Territory competitivity is no longer only meassured by infrastructure but also by the ability to develop, appeal to and retain talent. In the current context, factors like quality of life, flexibility and diversity are determinants.

Key Findings

1.1. Human capital as the main factor of economic resilience.
The OECD (2018) (1) research is conclusive: regions with a higher proportion of workers with tertiary education and a high value-added service sector have a significantly lower risk of job automation. As confirmed in the case of Madrid (2), knowledge-intensive services (programming, consulting) were the most ‘resilient’ sector during the pandemic. Investment in education and skills is not an expense, but the most effective long-term economic development policy. However, this conclusion is reinforced by recent analyses indicating that Artificial Intelligence is set to profoundly transform the nature of work tasks, requiring continuous adaptation of the workforce skills (3). The integration of learning into community resilience is also considered. While organisations strengthened their capacities in management, community leadership and technological adaptation during the pandemic, there is also evidence of the need to create local and territorial learning networks.

1.2. The new Atractiveness Compass: quality of life, housing and connectivity.
According to the 2023 OECD report (4), the most decisive factors in attracting and retaining international talent are no longer just work-related. The ‘compass’ points to three key elements: affordable housing, high-speed internet connectivity, and a quality ecosystem (services, natural environment, cultural offerings). Studies on the pandemic validate this, showing a shift in employment and residence towards suburban and peri-urban areas where these conditions may be more favourable (2). Quality universities continue to act as magnets that signal the existence of a talent pool. Finally, it highlights the importance of reinforcing the urgency of generating or strengthening labour policies with differential aspects for training and attracting talent in peripheral contexts that guarantee sustainability, not only of jobs but also of quality of life, access to housing and technological resources. It is necessary to involve rural networks in the design of policies for attracting talent, connectivity and learning ecosystems.

1.3. Creating desirable cities: the importance of the environment at the workplace.
The pandemic has transformed the work environment drastically, pushing forward the change of paradigm for remote work and hybrid models. This phenomenon is evident in Spain, where the percentage of remote workers went from 4.8 % in 2019 to a 14.4 % in the first quarter of 2024. This increase highlights the relevance of environmental condition for the remote worker for their well-being and productivity. In Barcelona, the proximity to green spaces i highly valued. So are the inside characteristics of the house. The quality of urban public services are another key factor. All these elements integrate the Environment component, which is added to Talent, Technology and Tolerance as the main attraction of urban economic spaces.

1.4. Diversity as the engine of not only equity but also innovation.
The 2018 Global Talent Competitiveness Index report shows that competitive advantage lies not only in having talent, but in managing its diversity. The concept of ‘2D Diversity’ (combining inherent diversity of gender and ethnicity with diversity acquired through experience and training) in leadership teams is key, as it is directly correlated with greater innovation, better market results and the prevention of ‘groupthink’. To this end, organisations are organising work into agile project teams to reap the benefits of diversity, understanding that the end result in terms of innovation and performance requires, above all, more inclusive norms (5).

1.5. The need of a lifelong learning ecosystem (Lifelong Learning).
The digital transformation pace makes skill become obsolete rapidly. It is necessary to create a local learning ecosystem that provides reskilling and upskilling. According to OECD (1), good practice is the creation of 'local skill ecosystem', a need local agents consider critical, pointing out that current policies are usually limitted to 'subsidy delivery' but do not invest in the creation of high level training centres with the latest equipment. This makes it difficult to align talent with real industry needs where companies, education centres and administrations collaborate to make the offer and demand meet (6).

1.6. The talent crisis as a structural challenge for the territory.
Local economic agents confirm a widespread talent crisis, especially in sectors such as tourism and the metal industry. They point to a ‘migration from the tourism sector to other sectors’ and the difficulty in attracting young talent to the industry. There is criticism that public policies focus on subsidising training provision rather than creating high-level training infrastructures with modern equipment, which leads to a mismatch between the training offered and the real needs of businesses (6). In this case, it is worth highlighting the importance of the creation, value and role of cooperation networks in local trade. The experience of networks such as Mercados de Oriente (in the case of Colombia) shows the importance of multi-stakeholder cooperation in sustaining short marketing circuits throughout the value chain, generating benefits not only for producers but also for buyers.

