July 19-21, 2000 Valencia Spain

 PROGRAMME  (Also available in PDF here)
Last minute changes at the end of the page


      9.00 to 10 Registration

     10,15 to 11,30 Parallel Sessions

    A: Complexity and Games (Chair: Gossner, O.)

            Hernandez, P. and Urbano, A.
            Pseudorandom Processes: Entropy and Automata

            Hernandez, P., Urbano, A and Vila, J.
           The Complexity of a Strategy

            Gossner, O.
           Sharing a Long Secret in a Few Public Words

    B: Applied Game Theory I (Chair: Sempere, J.J.)

        Van Tassel, E.
        Product Quality under Confidential Pricing

         Moner. R. , Sempere, J.J. and Urbano,A.
         Equilibrium Distribution System under Retailer's Strategic Behavior.

        Sempere, J.J, Moner, R. and Urbano,A.
        Product Quality and Distribution Channels

    C: CORE (Chair: Stefanescu, A.)

        Borm, P., Calleja, P. Hamers, H y Klijn, F.
        On the Balancedness of a Multi Machine Sequencing Game

        Levinsky, R.
        Balanced Solutions for TU-Games

        Stefanescu, A
        On the Structure of the Core of Balanced Games.

    D: GP-I: Cost-Sharing Models (Chair: García-Jurado, I.)

        Llorca, N., Meca, A., Molina, E., Pulido, M. and Sánchez-Soriano, J.
        Sharing the Cost of an Educational Network in Alicante Province

        Llorca, N., Pulido, M. and Sánchez-Soriano, J.
        Why not to use Game Theory?

        Garcia, M.D., and Garcia-Jurado, I.
        Cooperation in Queuing Models

11,30 to 12 Coffee Break

12 to 13,30 OPENING PLENARY SESSION                                       Chair: A. Urbano

Ehud Kalai

Strategic Polarization (joint with Adam Kalai)

13,30 to 15,30 Lunch

15,30 to 16,45  Invited Sessions

    A: Bargaining I (Organizer: Clara Ponsatí)

        Ponsatí, C.
        Search and Bargaining in Simple Markets

        Cardona, D.
        Multilateral Bargaining under Proportional Rules

        Cunyat, A, Olcina., G. and Calabuig, V.
        Commitment and Choice of Partners in a Negotiations with a Deadline

    B: Social Choice (Organizer: Salvador Barberá)

         Barbera, S.
        Some Dynamical Aspects in Social Choice

        Berga, D., Bergantiños, G., Massó, J. and Neme, A.
        Voting by Committees with Exit.

16.45 to 17,15 Coffee Break

17,15 to 19 Parallel Sessions

    A: Topics in Non-Cooperative Games I (Chair: Radzik, T.)

        Keiding, H. and Abdou, J.
        Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Strong Solvability of Games Forms

        Hansen, M. and Vermeulen, D.
        Computation of Strictly Perfect Equilibria

         Fernandez Saez, M.J, Zoroa, N. And Zoroa, P.
        On a Ruckle Problem in Discrete Games of Ambush

        Radzik, T.
        Equilibria in Constrained Matrix Games

        B: Auctions (Chair: Orzach, R.)

        Corbella, T.
        Declining Price Anomaly and Discrimination in Multiunit Auctions

        Gavious. A. and Sela, A.
        Auctions with Bounds

        Orzach, R., Einy , E. and Sela, A.
        Dominance Solvability of Second Price Auctions with Differential Observations

        C: NTU Games (Chair: Calvo, E..)

        Rafels, C. And Vilella, M.
        Average Monotonic Games with Non-Transferable Utility

        Orshan, G., Valenciano, F. And Zarzuelo, J.M.
        The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, The Core and NTU Bankruptcy

        Bergantiños, G., and Masso, J.
        The Chi-compromise Value for Non Transferable Utility Games

        Calvo, E. and Peters, H.
        Cardinal-Ordinal Invariance Solutions

        D: GP-II European Union (Chair: Bilbao, J.M.)

        Laruelle, A. and Valenciano, F.
        Inequality in the Distribution of Power among the EU Citizens, 1958-1995

        Lewinsky, R. and Soukenik, A.
        Bicameral System for the Enlarged EU: A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Redistribution of Power in the European Decision-Making

        Bilbao, J.M., Fernandez, J.R, Jimenez, N. And Lopez, J.J.
        Voting Power in the European Union Star Game.


9,00 to 10,15 Parallel Sessions

        A: Evolutionary Games (Chair: Arce, D.)

