

Civic Virtues, Family Ties, and Political Participation

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Abstract

Are family ties a complement to or a substitute for social capital? We establish a positive relationship between family ties and civic virtues, as captured by disapproval of tax and benefit cheating, corruption, and a range of other dimensions of exploiting others for personal gain. We find that family ties are a complement to social capital, using within and across country evidence from 83 nations spanning a quarter of a century. Our results contrast with earlier findings that family ties are negatively related to political participation, and hence a substitute for social capital. Furthermore, we find that those who are engaged in political activities, like demonstrators, are not necessarily those with the highest civic virtues. Our results indicate that political participation may, on the margin, be motivated by personal gain.

JEL codes: A13, H26, D73, P16, Z13

1 Introduction

Do strong family ties ruin social capital? Banfield (1958) proposes that strong family ties may induce an “amoral familism,” defined as a social equilibrium in which people exclusively trust and care about their immediate family, and expect everybody else to behave in that way. Such a society would have a low civic engagement. An alternative hypothesis is that strong family ties form tight knit networks that may make it harder to break the norm of the group, as family members may influence individuals to conform to the norm. If the family

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norm is to support behavior that builds social capital, then family ties could support high levels of social capital (see for example Weber, 1946; Fukuyama, 1995; Ostrom, 2000).

We find that family ties are strongly associated with attitudes that are important for building societies with higher mutual respect and fiscal capacity. Individuals with strong family ties are more disapproving of tax and benefit cheating, black market activities, corruption, and lying in your own interest. Individuals with strong family ties also think it is more important that children learn tolerance and respect toward others, as well as good manners. These dimensions all support the hypothesis that strong family ties help build a strong civil society, where individuals don't exploit other community members for private benefits.

Our findings contrast and complement the results in Alesina and Giuliano (2011). They find that strong family ties are associated with less civic engagement, indicating that family ties are a substitute for social capital. Individuals with stronger family ties are less likely to discuss politics, join demonstrations and strikes, and engage in voluntary work for political parties. Although individuals with strong family ties are less likely to engage in these civic activities they do not display lower levels of what we label 'civic virtues.' Civic virtue is the cultivation of habits of personal living that are claimed to be important for the success of the community. One such virtue is to not take advantage of other members of society, or impose on them, for personal gain. These virtues may facilitate cooperation among members of a community, and may hence be part of the "good" culture that constitutes social capital as discussed by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008). Such virtues are measured in several dimensions by the World Values Survey, which we use to empirically evaluate the role of family ties using both across and within country variation.

The results indicate that the politically active are less opposed to acting for personal benefit at the expense of others, and hence that personal benefits may be a motivation behind political action. Our finding of a positive relationship between family ties and civic virtues, and the negative relationship of family ties

with political participation in Alesina and Giuliano (2011), indicate a negative relationship between civic virtues and political participation. We establish the negative relationship between civic virtues and political participation in the data using both within and across country evidence.

Our analysis contributes to the understanding of what builds state capacity, as analyzed by Besley and Persson (2010). Disapproval of tax and benefits cheating, as well as disapproval of corruption, are essential parts of building an efficient state. The civic virtues we study may make it less likely that inefficient states emerge and persist as analyzed by Acemoglu, Ticchu, and Vindigni (2011). Furthermore, civic virtues may influence the civil society through cooperation in the labor market as well as regulation in the labor market as studied in Aghion, Algan, and Cahuc (2011) and Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, and Giuliano (2010).

Our results have implications that go beyond state capacity to resolve puzzles in public finance related to the low levels of observed tax evasion despite low detection probabilities. Even among the self-employed, who self report their income and have the largest scope for evading taxes, evasion is low. Six out of seven tax payers with self-employment income do not evade taxes in Denmark, as found in the randomized experiment studied by Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez (2011).¹ Can family ties help to explain this phenomenon? We find that individuals with stronger family ties are more opposed to tax evasion, and as many businesses are run by families,² it may be part of the explanation of the limited evasion rates among the self-employed.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data on our measures of family ties and of civic virtues, as well as the empirical specification. The following section presents the results on civic virtues and family ties, followed by the section analyzing the relationship between civic virtues and

¹Many factors may of course influence cross-country differences in tax evasion, but we find the positive relationship between disapproval of tax cheating and family ties using both across and within country variation.