Remote work and economy of the platforms are no longer isolated phenomena but structural elements that lay out a new set of opportunities and challenges.

Key Findings

2.1. Remote work as a tool for territory reconfiguration and inequality enhancement.
Remote work has emerged as a force for territorial reconfiguration that presents a critical duality. On the one hand, it offers an opportunity for residential relocation to the metropolitan periphery in search of affordable housing (6,10). In addition, the Record of Temporary Employment Regulation acted as a mechanism of internal flexibility to cushion the loss of employment and job destruction during the pandemic crisis, with an uneven impact across territories and sectors (11). On the other hand, the data show that it is consolidating as an urban and highly skilled privilege. Studies identify gaps by age, with young people being more prone, and also by gender, although the evidence of a greater propensity among women seems less conclusive (10,12). This trend, together with partial adoption (half of those who could telework in 2021 did not do so), threatens to amplify socio-territorial inequalities (10). A dual strategy is therefore required, combining investment in infrastructure in depopulated areas with active policies on training and digital equity.
Our studies in Madrid confirm that remote work can interact with the housing crisis in different ways. It seems that increasing flexibility with regard to the workplace can facilitate access to housing from less stressed areas, although it remains to be seen whether this could extend the problem to the metropolitan peripheries. Seasonal rentals for professionals and nomads could reduce supply there. On the other hand, studies show that much of the talent, despite being able to, prefers to remain located in very central areas, increasing the problems of gentrification.

2.2. The environmental paradox of remote work: less transport use but higher residentail impact and more non-labour movement.
Remote work generates significant environmental benefits by drastically reducing emissions from commuting (up to 70% CO₂ in cases studied), but these savings are threatened by ‘rebound effects’ (12). Evidence shows an increase in non-work-related travel by private vehicle and energy consumption in households, which can neutralise the initial benefits. To ensure a clearly positive climate impact, it is essential that remote work policies are integrated into a broader framework that includes incentives for residential energy efficiency and the promotion of sustainable mobility (13).

2.3. Urban green spaces: further than quantity, a challenge of equity and accessibility.
The aspiration for a ‘green city’ transcends mere square metres, with recommendations such as the WHO's 10-15 m² per inhabitant and Greenpeace's 3-30-300 rule (3 visible trees, 30% tree cover per neighbourhood, 300 m to the nearest park) emphasising the importance of quality, accessibility and distribution. However, urban biodiversity, although an essential public good, faces inherent inequality in access, exacerbating social division and generating insecurity in vulnerable neighbourhoods. Interestingly, in compact cities such as Barcelona, Madrid and València, per capita income does not correlate directly with the amount of green space. Instead, the geographical location of the residence emerges as the determining factor for access to urban vegetation, showing that environmental justice in the green environment depends critically on where one lives.

2.4. Urban remote work: satisfaction, impact and callenges of city adaptation.
Remote work is a growing urban phenomenon, but its spatial distribution and the influence of urban externalities on its performance have been little studied. To address this gap, the Home Teleworking Satisfaction Index (HTS) has been developed in Barcelona, which considers housing habitability, the built environment, and environmental quality to evaluate the remote work experience. The pandemic has catalysed an intense debate on the impact of remote work on the urban economy, questioning the ‘death of distance’ and its effects on territorial cohesion and regional development, as well as on urban migration patterns. Beyond these questions, the crucial issue arises as to whether today's cities are truly prepared and are optimal environments for remote work from home.

