.

References: (V) págs. 381-382 y 17.7. Starr (1997, 2.8).¹ (GR) págs. 475-77, 485-87 y 502-504.

Lesson 4. Market Failures and the Theory of the second best

4.1 Public Goods.4.2 Externalities4.3 The Theory of the second best.

References: (V) 23.4, 23.5, 23.7, 24.1 y 24.2. (GR) 18C

Lesson 5. Uncertainty and The Economics of Information

5.1 Expected utility and risk aversion.5.2 The Principal-Agent set up.5.3 Moral Hazard problems.5.4 Adverse Selection problems.

References: (V) Caps. 11 y 25.

¹ Ver textos complementarios.