²See for example Bertrand and Schoar (2006) for a discussion of the significance of family businesses.

political participation. The last section concludes.

2 Data and Specification

We use the integrated European and World Values Surveys (EVS/WVS). For the variables we focus on the survey covers 83 countries for up to five waves. The first wave was conducted in 1981-1984 and the last wave was in 2005-2008. The data includes information on a wide range of attitudes as well as standard demographic variables.

2.1 Family Ties

Our main variable of interest is family ties and how it is related to a range of attitudes. We follow Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and base our measure of family ties on three questions from the WVS. The first question assesses how important family life is in one person's life. Answers are recorded in four categories and range from very important to not that important. We code the variable such that a higher value captures stronger family ties. The second question asks the respondent to agree with one of the two statements: 1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them, 2) One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it. We code alternative 1) as expressing stronger family ties. The third question prompts respondents to agree with one of the following statements: 1) It is the parents' duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; 2) Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children. Again, we code alternative 1) as expressing stronger family ties.

We summarize these three expressions of family ties by extracting their first principal component.³ This is the measure of family ties we use in the analysis below. Results are very similar if we instead use the (normalized) average of

³Also see Alesina and Giuliano (2010) for the construction of the family ties variable.

the three variables. Table 1 presents the summary statistics.⁴

2.2 Civic Virtues

We focus on a set of variables that capture several dimensions of civic virtues. The common denominator among these virtues is a trade-off between personal gains at the expense of members of society. We consider it a civic virtue when individuals don't think it is right to exploit strangers for private benefits. It may be akin to the 'golden rule,' which states one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself.

To capture specific dimensions of civic virtues we turn to a set of questions that assess how justifiable a range of activities are in the eyes of the respondent. The respondent is to say "for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between". The statements are "Cheating on taxes if you have a chance"; "Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled"; "Avoiding a fare on public transport"; "Paying cash for services to avoid taxes"; "Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties"; "Lying in your own interest"; "Throwing away litter in a public place"; "Driving under the influence of alcohol"; "Speeding over the limit in built-up areas"; "Smoking in public buildings"; "Failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle"; "Buy stolen goods." Answers to each statement are coded from 1, never justified, to 10, always justified.

The least justifiable behavior is driving under the influence, with an average of 1.5, and the most accepted behavior is using cash to avoid taxes, with an average of 3.1. The majority of the observations are at the lower end of the range. The mode is 1, never justifiable, across all categories and in a majority of the categories the median is 1. This indicates that the norm is that none of these behaviors are justifiable, which makes it relevant to evaluate if stronger families may be a complement to social capital.

We also consider qualities children can be encouraged to learn at home. The

⁴Our summary statistics are slightly different from Alesina and Giuliano (2011) since we have included the fifth wave of the WVS in our analysis.

two dimensions we study focus on how we get along with people in society. The two qualities which the respondent may consider especially important are "Good manners" and "Tolerance and respect for other people."

We also construct a summary variable of civic virtues based on five of the above variables, from which we extract the first principal component. The components are chosen because they measure important aspects of civic virtues and that they are measured in many countries and waves. The five variables are "Cheating on taxes if you have a chance"; "Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled"; "Avoiding a fare on public transport"; "Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties"; and the child quality "Tolerance and respect for other people."⁵ The variables are ordered such that a higher value of the principle component corresponds to stronger civic virtues in the sense that a higher value represents a stronger disapproval of cheating and more importance on respect for other people.

2.3 Political participation

In section 4 we analyze political participation. We construct a summary variable of political participation from four questions in the World Values Survey. The questions are directed toward political action in several dimensions and are the most frequently asked across countries and survey waves. Individuals indicate if the activity is something they "have done," "might do," or "would never do." The activities are "joining in boycotts"; "attending lawful demonstrations"; "joining unofficial strikes"; and "occupying buildings or factories." These variables have been analyzed in the previous literature. We have ordered the variables such that a higher value of the principal component correspond to a higher level of political participation.⁶

⁵Our results are robust to alternative ways of summarizing civic virtues.