2.5. Post-pandemic challenge: from regulation adjustment to the hybrid work culture.
Following the consolidation of hybrid remote work, valued for its impact on work-life balance and productivity (14), the main challenges have shifted from technological to social and organisational. The evidence identifies three critical challenges that require organisations to go beyond the legal framework:

• The loss of social ties: workers themselves identify this as the main negative aspect and one of the key reasons for not remote work, describing it as a feeling of ‘loneliness’ and ‘depression’ due to the lack of informal contact with colleagues (6,10,14). 
• The difficulty of disconnecting digitally: ‘not disconnecting from work’ and the discomfort of working from home are recurring concerns that highlight the blurring of the boundaries between work and personal life (10,14).
• Lack of expense compensation: The absence of material resources and the transfer of office costs (electricity, equipment) to the worker is another recurring problem (14). 

The best practice for addressing these challenges is to actively develop a hybrid work culture based on trust and well-being, training leaders to manage the flexibility and occupational health of their teams (13,15).

2.6. Practical flexicurity: Record of Temporary Employment Regulation valoration and subsidy management critique.
Business leaders validate Record of Temporary Employment Regulation as an ‘essential’ tool for retaining human capital linked to the workforce in times of crisis and enabling a rapid recovery, unlike the 2008 crisis. However, they strongly criticise the management of digitalisation aid (such as the Digital Kit) for its excessive bureaucracy, rigid annual deadlines and lack of strategic planning (e.g. consulting aid came after equipment aid), which has limited its real transformative impact (6).

Digitalisation and recent crises have accelerated profound transformations in the use of urban and rural space, affecting commerce, tourism, and the provision of basic services.

Key Findings

3.1. Rise of the polycentric urban model and the new work geography.
Studies on Madrid and Zaragoza (2.7) show that we are not facing the ‘death of the centre’. A polycentric urban model is taking shape: city centres are maintaining their role as hubs for interaction and ‘reactive’ services (commerce, finance, leisure), while the periphery is gaining new prominence as a logistics hub (driven by the ‘delivery economy’ and the growth of courier services) and as a place of residence and teleworking for knowledge-based services. Studies of Madrid show us the multi-scalar nature of urban logistics networks, observing growth throughout the metropolitan periphery in warehouses and logistics facilities, but also within the central city, associated with the so-called ‘last mile’.

3.2. Paradox of commercial revitalisation: homogeneisation, deserts and cannibalism.
The pandemic has accelerated commercial reconfiguration processes in urban spaces, driven by changes in consumption patterns and the digitisation of the sector. Large retail chains have led a ‘return to the centre’ with flagship store models, located in iconic areas and tourist hotspots (7). While this revitalises certain areas, it also leads to a homogenisation of the landscape, as well as the creation of ‘commercial deserts’ in declining areas and working-class neighbourhoods (18). Local actors confirm this trend, estimating a 10% loss in the commercial fabric since 2019, mainly local and neighbourhood commerce, while noting the proliferation of empty premises (6) in neighbourhoods and new developments, as well as ‘cannibalisation’ between shopping centres, or forcing others to transform radically.

3.3. Urban dynamics: types of streets and service commerce transformation.
In medium-sized cities in Catalonia, categorising urban streets into Attraction, Stay, Walkability and Residual is essential to understanding the evolution of retail trade and the vitality of urban centres. Each type of street fulfils a specific function, directly influenced by socio-economic dynamics and the constant transformation of the commercial landscape. Attraction Streets in urban centres are changing: essential shops are moving to the outskirts and there is an increase in restaurants and services, indicating a clear shift towards tourism, leisure and experiential consumption. Stay Streets complement this trend, offering rest areas that enhance the visitor experience. Walkability Streets act as vital infrastructure, efficiently connecting all these areas and facilitating pedestrian movement. In contrast, Residual Streets remain on the margins, with little activity and no contribution to this new central vitality. Thus, the evolution of commerce not only changes the type of establishments, but also redefines the purpose and interaction between different types of streets, creating a more specialised and experiential urban centre.