            Haller, H., Baron, R., Durieu, J. and Solal, P.
           Control Costs and Potential Functions for Spatial Games

            Possajennikov, A.
            Evolution of Preferences in 2X2 Symmetric Games.

            Arce, D.
           The Evolution of Heterogeneity in Biodiversity and Environmental Regimes

            B: Voting Games. (Chair: Valenciano, F.)

            Bugarin, M.
           Vote Splitting, Reelection and Electoral Control: A Unified Model.

            Montero, M. and Morelli, M.
            Stable Demands in Majority Games

            Valenciano, F. and Laruelle, A.
           Power Indices and the Veil of Ignorance

        C: TU Games I. (Chair: Driessen, T.)

            Izquierdo, J.M. and Llerena, F.
           Priority Methods for TU Cooperative Games.

         Norde, H.W.
           Information Sharing Games..

            Driessen, T. and Meinhardt, H.
            Convexity and Average-Convexity of Common Pool TU Games

          D: GP-III Environmental Models. (Chair: Patrone, F.)

           Okada. A.
           A Cooperative Game Analysis of CO2 Emission Permits Trading: Evaluating Initial Allocation Rules.

            Imai, H.
           Some Incentives Issues in the Clean Development Mechanism for the Global Warming Problem

            Patrone, F.
            Cost Allocation Problems Related with Waste Collection and Disposal.

10,15 to 10,45  Coffee Break

10,45 to 12   Invited Sessions

        A: Cooperative Games (Organizer: Carles Rafels)

        Rafels, C.
        Cooperative Games: The State of the Art.

        Bilbao, J.M.
        Dual Games on Combinatorial Structures

        Nuñez, M. and Rafels, C.
        Reduced Marginal Worth Vector and the Core of Assignment Games

        B: Experimental Game Theory (Organizer: Jordi Brandts)

        Brandts, J. and Charness, G.
       Do Market Conditions Affect Preferences? Evidence from Experimental Markets with Excess Supply and Excess Demand.

         Cooper, D.J. and Kagel, J.H.
        Transfer in Signalling Games

12.P.M. PLENARY SESSION                                                               Chair: F. Patrone

Eyal Winter

Scapegoats and Optimal Allocations of Responsibility

13,30 to 15,30 Lunch

15,30 to 16,45 Parallel Sessions

        A: Correlation and Communication (Chair: Koessler, F.)

            Fiestras-Janeiro, G. and Garcia-Jurado, I.
           Proper Solution and Correlated Equilibrium

            Koessler, F.
            Strategic Communication in Games with Incomplete and Certifiable Information.

        B: Information and Games. (Chair: Weinschelbaum, F.)

            Dimitri, N.
            Efficiency and Equilibrium in the Electronic Mail Game: The General Case.

            Escriche, L., Olcina, G. and Sánchez, R.
           Education and Job Assignment: A Signalling Model.

            Weinschelbaum, F. and Tommasi, M.
           The Threat of Insurance

        C: Large Games. (Chair: Rosenmuller, J.)

            Ekes, M.
           General Elections Modelled with Infinitely Many Voters

            Malawski, M.
           "Oceanic" Probabilistic Values.

            Rosenmuller, J.
            The Endogenous Formation of Cartels in Large Markets

        D: GP-IV Topics in Game Practice (Chair: Borm, P.)

         Mas-Mañez, X.
         Leader-Follower Equilibria in a Two-Stage Model

         Catilina, E.
        Information Acquisition Games in Cournot Oligopolistic Markets: A Three Stage Approach.

         Borm, P.
         On Evaluating the Graph Competition

16.45 to 17,15 Coffee Break

!7,15 to 18,30 PLENARY SESSION                                                    Chair: Y. Tauman

Pradeep Dubey

Competitive Prizes: When Less Scrutiny Induces More Effort

FRIDAY, 21 July

9,00 to 10,15 Parallel Sessions

        A: Bargaining II (Chair: Rusinowska, A..)

            Potters, J. and Sudholter, P.
           The semi-reactive bargaining set

            Flamini, F.
            Two-Player Bargaining Games with Continuation Game Dependent from the Initial Agreement

            Rusinowska, A.
          Bargaining Model with Preferences Described by Sequences of Discount Rates and Sequences of Bargaining Costs

        B: Applied Game Theory II. (Chair: Filipovich, D.)