⁶Our results are robust to alternative ways of summarizing political participation and to analyzing the individual questions separately.

2.4 Empirical Specification

We run a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the following form:⁷

$$Y_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Family_ties}_{ijt} + \beta_2 X_{ijt} + \gamma_j \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

where the dependent variable captures the realization of a particular variable for individual i in country j at time t , where time is given by the survey wave. Family_ties_{ijt} is the variable of main interest, which is increasing in the strength of family ties. The controls are included in X_{ijt} . We also include a full set of country-wave fixed effects, represented by $\gamma_j \delta_t$, which accounts for aggregate levels and time trends for each country. Hence, the variation we use to identify β_1 is only due to differences in family ties within countries while also accounting for non-linear time trends within countries.⁸ In section 4 we use the same basic model, where the dependent variable is political participation and the variable of main interest is civic virtues, but we also present some results without the country fixed effects γ_j .

3 Civic Virtues and Family Ties

Stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues across all measures. It suggests that family ties are a complement to these virtues, which are part of what is labeled social capital. As an illustration, cross country evidence on the relationship between family ties and disapproval of tax cheating is presented in Figure 1. We find that in countries with stronger family ties there are stronger civic virtues as the disapproval of tax cheating is stronger. This relationship remains when we study the within country evidence across a broad set of attitudes toward exploiting others for personal gain in the analysis below.

All regressions include a set of demographic controls, as the attitudes we

⁷Our results are robust to using an ordered logit or an ordered probit estimator.

⁸As discussed by Alesina and Giuliano (2011), the estimated coefficient shouldn't necessarily be interpreted as causal.

examine may vary with individual characteristics. We control for age and its square, gender, marital status, education, employment status, income,⁹ and religion. Table 2 and 3 present our findings.

The estimated coefficient on family ties is negative and strongly significant across the specifications in Table 2. Beginning with the first column, stronger family ties are associated with less justification of tax cheating. Hence, tax cheating, which may give private benefits at the expense of the anonymous tax payer, is tolerated less among those with strong family ties. The same goes for benefit cheating as seen in the second specification. The estimated coefficients are quantitatively significant. Consider the tax cheating estimates in the first column. A one standard deviation increase in the strength of family ties corresponds to one and a half times the difference between having a college degree versus less than a high school degree.

Paying with cash to avoid taxes, a form of tax cheating, is seen as less justified among those with stronger ties. Furthermore, not paying for public transit is looked upon less keenly by those with tighter families. Getting private benefits at the tax payers' expense is less tolerated among those with stronger family ties.

One prediction of Banfield (1958) discussed by Alesina and Giuliano (2011) is that strong family ties leads to an equilibrium with widespread corruption. We find the opposite result. Individuals with stronger family ties are more opposed to someone taking a bribe than those with weaker ties, as seen in column 5. It does not seem like strong family ties support an equilibrium with a high level of corruption in this dimension.

Telling the truth is another civic virtue that is cherished more among those with stronger family ties. Stronger family ties are associated with a lower acceptance of lying in your own interest. This attitude may make it harder to sustain an equilibrium with corrupt politicians.

Among the control variables we may note that the self-employed are more

⁹All regressions include a full set of dummies for 10 income groups. The estimated coefficients are not reported.

accepting of tax cheating but less so regarding benefit cheating.¹⁰ Part-time employees are more accepting of benefit cheating and riding public transit without paying the fare. Older individuals, women, Protestants, those married and with higher education are associated with less accepting attitudes across the different dimensions in Table 2.