3.4. Two sides of proximity:comerce sector validation.
Retailers confirm the ‘revaluation of proximity’, with 46% of Valencian consumers shopping close to home. However, they also validate the paradox: the loss of 10% of the local commercial fabric since 2019 and the proliferation of empty premises, while large chains are reorganising and business models based on the circular economy and fast food convenience are growing exponentially (6). In the case of Zaragoza, local and neighbourhood retailers view the reconfiguration of the sector with concern, although they highlight proximity as one of their main values and attractions, particularly in working-class neighbourhoods. For their part, public policies to support local and neighbourhood commerce have been very insufficient during the post-pandemic period, focusing on loyalty programmes and direct incentives for consumption and on aid for the digitisation of the sector, with little focus on the real needs of small businesses. Other aid has focused on intervening in public spaces to improve their quality and boost commerce, in some cases creating ‘open shopping centres’ (18, 19).

3.5. The hybrid commerce paradox: a urban consumer dilemma.
In medium-sized cities in Catalonia, consumers face a dilemma. On the one hand, they are attracted by the convenience of shopping online or in large stores. On the other hand, they want to support local businesses. This situation creates a paradox in their purchasing decisions. This tension manifests itself in various ways among users of urban centres: from the ‘conscious consumer’, who experiences a conflict between their values and practicality, to the ‘urban experience consumer’, who prioritises leisure and culture, or the ‘functional consumer’, who seeks efficiency, and the ‘stroller’, whose purchases are more spontaneous. Each profile navigates and resolves, in their own way, this complex scenario of options in the heart of the city.

3.6. Cycledistribbution and the consumer paradox: sustainaility vs convenience in the 'last mile'.
Urban goods distribution is changing, and cycledistribution is emerging as a key sustainable alternative for last-mile logistics. Consumers prioritise speed, price and convenience without being influenced by socio-demographic factors in terms of environmental and social awareness.

3.7. Child mobility in Barcelona: past Eixample.
The results of our study reveal that the apparent functionality of neighbourhoods such as Barcelona's Eixample district does not always translate into good autonomous mobility for children. In these neighbourhoods, heavy traffic and a lack of green spaces generate feelings of fear and limit child development. Interestingly, the neighbourhoods with the highest scores on the Child Autonomous Mobility Index (MAI) are the old historic centres of annexed towns such as Sants, Gràcia, Les Corts and Sant Andreu. In contrast, the neighbourhoods with the lowest MAI scores are the outlying ones, which are characterised by their vulnerability, insecurity, dispersion and lack of adequate spaces and uses for children.

3.8. Financial exclusion: the dark side of digitalisation in countryside territory.
The same optimisation strategies that are a sign of resilience in urban areas (online banking) cause exclusion in rural areas. The study on Aragon (9) identifies ‘Type I financial exclusion’ (total absence of branches in small, ageing municipalities) and ‘Type II’ (saturation of the few remaining offices in larger towns and cities). This process, driven by post-2008 banking restructuring and the effects of the pandemic, exacerbates the vicious cycle of depopulation and ageing.

3.9. From tourism onoculture to intelligent diversification.
The analysis of tourist destinations (8) reveals two contrasting models. On the one hand, there is the vulnerability of ‘insularity’ and tourism monoculture (Balearic Islands), which generates overtourism and pressure on resources. On the other hand, there is the model of medium-sized cities such as Osuna, which are committed to intelligent diversification, capitalising on intangible assets to create innovative products such as ‘film tourism’ (the ‘Game of Thrones’ effect). This is complemented by the rise of ‘creative tourism’, based on the co-creation of experiences with local talent.

This section focuses on analysing the causes and territorial manifestation of the rise of Tourist Apartments (TAs). It explores how an initial deregulation framework, combined with the platform economy, has led to massive and geographically concentrated growth, generating serious social impacts and transforming public perception of the phenomenon from an economic opportunity to an urban conflict.

