Copyright (c) 2002 First Things 126 (October
2002): 27-29.
The title question has been asked frequently in recent
years, both within and outside the field. I think that it can be answered
rather easily: sociology has fallen victim to two severe deformations. The
first began in the 1950s; I would label it as methodological fetishism. The
second was part of the cultural revolution that started in the late 1960s; it
sought to transform sociology from a science into an instrument of ideological
advocacy. As a wider public became increasingly aware of these changes,
sociology lost the prestigious status it once occupied in American cultural
life, lost its attraction to the brightest students, and, not so incidentally,
lost a lot of its funding.
I am not a disinterested observer of these
developments. As a young sociologist, still full of enthusiasm for my chosen
discipline, I wrote Invitation to Sociology. It was published in 1963,
before the second deformation began and while the first one still seemed
containable. The little book is still in print and still gets students
interested in sociology. My own view of the discipline has not changed fundamentally
since then, and I do not regret what I wrote at the time. But whenever I am
asked about the book (especially by students), I have to say that the picture I
painted of the discipline bears little relation to what goes on in it today.
The relation is a bit like that of the Marxian utopia to what used to be called
“real existing socialism.”
The 1950s were a sort of golden age for sociology,
even as the first deformation was beginning to develop. There were three
powerful academic centers from which eager young
teachers fanned out across the provincial hinterlands. At Harvard there was the
imposing figure of Talcott Parsons, putting together,
book by book, the theoretical system known as “structural functionalism” and
producing a growing body of active disciples. Parsons wrote terrible prose (it
read like a bad translation from German), but he dealt with the “big questions”
that had been the subject matter of sociology from its beginnings: What holds a
society together? What is the relation between beliefs and institutions? How
does change come about? What is modernity? At Columbia University there were
two other figures, almost as impressive—Robert Merton, who taught what could be
called a more moderate version of “structural functionalism,” and Paul Lazarsfeld, who helped develop increasingly sophisticated
quantitative methods but who never forgot the “big questions” that these
methods were supposed to help answer. And at the University of Chicago there
was still the lively presence of two distinctively American traditions of
sociology—the blend of sociology with social psychology, called “symbolic interactionism,” which began with the work of George
Herbert Mead (who had taught at Chicago most of his life), and the so-called
“Chicago school” of urban sociology, which had produced a whole library of
insightful empirical studies of many aspects of American life. Columbia and
Chicago also sent out their young graduates across the country and,
increasingly, to foreign universities; Europeans came to study sociology in
America and European sociology for a while had the character of an American
missionary enterprise.
What I mean by “methodological fetishism” is the
dominance of methods over content. In principle this could happen with any
method in the human sciences; in fact the methods have been invariably
quantitative. Statistics became the mother science for sociologists. Now, there
can be no question but that statistical analysis has been a useful tool in many
areas. We live in a society comprising millions of people and statistics is
designed precisely to make sense of such a society without having to interview
every one of its members. To say this, however, is a long way from assenting to
the widespread implication that nothing is worth studying that cannot be
analyzed quantitatively.
In order for data to be analyzed statistically, they
must be produced by means of a standardized questionnaire. This means,
inevitably, that people are asked to reply to a limited number of typically
simple questions. Sometimes this works; sometimes it does not. Take the example
of the sociology of religion. One can get useful data by asking people how
often they have gone to church in the last four weeks (leave aside the fact
that, as has been shown, they sometimes lie about this). But then such
questionnaires try to cover beliefs as well as behavior,
and there the meaning of the replies is much less clear. Even such a seemingly
simple question as “Do you believe in God?” will be interpreted by respondents
in so many different ways that their replies are hard to analyze, let alone
capable of helping a researcher construct something like, say, an index of
orthodoxy. This does not mean that the intentions behind these replies could
not be clarified; it only means that survey research is not a good way of doing
so.
The reasons for this worship of quantitative methods
are probably twofold. As often happens in intellectual history, there is a mix
of “ideal” and “material” factors (the sociology of knowledge is the attempt to
sort out such mixes). On the level of ideas, there is the enormous prestige of
the natural sciences, in which quantitative methods are indispensable, and
little sociologists want to be as much as possible like their big brothers in
physics. On the level of material interests, many of those who fund social
research (such as government agencies) want results that are within very small
“margins of error” and can therefore be presented as unassailably scientific
arguments for this or that course of action. This too pushes toward
quantitative methods. In sociology as in many other areas of endeavor, he who pays the piper calls the tune.
Methodological fetishism has resulted in many
sociologists using increasingly sophisticated methods to study increasingly
trivial topics. It has also meant that sociological studies have become
increasingly expensive. Earlier sociologists (such as those of the “Chicago
school”) would go into a community, check into a cheap hotel, and spend the
next months observing and talking to their neighbors.