We present further evidence on how stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues in Table 3. We find that also in these dimensions, which may be more mundane or more personal, manifestations of mutual respect are stronger for those with stronger family ties. Littering in a public place, which may be convenient for the individual but a nuisance to those using the public place, is less tolerated by people with strong family ties. Both driving under the influence and speeding in urban areas, which may give private benefits to the driver but put others at higher risk, are less acceptable to individuals with strong family ties, as seen in the second and third columns. Failure to report damage one has done by accident to a parked vehicle is less tolerated among those with strong ties. Disapproval of smoking in public buildings is stronger among those with tighter family ties, as is the disapproval of buying stolen goods.¹¹

The last two columns of Table 3 analyze the relationship between family ties and two qualities that are singled out as especially important for children to learn at home. The first is good manners. Manners are rules of conduct that may make it easier for people to get along in society. Living by these manners may come at a private cost, holding the door open for someone takes time that could be spent differently, and the good manners provide benefits to others in society, for example the person you hold the door for. Individuals with stronger family ties think that it is more important that children learn good manners. Also in this dimension we find that stronger family ties are associated with

¹⁰This lines up well with Kleven et al's (2011) finding that self-employed indeed cheat more on taxes compared to employed earners.

¹¹Alesina and Giuliano (2011) also studied immigrants using the European Social Survey (ESS), although it was hard to draw strong conclusions from their analysis. We can't, however, use the ESS data since it lacks information on the civic virtues we study.

stronger civic virtues.

We find the same result for the second child quality, tolerance and respect for other people, which may be one of the fundamental civic virtues. The stronger the family ties, the more important individuals think it is that children learn tolerance and respect for other people. This also points to a mechanism for the transmission of civic virtues, individuals with strong family ties stress the importance of teaching children tolerance and respect for others. This inter-generational transmission mechanism may explain the presence of these civic attitudes within families with strong ties.

As Banfield (1958) studied family ties in Italy it may be relevant to examine if Italy is different. We find that Italy is not different. Running the same regressions as presented in Tables 2 and 3 with Italy alone produce the same results. The point estimates have the same signs as in the full sample and, even though the sample is much smaller, in most cases the estimates are strongly significant.

We find that in the dimension of civic virtues, habits of personal living that are claimed to be important for the success of the community, family ties are a complement to social capital. Our findings stand in contrast to Alesina and Giuliano (2011). They find that family ties are associated with less civic engagement, like participation in political activities, and conclude that family ties are a substitute for social capital.

What can reconcile these different results? It could be that individuals with strong family ties have a tighter time constraint due to more family obligations, and that these individuals have a higher cost of being engaged in civic activities. It's, however, hard to evaluate this hypothesis with the available data.¹²

Our results indicate that lower civic engagement is not associated with lower levels of civic virtues. On the contrary, those who are politically active are not necessarily those with the highest civic virtues. We explore these implications in the next section.

¹²The WVS has questions on how much time one spends with family and other groups that would seem to help in this respect. However, the questions aren't asked in sufficiently many waves and countries to allow a meaningful analysis.

4 Civic Virtues and Political Participation

A negative relationship between civic virtues and political participation is implied by our finding of a positive relationship between family ties and civic virtues, and the negative association between family ties with political participation in Alesina and Giuliano (2011). We also estimate this relationship directly in our data. It holds both across as well as within countries.

The cross country relationship between civic virtues and political participation is displayed in Figure 2, which shows a negative relationship.¹³ In countries where civic virtues are relatively high, political participation tends to be lower.¹⁴ The relationship also holds when estimated on the micro data using both cross country and within country variation.

The results using cross country variation are presented in the first two columns of Table 4. In the first column we regress political participation on civic virtues, individual controls as in Tables 2 and 3, and wave fixed effects. No country fixed effects are included. We find a negative and strongly significant relationship. The estimate is quantitatively significant. A one standard deviation increase of civic virtues corresponds to the difference in political participation between the middle and the lowest income groups (political participation is increasing in income). We add the measure of family ties to the controls in column 2, as it has been found to have a strong relationship with political participation. We find that both civic virtues and family ties are negatively related to political participation, and both factors are strongly significant.

In the following two specifications we remove all the cross country variation by including country fixed effects interacted with wave fixed effects. Now the coefficient estimates are identified solely from within country variation. The coefficient estimate in specification 3 is negative, strongly significant, and similar

¹³The variable 'civic virtues' is increasing in respect for others and disapproval of cheating. The variable 'political participation' is increasing in political participation. Both variables are the first principal component of several measures of civic virtues and political participation, respectively. Our results are robust to alternative specifications.