Key Findings

4.1. The origin of deregulation and exponential growth.
The phenomenon stems from the exclusion of TAs from the Urban Leasing Law (LAU), which allowed for massive proliferation. The case of Valencia is paradigmatic, with an increase of more than 6,000 TAs between 2015 and 2024, evidencing a supply bubble (16,17).

4.2. Extreme geographic concentration.
The problem is not diluted across the city, but rather intensified in very specific neighbourhoods. In Valencia, districts such as Poblats Marítims (16.3%), Ciutat Vella (13.7%) and L'Eixample (9%) account for most of the supply and, therefore, most of the conflicts, demonstrating a strong correlation between tourist appeal and the concentration of TAs (16).

4.3. Direct impact on the residential habitability.
The research identifies a clear set of negative effects: increased housing costs (rent and purchase), difficulty in finding suitable housing, commercial gentrification with the loss of essential services for residents, and conflicts between residents that deteriorate the quality of life in the most affected neighbourhoods (16,17).

4.4. From economic opportunity to social conflict.
Press analysis on Valencia and Zaragoza shows that public discourse has shifted dramatically. While initially there was talk of ‘development’ and ‘changes in use,’ the current debate focuses heavily on ‘complaints and problems with TAs’ (42.7% of news items in Valencia), indicating that the phenomenon has reached a point of social and political saturation (16).

4.5 Institutional response: government, regulations and learnt lessons to manage the rise of TAs.
The following points address the ability (or inability) of administrations to manage the rise of TAs. The difference in policy responses between territories, the lack of integrated planning, and the lessons that can be learned from reactive versus proactive management models are analysed.

4.6. Government failure: incoherence and late reaction.
The main conclusion is the lack of a proactive and coordinated tourism and urban planning policy. Regulation has been reactive, arriving late when the problem was already out of control, as demonstrated by the three failed attempts to pass specific regulations in Valencia, compared to the inaction in Zaragoza (16,17).

4.7. Different trajectories as warning.
The comparison between Valencia (conflict phase and post-saturation regulation, with a moratorium approved in May 2024) and Zaragoza (early phase of regulation) does not show two different problems, but rather two moments in time of the same phenomenon. The experience of Valencia serves as a warning about the consequences of inaction and lack of early regulation (17).

4.8. The urban adjustment vs. municipality regulations dilemma.
It has been observed that many municipalities resort to municipal ordinances to zone or limit TAs, when the natural and most appropriate instrument for regulating these uses is urban planning. This denotes a lack of integrated, long-term planning and a more short-term response to social pressure (16,17).

4.9. Gobal-local challenge.
The final reflection of the studies raises the central dilemma of governance: Can such a globalised problem, driven by international platforms and capital, be managed effectively only at the regional or local level, or does it require a robust state framework that establishes clear rules of the game for all? (16,17). In this case, it is important to articulate multilevel governance that allows for the combination of institutional efforts, linking social leadership and intersectoral cooperation networks. Promote social innovation as a driver of adaptation in the face of systemic crises, with an emphasis on community empowerment that generates self-management and sustainability.

During the course of the project, it has been possible to delve deeper into some experiences of social innovation and urban governance that have provided important lessons in the context of COVID-19 and post-COVID-19. This text aims to highlight some of the conclusions reached and serve as a tool for analysing the various social and political processes. In this regard, the following points are noteworthy:

5.1. The COVID-19 crisis pushed forward social innovation initiatives.
Even in those areas where the social fabric was partially disabled, COVID-19 facilitated the reactivation of this fabric through the mobilisation of various resources aimed at alleviating the most immediate effects of the crisis. Some studies have linked this rapid response to the severity of the health crisis or to the DANA in Valencia, which raises the question of whether a similar response can be expected in the face of other types of crises that are less obvious in the short term (e.g., the environmental crisis). From a comparative perspective between Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia, which have been the main cities where the project has been developed, we see how in all cases COVID-19 led to an increase in social innovation initiatives.