Latter-day sociologists, as a joke has it, need a million-dollar grant to find
their way to the nearest house of ill repute. Inevitably, the “big questions”
tend to get lost in this version of sociology. Its results can still be useful
to this or that institution (say, a government agency that wants to find out
how many people are making use of one of its programs, and perhaps even what
those people think about it), but they are unlikely to be of interest to a
wider public.
The ideologization of sociology
has been even more devastating. However trivial or simplistic have been the
results of methodological fetishism, at least they have been produced by
objective investigations that merit the name of science. The ideologues who
have been in the ascendancy for the last thirty years have deformed science
into an instrument of agitation and propaganda (the Communists used to call
this “agitprop”), invariably for causes on the left of the ideological
spectrum. The core scientific principle of objectivity has been ignored in
practice and denied validity in theory. Thus a large number of sociologists
have become active combatants in the “culture wars,” almost always on one side
of the battle lines. And this, of course. has alienated everyone who does not
share the beliefs and values of this ideological camp.
The ideological amalgam that is transported by this
propaganda campaign is, broadly speaking, of Marxist provenance. But the
adherents of Marxism proper have considerably shrunk in numbers. (In the wake
of the demise of “real existing socialism,” those who remain have a certain
heroic quality, like adherents of flat-earth theory in the wake of the
Copernican revolution.) The ideology is not so much Marxist as marxisant—in its antagonism to capitalism and to bourgeois
culture, in its denial of scientific objectivity, in its view of the combatant
role of intellectuals, and, last but not least, in its fanaticism. In recent
years this version of sociology has intoned the mantra of “class, race, and
gender.”
The first term of the mantra is still the most visibly
marxisant, except for its substitution of the
working class by other categories of alleged victims, such as, notably, the
people of developing societies as described by theories of neo-imperialism. The
anticapitalism of the ideology is also expressed by
way of environmental concerns and, most recently, in opposition to
globalization. “Race” and “gender,” of course, refer to a variety of victimological categories—racial and ethnic minorities,
women, gays and lesbians (recently expanded to include transvestites and
transsexuals—one wonders whether there are enough of those to make up a
credible group of victims). The ideological amalgam here draws from the
theorists of multiculturism and feminism. Unlike the
doctrines of orthodox Marxism, some elements in the amalgam are in tension with
each other. For instance, how do multiculturalists and feminists negotiate a
topic like “Islamic modesty”? But logical inconsistency has only rarely been an
obstacle to ideological dominance (the Leninists were an exception in their
insistence on relentless conformity). And, as has been amply documented, this
particular ideology, with its stultifying mantra, has become dominant not only
in much of sociology but in many of the other human sciences. Along with
methodological fetishism, this ideological propaganda has been a crucial factor
in the decline of sociology, and not only in America.
I don’t want to exaggerate. Here and there one can
still find sociologists doing excellent work. Since I mentioned the sociology
of religion, let me refer here to the work of Nancy Ammerman,
Jose Casanova, James Davison Hunter, and Robert Wuthnow.
And there are still sociologists who, in one way or another, address the “big
questions,” such as Irving Louis Horowitz and Orlando
Patterson in America, or Anthony Giddens and the
recently deceased Niklas Luhmann
in Europe. But the contributions of these sociologists, none of whom have
created anything resembling a school of thought, only serve to underline the
overall depressing condition of this discipline. It would take an enormous and
sustained effort to reverse this condition. I’m relieved to observe that I am
both too old and too occupied elsewhere to participate in such an effort.
Sociology originated in the attempt to understand the
profound transformations brought about by the processes of modernity. Its basic
question, to paraphrase the question asked in the Passover ritual, was “Why
does this age differ from every other age?” In its classical period, roughly
between 1890 and 1930, sociology flourished principally in three
countries—France, Germany, and the United States. In each country the basic
question took somewhat different forms, due to differing intellectual and
political milieus. Sociology produced such intellectual giants as Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, and powerful schools of
thought derived from their work. Given the structure of modern academic life,
sociology became a distinct discipline and a profession. However, one could
argue that, unlike other disciplines (such as political science or economics),
sociology does not concern itself with a delineated field of human life. It is
a perspective rather than a field (a perspective which, incidentally, I tried
to describe in Invitation to Sociology). This perspective (sometimes
misunderstood, often correctly applied) has greatly influenced virtually all of
the other social sciences as well as the humanities. Perhaps, then, sociology
has fulfilled its purpose and its eventual demise should be seen as less than
an intellectual catastrophe.
Peter L. Berger is Director of the recently founded
Institute on Religion and World Affairs at Boston University.