¹⁴The country averages in Figure 2 are computed after partialling out individual demographic characteristics and wave fixed effects.

to the first column. Results in column 4, where we also include family ties are slightly stronger now that the cross country variation has been removed.^{15,16} The quantitative significance of civic virtues is similar to that of family ties, based on the impact of a one standard deviation increase of each variable.

Thus far we have included all countries in the sample. It could be that the relationship is different in more or less developed countries. In specifications 5 and 6 we restrict the sample to OECD countries.¹⁷ The association between political participation and civic virtues is more than one third stronger in specification 5, where cross country variation is included, compared to the full sample in specification 2. When we remove the cross country variation in column 6 the results are again stronger, by more than a quarter, than the full sample in column 4. We conclude that the negative relationship between civic virtues and political participation is stronger among developed countries.

5 Conclusion

Are family ties a complement to or a substitute for social capital? Our first main result is that family ties are a complement to social capital, in the domain of civic virtues. We find that individuals in strong family networks are substantially more disapproving of tax and benefit cheating, corruption, and a range of other activities which involve a personal benefit at the expense of other individuals.

Our second main result is on the motivation behind political action. We find that individuals with weaker civic virtues are more likely to be politically active. Those who are less opposed to exploiting others for private gain tend to join the demonstration or boycott more frequently than those with stronger civic virtues. It could be that those who are politically active participate for personal benefits, which is less approved by individuals with strong civic virtues

¹⁵The estimated coefficients on the individual controls are similar to those reported by Alesina and Giuliano (2011).

¹⁶The results are similar if we study the individual components of political participation rather than their principal component.

¹⁷We include all the 34 countries who were OECD members as of December 9th, 2010, in this group.

and hence more costly for them. The level of participation is of course influenced by a range of factors, but our results indicate that political participation may, on the margin, be motivated by private gain.

We argued that the dominant norms are to not accept tax cheating and other ways of exploiting or imposing on others based on the averages in Table 1. It could of course be that in some families with strong ties the norm is that one takes advantage of others by for example cheating on taxes and benefits. Our analysis of the data clearly speaks against this as the dominant norm across families, as stronger family ties are associated with less acceptance of exploiting others for personal gain. We also find that individuals with stronger family ties think it is more important that children learn to respect others. It provides an intergenerational transmission mechanism for civic virtues, which may explain the presence of civic virtues in tighter family networks.

Our results support the idea that tightly knit groups, such as families, can promote habits that may be important for the success of the community, as suggested by Weber (1946). Our findings provide a constructive role for families, as they may support communities with high levels of civic virtues, in contrast to Banfield's (1958) detrimental prediction of an amoral familism in tightly knit families. Strong families benefit both family members as well as society as a whole.

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Figure 1. Family ties and tax cheating across countries.





Figure 2. Civic virtues and political participation.



Note: Demographic variables have been partialled out.

Table 1. Summary statistics.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Parents' responsibilities	1.782	0.413	1	2
Respect and love for parents	1.827	0.378	1	2
Family important in life	3.864	0.400	1	4
Cheat on taxes	2.358	2.315	1	10
Claim benefits	2.368	2.325	1	10
Pay cash to avoid tax	3.103	2.588	1	10
Someone accepting a bribe	1.735	1.715	1	10
Lying in your own interest	2.797	2.332	1	10
Ride public transit without fare	2.482	2.389	1	10
Litter in a public place	1.755	1.572	1	10
Driving under the influence	1.532	1.375	1	10
Speeding in built-up area	2.227	1.931	1	10
Failing to report damage	2.140	2.049	1	10
Smoking in public building	3.369	2.698	1	10
Buy stolen goods	1.768	1.730	1	10
Good Manners	0.765	0.424	0	1
Tolerance and respect for others	0.676	0.468	0	1
Joining in boycotts	2.50	0.66	1	3
Attending demonstrations	2.28	0.74	1	3
Joining strikes	2.71	0.55	1	3
Occupying buildings	2.83	0.42	1	3
Female	0.516	0.500	0	1
College/university degree	0.109	0.312	0	1
High school degree	0.323	0.468	0	1
Age	41.5	16.2	15	101
Married	0.604	0.489	0	1
single	0.231	0.422	0	1
Employed, full-time	0.373	0.483	0	1
Employed, part-time	0.068	0.252	0	1
Self-employed	0.087	0.282	0	1
Catholic	0.318	0.466	0	1
Protestant	0.124	0.329	0	1
Orthodox	0.086	0.281	0	1
Income groups	4.551	2.441	1	10