These initiatives generally arise in times of crisis, but their focus is changing. While the 2008 crisis led to the emergence of initiatives linked to the social economy, the COVID-19 crisis has led to initiatives focused on mutual and neighbourhood support.

Athough the moments of crisis implied the activation of the fabric, they have also damaged the participation of already affected people, since they have had to face the crisis consequences in their personal life. In conclusion of the divrse experiences of these citis, the moments when crisis occur, the activation of social innovation initiatives takes place, even if they can fall short in medium-term, but they do have an impact in the long-term. This aspect is studied in the following item.

5.2. The spatial component as a fundamental result to understand the emergence of social innovation initiatives.
Unlike other studies that pointed to the vulnerability factor of neighbourhoods (or in other cases a certain socioeconomic level) as a determining factor in the emergence of these initiatives, we have observed that the fact that neighbourhoods or districts had previous experiences of social mobilisation has been the most influential factor in reactivating or strengthening these experiences, regardless of vulnerability. This ‘sedimented’ component represents a form of territorial capital, ready to be mobilised in times of crisis.

This spatial component has been fundamental in the three cities studied.

• For Madrid, we notice that the pre-existent fabric allowed the articulation of neighbourhoods into support networks during the COVID-19 and the incorporation of new agents and generations in a neighboural movement that had been held until then.
• For València, in post-COVID-19 crisis like the DANA, the reconstruction initiatives have been particularly efficient in spaces where self-organisation had happened before like Parc Alosa, while places lacking of experience weren¡t able to accomplish the same feat and waited for institutional aid. This implied more resolution obstacles.
• For Barcelona, what is most remarkable is the lack of relation between vulnerability and participation; usually, intermediate neighbourhoods are the places where these initiate apear and develop the most thanks to an existent associate network.

The conclusion is that the territory is slowy but steadily creating this type of initiatives of social innovation with less resistance and that their activation in times of crisis is more efficient.

5.3. The transformation of initiatives due to COVID-19.
Although the initiatives arose with the main objective of responding to the immediate effects of COVID-19 by forming mutual aid groups, in many cases they were not merely welfare-based, but rather there was a certain shift in their objectives from more solidarity-based and welfare-oriented goals to more transformative ones; which is why we have identified them as social innovation initiatives. In this sense, there has been a desire for social transformation through a change in power relations and an attempt to transform urban governance, calling for more participatory forms and criticising the difficulty of institutions in responding to social demands. Furthermore, these initiatives arose with the desire to be permanent and, therefore, with the idea of going beyond the specific moment of COVID-19.

We have to connsider the paradox of counting on public institutions to promote social innovation initiatives and the fact that those innovation, the creativity and momentum appear when facing the lack of an administrative action.

The study of each city is compared and leaves important lessons on the complex role public institutions play regarding social innovation initiatives.

• First, the role of public institutions should act as support only when resources must be available for the social fabric and remain in the back row once they have.
• Second, public institutions should provide protection and reconaissance for the social fabric to turn it into a legitimate agent in public life.
• Third, the proposal of looking for 'infiltrators', members of local public institutions willing to play the roles above that would allow many social initiatives to grow; they would fight the obstacles the social fabric finds when trying to dialogue with public administration.

5.4. Post-COVID-19 and the social fabric reactivation.
The social fabric reactivated after the pandemic and the configuration of a discourse about mutual care allowed social mobilisation experiences taking this idea of mutual care and dependance between people, environment and public space. Particularly among COVID-19 related conversations, it has been noticed how the care matter and the creation of 'caring commmunities' in the urban area has been increasing. This is specially noticeable in Madrid and València, where post-COVID-19 collectives were formed within this logic. For example, the 'No a la Tala' ('No Felling') movement in Madrid came to be in a caring community that understood how environment is intrinsically related to people and so caring for it is just as important. In València, the 'Comités de Reconstrucció i Emergència' ('Reconstruction and Emergency Committees') retrieved this idea during the DANA crisis, that people are not isolated and mutual care is a necessity.

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