            Harrison, C.
           Collusion and Dynamic Perfect Competition

            Meca, A., Timmer, J., Garcia-Jurado , I. and Borm, P.
            Inventory Games

            Filipovich, D.
            Choosing one's Identity

        C: TU-Games II (Chair: Veldman, L.)

           Sales, J. , Izquierdo J.M. and Rafels, C.
           Cost Allocation in Library Consortia

           Tijs, S., Llorca, N., Timmer, J. , M. and Sánchez-Soriano, J.
            Balancedness of Semi-Infinite Discrete Transportation Games

            Veldman, L.
           Representation of Multi-Level Games

        D: GP-V Political Science Models I (Chair: Ball, M.)

            Carreras, F. and Freixas, J.
           Semivalue Versatility and Application

            Bodo, P.
           An Evolutionary Game for the Analysis of the Russian Economic Transition

            Kim, H.
           Sequential Crisis Bargaining

            Ball, M. A..
           How Coalitional Theory Overcomes the Problem of the Bicameral Postulate for Voting Games

10,15 to 10,45 Coffee Break

10,45 to 12  Parallel Sessions

        A: Topics in Non-Cooperative Games II (Chair: Arribas, I.)

         Arribas, I. and Urbano, A.
         Repeated Games with Probabilistic Horizon

        B: Experimental Game Theory II (Chair: Ponti, G.)

        Broseta, B., Fatas, E. and Neugebauer, T.
        Forward Induction and equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points: An Experimental Study.

        Peñarrubia, C., Olcina, G. and Fatas, E.
         Specific Investment and Coordination Failures.

         Gantner, A., Montgomery, R. and Ponti, G.
         Solomon´s  Dilemma: an Experimental Study on Dynamic Implementation.

        C: Simple Games  and Topics in Game Theory (in Spanish) (Chair: Llongueras, M.)

         Sales-i-Ingles, V.
         Función característica múltiple

        Amer. R. and Gimenez, J.M.
        Indistinguishable Games by Semivalues

        Amer. R. and Gimenez, J.M.
        An Axiomatic Characterization of the Banzhaf Solution for Games with Coalition Structures

         Llongueras i Arola, M. and Magaña Nieto, A.
        Optimum Cuota in R-Majority Simple Games.

            D: Coalition Formation (Chair: Olaizola, N.)

            Revilla, P. and Alcalde, J.
           Strategy-Proofness and the Coalition Formation Problem

            Iñarra, E., Kuipers, J. and Olaizola, N.
           The Absorbing Sets Solutions in Coalition Formation Systems

12 to 13.30 PLENARY SESSION                                                                   Chair: G. Olcina

Thomas R. Palfrey

The quantal response approach to equilibrium in games: theory and experiments.

13,30 to 15,30 Lunch

15,30 to 16,45 Parallel Sessions

        A.: Topics in Cooperative Games (Chair: Erauskin, A.)

        Klijn, F. and Massó, J.
        Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model.

        Sotomayor, M.
        The Strategy Structure of the College Admissions Stable Mechanisms.

        Arín, J. , Kuipers, J. and Vermeulen , D.
        Some characterizations of Egalitarian Solutions on Classes of TU-Games.

        Erauskin, A. and Arín ,J.
        Egalitarian Allocations and Cost Games.

        B: TU-Games III (Chair: Algaba, E.)

        Rossi, G.
        Axiomatizations of Value-Functions for Communication Situations

        Branzei, R., Tijs, S. and Timmer, J.
        Transmission of Knowledge in a Cooperative Environment

        Algaba. E., Bilbao, J.M. and Fernandez, JR.
        On the Complexity of Computing the Myerson Value by Dividends

        C: GP-VI Political Science Models II. (Chair: Gambarelli, G.)

         Sacconi, L.
         A Game Theoretical Model for Developing Company Codes of Ethics

        Alonso, J.M.
        A New Power Index for Games for a Coalition Structure

        Bertini, C., Gambarelli, G. and Stach-Janas, I.
        Values and Algorithms for N-person Games

16,45 to 17,15 Coffe Break

17,15 PLENARY SESSION                                                                Chair: I. García-Jurado

Stef Tijs

Cooperative Game Theory with an Open Eye Outside

Last minute changes:

The talk  On a Ruckle Problem in Discrete Games of Ambush  by Fernandez Saez, M.J, Zoroa, N. And Zoroa, P, changes from Topics in Non-Cooperative Games II to Topics in Non-Cooperative Games I

In Bargaining II there is a new talk:  The semi-reactive bargaining set  by Potters, J. and Sudholter, P.