Table 2. Family ties and civic virtues.

	Is it justifiable to:					
	Cheat on taxes if you have a chance	Claim benefits you are not entitled to	Pay cash to avoid taxes	Ride public transit with no ticket	Someone accepting a bribe	Lie in your own interest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Family ties	-0.172 (0.006)***	-0.105 (0.005)***	-0.208 (0.014)***	-0.164 (0.006)***	-0.102 (0.004)***	-0.191 (0.008)***
Female	-0.260 (0.011)***	-0.110 (0.011)***	-0.338 (0.032)***	-0.118 (0.012)***	-0.144 (0.008)***	-0.240 (0.018)***
College or university	-0.121 (0.020)***	-0.195 (0.020)***	0.026 (0.054)	-0.087 (0.021)***	-0.173 (0.014)***	-0.091 (0.038)*
High-school	-0.094 (0.014)***	-0.122 (0.014)***	0.009 (0.035)	-0.092 (0.015)***	-0.093 (0.010)***	-0.073 (0.027)**
Age	-0.016 (0.002)***	-0.020 (0.002)***	-0.030 (0.006)***	-0.034 (0.002)***	-0.018 (0.002)***	-0.028 (0.003)***
Age squared	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)**	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)***	0.000 (0.000)***	0.000 (0.000)
Married	-0.148 (0.016)***	-0.129 (0.016)***	-0.182 (0.043)***	-0.156 (0.017)***	-0.090 (0.012)***	-0.225 (0.024)***
Single	-0.094 (0.022)***	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.110 (0.059)	0.059 (0.023)*	-0.035 (0.016)*	-0.041 (0.034)
Employed (full-time)	-0.023 (0.014)	-0.054 (0.014)***	0.015 (0.039)	-0.060 (0.015)***	-0.025 (0.010)*	-0.067 (0.022)**
Employed (part-time)	0.025 (0.023)	0.078 (0.024)***	0.151 (0.069)*	0.097 (0.024)***	0.016 (0.017)	-0.024 (0.037)
Self-employed	0.170 (0.021)***	-0.071 (0.022)**	0.143 (0.075)	-0.038 (0.022)	0.031 (0.016)*	0.081 (0.040)*
Catholic	-0.057 (0.018)**	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.130 (0.047)**	-0.127 (0.019)***	-0.033 (0.014)*	-0.132 (0.026)***
Protestant	-0.124 (0.021)***	-0.076 (0.020)***	-0.009 (0.065)	-0.141 (0.022)***	-0.099 (0.016)***	-0.168 (0.033)***
Orthodox	0.012 (0.031)	0.053 (0.029)	-0.060 (0.067)	0.121 (0.033)***	-0.079 (0.021)***	-0.052 (0.045)
R-squared	0.114	0.109	0.139	0.138	0.093	0.120
Observations	170672	168858	26673	158010	173680	69093

Notes: Answers in the questions are coded from 1, never justified, to 10, always justified.

All regressions include a full set of country times wave fixed effects, and dummies for 10 income categories.

Robust standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table 3. Family ties, civic virtues, and child qualities.

