A study finds that, in Madrid, Vox first gained support among middle- and upper-income groups and later among “modernisation losers”

The research challenges one of the most widespread explanations for the rise of the European far right: the idea that its growth is primarily driven by the so-called “modernisation losers”, that is, economically vulnerable social groups disaffected by globalisation. According to the study, Vox’s entry into and initial expansion in Madrid were led by middle- and upper-income voters, mainly defectors from the People’s Party (PP) and Ciudadanos, rather than by lower-income groups.

To conduct this research, the authors constructed a large database combining electoral results and income levels at the census-tract level (each tract consisting of between one and three polling stations of approximately one thousand voters each within a specific geographical area). Using advanced ecological inference techniques — which infer individual voting behaviour from aggregated group-level data — they estimated vote transfer matrices to identify the origins of Vox’s new voters.

The analysis identifies three main phases. In the first phase, up to the April 2019 elections, Vox took advantage of the crisis within the PP and the political context of the Catalan independence process to consolidate itself as a radical right challenger party. During this period, it strongly introduced the axis of Spanish national identity and primarily attracted high-income conservative voters.

From November 2019 onwards, and especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, the landscape changed. The gradual disappearance of Ciudadanos opened up a new pool of voters for Vox, while mobility restrictions during the pandemic allowed the party to position itself as a critical voice against public health measures. However, in the 2021 regional elections, this stance was largely capitalised on by the PP candidate and current president of the Community of Madrid, Isabel Díaz Ayuso, who succeeded in concentrating much of the right-wing vote around her leadership.

In this scenario, the study detects a significant shift: former left-wing voters — particularly from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and Podemos — began to enter Vox’s electorate, and these voters tended to have lower income levels. By the 2023 regional elections, the probability of voting for Vox had become almost independent of income level for the first time, and the share of former PSOE and Podemos voters within Vox increased, especially among low- and lower-middle-income groups.

The results point to a combination of two phenomena: on the one hand, what has been termed the “wealth paradox” — greater hostility towards certain social changes in affluent environments — and on the other, the gradual incorporation of the “modernisation losers” into support for the radical right. The relative weight of each factor depends both on the economic and territorial context and on the specific political offer, particularly the type of leadership presented by the traditional right-wing party.

At a time when electoral support for Vox is growing at the national level and across different territories, the study underscores that there is no single explanation or voter profile. The Madrid case illustrates a dynamic process in which Vox evolves from being primarily a refuge for high-income conservative voters disenchanted with the PP to incorporating lower-income segments, including voters originating from the left.

This research was supported by several competitive research projects at both the regional level (Valencian Department of Education, Culture, Universities and Employment) and the national level (Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities).

Article reference: Roig R, Espinosa P and Pavía JM (2025). Who votes for Vox? Socioeconomic profiles and electoral shifts in the region of Madrid. Front. Polit. Sci. 7:1717586. doi: 10.3389/fpos.2025.1717586

Link: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1717586/full