	Is it justifiable to:						Child Qualities:	
	Litter in a public place (1)	Drive under the influence (2)	Speed in built-up area (3)	Fail to report damage (4)	Smoke in public buildings (5)	Buy stolen goods (6)	Good manners (7)	Tolerance and respect for others (8)
Family ties	-0.087 (0.006)***	-0.081 (0.005)***	-0.089 (0.010)***	-0.119 (0.009)***	-0.195 (0.014)***	-0.142 (0.006)***	0.028 (0.001)***	0.009 (0.001)***
Female	-0.128 (0.013)***	-0.257 (0.011)***	-0.365 (0.023)***	-0.166 (0.022)***	-0.293 (0.033)***	-0.191 (0.011)***	0.008 (0.002)***	0.039 (0.002)***
College or university	-0.073 (0.026)**	-0.044 (0.022)*	0.254 (0.040)***	0.264 (0.074)***	-0.059 (0.054)	-0.155 (0.021)***	-0.063 (0.004)***	0.040 (0.004)***
High-school	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.039 (0.016)*	0.112 (0.026)***	0.196 (0.059)***	0.007 (0.037)	-0.111 (0.015)***	-0.022 (0.003)***	0.024 (0.003)***
Age	-0.025 (0.002)***	-0.012 (0.002)***	-0.037 (0.004)***	-0.039 (0.004)***	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.037 (0.002)***	-0.003 (0.000)***	0.002 (0.000)***
Age squared	0.000 (0.000)***	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)***	0.000 (0.000)***	-0.000 (0.000)***	0.000 (0.000)***	0.000 (0.000)***	-0.000 (0.000)***
Married	-0.057 (0.017)***	-0.077 (0.015)***	-0.102 (0.029)***	-0.111 (0.030)***	-0.286 (0.044)***	-0.127 (0.015)***	0.007 (0.003)*	0.003 (0.003)
Single	0.003 (0.024)	0.022 (0.021)	0.097 (0.043)*	0.037 (0.042)	0.029 (0.061)	0.009 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.004)***	0.015 (0.004)***
Employed (full-time)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.023 (0.014)	0.066 (0.029)*	-0.039 (0.028)	-0.030 (0.041)	-0.037 (0.014)**	-0.003 (0.003)	0.009 (0.003)**
Employed (part-time)	0.022 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.076 (0.049)	0.045 (0.046)	0.115 (0.069)	0.027 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.008 (0.004)
Self-employed	0.002 (0.027)	0.051 (0.024)*	0.186 (0.057)**	-0.046 (0.044)	0.079 (0.078)	0.038 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)
Catholic	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.091 (0.035)**	-0.118 (0.031)***	-0.183 (0.049)***	-0.059 (0.017)***	0.019 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.003)**
Protestant	-0.085 (0.026)**	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.069 (0.044)	-0.119 (0.039)**	-0.233 (0.069)***	-0.114 (0.021)***	0.021 (0.004)***	-0.012 (0.004)**
Orthodox	-0.070 (0.029)*	-0.054 (0.025)*	0.016 (0.047)	-0.262 (0.071)***	-0.097 (0.063)	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.006)**	-0.002 (0.006)
R-squared	0.077	0.072	0.156	0.096	0.127	0.089	0.130	0.054
Observations	65513	68560	27641	38191	27338	98404	146678	180592

Notes: Answers in the first six columns are coded from 1, never justified, to 10, always justified. The child quality variables are coded as 1 if the quality is mentioned and zero otherwise. All regressions include a full set of country times wave fixed effects, and a full set of dummies for 10 income categories.

Robust standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table 4. Civic virtues and political participation.

Dependent variable: political participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civic virtues	-0.102 (0.003)***	-0.075 (0.003)***	-0.100 (0.003)***	-0.081 (0.003)***	-0.103 (0.005)***	-0.104 (0.005)***
Family ties		-0.15 (0.004)***		-0.118 (0.004)***	-0.144 (0.006)***	-0.144 (0.006)***
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave fixed effects	Yes	Yes			Yes	
Country*wave effects			Yes	Yes		Yes
Full sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	OECD only	OECD only
R-squared	0.085	0.091	0.164	0.166	0.13	0.185
Observations	149835	120697	149835	120697	52797	52797

Notes: The variables political participation, civic virtues, and family ties are the first principle components of several variables as defined in the text.

The individual controls are the same as in tables 2 and 3.

Robust standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.